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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite a long-term increase in consumer welfare, free trade continues to be a topic of heated 
debate. It has gained new prominence with the election of Donald J. Trump as US president. His 
protectionist platform promised to ‘Make America Great Again’ by withdrawing from or 
renegotiating ‘bad’ trade agreements.  
 
Protectionism is a politically successful strategy despite evidence that it is a self-defeating trade 
policy, weakens the economy and leads to a reduced standard of living. It ignores the 
complexities and dynamics of the global market, likely retaliation by other nations and the cost 
borne by American consumers and businesses.  
 
This thesis uses business examples to show the complexity and benefit of global supply chains, 
challenging the idea that increased protectionism can strengthen the economy. It shows how 
politicians either don’t understand or misrepresent the dynamics of the economy and that past 
protectionist policies have failed to achieve their stated objectives. Using the examples of the 
boycotting of oil palm products and the local food movement, it shows how self-serving special 
interest groups use environmental and social welfare arguments to influence consumers and 
activists to support intervention in the market, which goes against both their own best interests 
and those whom they are trying to ‘help’, and how unfiltered prices lead to better environmental 
outcomes, and higher standards of living for both producers and consumers.  
 
Governments sign Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to obtain economic benefits and to further 
their foreign policy objectives. Although there has been a significant reduction in tariffs since the 
implementation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), more recently a 
proliferation of agreements has increased business transaction costs. In addition, the growing 
focus on non-tariff trade barriers has provided opportunities for special interest groups to reduce 
competition by tilting regulations in their favour.  
 
Ultimately, trade agreements are driven by two competing objectives: the economic free trade 
argument for reciprocal access to markets versus the mercantilist political desire to increase 
11 
 
exports and reduce imports. While free trade still maximizes overall economic benefits today, 
politicians generally craft trade policy that puts the interests of producers ahead of consumers. 
The best counterbalance is to reduce the scope of trade agreements to measures that actually 
reduce trade barriers.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economists generally agree that free trade produces the best overall results for the community at 
large. However, it is not economists who make the decisions on trade policy: it is politicians. 
This thesis examines why protectionism is often a politically successful strategy despite its 
negative economic consequences. 
 
Mounting support for protectionism in the United States contributed to the election of Donald J. 
Trump in November 2016. Voters supported Trump’s economic platform because they were 
disenchanted with jobs losses, lower wages and growing inequality which they blamed largely on 
globalization. In addition, voters also support trade restrictions for other ‘qualitative’ reasons 
such as health concerns, preserving the environment, and social justice considerations. Both 
government and business use such concerns to influence voters/consumers to support measures 
that run contrary to their own best interests. 
 
This paper asks the question “can the benefits of free trade still be realized in the 21st century?”, 
and concludes that consumers can and do benefit from trade liberalization. However, government 
and business increasingly seek to manage trade rather than eliminate restrictions. In the process, 
the ‘benefits’ of intervention are diverted from consumers to producers. Nonetheless, consumers 
and voters support interventionist governments, because they (mistakenly) believe that without 
government intervention, big businesses and other nations would not behave in a socially 
desirable manner.  
 
By exposing some of the myths surrounding the benefits of global trade, this study shows that 
isolating the economy from the international market will only lead to declining competitiveness 
of not only the protected industry but also other industries, a disrupted global supply chain, 
higher consumer prices, and likely retaliation by other trading partners, 
 
The current political climate is less favourable to free trade than a few years ago. Recent ‘Free 
Trade Agreements’ are, in fact, agreements to manage trade, usually for the benefit of the 
dominant participants in the negotiation. The trend towards the inclusion of peripheral issues 
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such as environmental and labour standards, and the protection of intellectual property shifts 
negotiations away from trade liberalization, and diminishes the comparative advantages of those 
countries which stand to gain the most from access to foreign markets.  
 
Sharp reversals in public policy can and do occur, and the circumstances under which these 
dramatic shifts occur are important. In the middle of the 19th century, and after a long public 
debate, Britain repealed the Corn Laws and abandoned mercantilist policies, beginning a short 
period of free trade.1 Markets for products manufactured in Britain increased both domestically 
and abroad, and the price British workers paid for the necessities of life dropped. The mercantile 
system involved considerable levels of public sector spending on defence and enforcement of 
customs regulations. The shift to a free trade policy relieved pressure on public expenditure and 
paved the way for the independence of colonies which were tied to Britain under the mercantile 
system. The general improvement in prosperity that resulted from the liberalization of trade also 
improved public finances.  
 
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section deals with the mounting scepticism over 
the benefits of international trade. The second looks at the theoretical basis of our understanding 
of the potential benefits of trade. The third section considers how the economy works in practice 
and why trade has become a political issue. The fourth section explains the four main 
constituencies in society and how their incentives and interaction affect trade policy. The final 
section outlines the structure of the thesis.  
 
1. Rising Scepticism about International Trade  
 
Trade – or the voluntary and mutually beneficial exchange of goods or services – is a unique 
characteristic of the human species. Trade has increased over time as transportation and 
communication costs have declined. People tend to accept that they benefit from an exchange of 
goods and services with others within a nation’s borders. But attitudes to trade with individuals 
beyond those borders vary over time. National boundaries tend to impede trade, but trade 
                                                 
1 (Helpman 2011) pp. 46 and 179. The Corn Laws was a major piece of protectionist legislation that was passed in 
the British parliament by the landed aristocracy in 1815, and it was repealed in 1846 when Britain adopted a free 
trade policy.  
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liberalization policies in the late 20th century contributed to a dramatic increase in the volume 
and value of goods traded internationally. 
 
A protectionist backlash against the rapid increase in international trade – often referred to as 
‘globalization’– is now evident in some jurisdictions. The withdrawal of the United States from 
the negotiations aimed towards the creation of a Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership (TPP) and the 
renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) currently underway are 
consequences of the popular backlash against trade liberalization that U.S President Trump 
exploited with his campaign promise to ‘Make America Great Again”.  
 
International trade and globalization are under attack not only in the US but also in Europe. In 
June 2016, 52% of Britons voted for “Brexit” in a referendum held to decide whether or not to 
Britain should leave the European Union.2 This result was attributed, in part, to frustration with 
European Union officials in Brussels, and resentment among laborers who blame trade for 
declining income and lost jobs.  
 
The collapse of the Doha Round of international trade negotiations among the member countries 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2008, and the protests against globalization 
organized to coincide with meetings involving the leaders of the world’s most prosperous nations 
(e.g. at the G7 and G20 meetings and the annual Davos Forum) are further indications that trade 
liberalization is both difficult to realise and increasingly unpopular. 
 
This thesis uses the current debate over international trade policy to examine the roles which four 
distinct groups within society – government, business, special interest groups, and consumers – 
play in shaping trade policy. It shows that the uncertainty over international trade regulation and 
the propensity of governments to actively intervene to either encourage or discourage trade 
creates opportunities which large businesses, multi-national corporations (MNCs) and special 
interest groups are quick to exploit.  
 
                                                 
2 (Nelson 2016) 
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Understanding the attitudes and objectives of two sub-groups in society – special interest groups 
and the general public – is an important part of this discussion. Popular discontent over the 
adverse short-term consequences of trade liberalisation and pressure from special interest groups 
to persuade the general public that individual sacrifices are required for the ‘greater good’ 
provide justification for government intervention. For their part, politicians and government want 
to be seen to be doing something about issues perceived as problems by the electorate. Using 
trade policy as an example, this thesis shows how the public sector’s enthusiasm ‘to do 
something’ imposes significant costs on individuals, and provides some businesses with 
opportunities to profit and avoid competition that would not exist in a competitive market.  
 
2. Trade Theories from Adam Smith to Frédéric Bastiat 
 
2.1 Adam Smith  
The benefits of trade have been examined from a theoretical perspective only since the 18th 
century. Adam Smith drew attention to the human propensity “to truck, barter, and exchange one 
thing for another” in his 1776 classic work, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations (‘Wealth of Nations’). He recognized that this unique propensity encouraged 
specialization or division of labour which enabled dramatic increases in productivity. He used 
the example of the fabrication of pins to illustrate how the benefits of the division of labour 
involved innovations of three distinct types: 
 
This great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the 
division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is 
owning to three different circumstances; first to the increase of dexterity in 
every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of time which is commonly 
lost in passing from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention 
of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable 
one man to do the work of many.3 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 (Smith 1904/1776) Book I, Chapter 1 Of the Division of Labor, 5. 
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Figure 1 The Pin-making Factory-1760  
 
Source: Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, ed. Diderot and d'Alembert 
(1751-1772). Online at <http://www.alembert.fr/> 
 
In modern terminology, these productivity-improving innovations would be thought of as 
improvements in the skills of the labour force, minimization of lost production due to re-tooling, 
and automation. Smith acknowledged that the wealth of nations meant providing ordinary people 
with “all the necessaries and conveniences of life” through “the division of labour” 
(specialization) and free trade.4 Perhaps his most important realization was the collective benefits 
that derive from the self-interested actions of individuals: as he phrased it, “It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their 
regard to their own interest”.5  He realized that competition was necessary to drive the process of 
specialization and railed against the mercantilist trade policies of his time in general, and the 
granting of monopolies to a privileged few in particular. He was also one of the first to draw 
attention to the propensity of business owners to conspire together in order to limit competition 
to the detriment of the consumer:   
                                                 
4 (Smith 1904/1776) Volume I, Introduction and Plan of the Work, 1. 
5 (Smith 1904/1776) Book I, Chapter 2 Of Principle which gives Occasion to the Division of Labour, 2. 
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The interest of [businessmen] is always in some respects different from, and 
even opposite to, that of the public…. The proposal of any new law or 
regulation of commerce which comes from this order…. Ought never to be 
adopted, till after having been long and carefully examined…. with the most 
suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men… who have generally an 
interest to deceive and even oppress the public.6 
 
Because they are relevant to the discussion later in this thesis, there are two additional aspects of 
Smith’s work which should be noted. First, he recognized that international trade involved 
additional and sometimes significant risks in comparison with doing business in the home market 
where institutional arrangements were well known, were not subject to abrupt change and were 
followed because they facilitated business transactions. Second, he considered production of 
food an economic activity with strategic importance.  
 
2.2 David Ricardo 
Early in the 19th century, the British political economist David Ricardo extended Smith’s 
insights by formulating a ‘theory of comparative advantage’. He explained in his book On the 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817) that gains from trade would occur if 
nations specialized in the production of goods in which they had a comparative advantage, using 
production of wine and cloth as examples. He pointed out that although Portugal could produce 
both wine and cloth more cheaply than Britain, the efficiency differential between Portuguese 
and English wine was much larger than that between Portuguese and British cloth. He then 
showed that both countries would be better off if Portugal concentrated its resources on wine 
production and Britain devoted its resources to producing cloth.7 
  
Ricardo agreed with Smith that lower prices paid for imported products saved resources and 
increased the purchasing power of the populace. Thus, all strata of society shared the gains from 
trade because: 
 
If, in consequence of the price of foreign commodities being cheaper, a less 
portion of the annual produce of the land and labour of England is employed in 
                                                 
6 (Smith 1904/1776)Book I, Chapter 11 Of the Rent of Land, 264.  
7 (Ricardo 1817/1971) Chapter 7 On Foreign Trade, 13-31. 
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the purchase of foreign commodities, more will remain for the purchase of 
other things.8 
 
Pursuit of comparative advantage therefore allocates resources (labour, capital and natural 
endowments) to their most productive use, generating more output more efficiently and 
encouraging mutually beneficial interaction among the peoples of the world: 
 
Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its 
capital and labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This 
pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good 
of the whole. By stimulating industry, by rewarding ingenuity, and by using 
most efficaciously the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, it distributes labour 
most effectively and most economically: while, by increasing the general mass 
of productions, it diffuses general benefit, and binds together by one common 
tie of interest and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the 
civilized world. It is this principle which determines that wine shall be made in 
France and Portugal, that corn shall be grown in America and Poland, and that 
hardware and other goods shall be manufactured in England.9  
 
2.3 Frédéric Bastiat 
The French economist and statesman in the 19th century, Frédéric Bastiat marvelled at how the 
population of Paris got fed every day: 
Here are a million human beings who would all die in a few days if supplies of 
all sorts did not flow into this great metropolis. It staggers the imagination to 
try to comprehend the vast multiplicity of objects that must pass through its 
gates tomorrow, if its inhabitants are to be preserved from the horrors of 
famine, insurrection, and pillage. And yet all are sleeping peacefully at this 
moment, without being disturbed for a single instant by the idea of so frightful 
a prospect.10 
 
Like Smith, for Bastiat, the miracle of the feeding of Paris day after day, year in and year out, 
was that it was the result of a ‘bottom-up’ process involving the actions of thousands of 
individuals coordinated only by their own self-interest.  
                                                 
8 (Ricardo 1817/ 1971) Chapter 7 On Foreign Trade, 4. 
9 (Ricardo 1817/ 1971) Chapter 7 On Foreign Trade, 11. 
10 (Bastiat 1845/1996) 
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However, the most important contribution of Bastiat to the argument presented in this thesis 
comes from what has been labelled his ‘broken window fallacy’: if a window is broken, its repair 
is obviously economic activity: a glazier is summoned, the window is replaced, and money 
changes hands. However, if the window is not broken, the funds that would otherwise be used 
paying for the repair of the window are put to other uses, and the individual involved continues 
to enjoy the benefit of the window as well as the benefits of having funds to spend elsewhere. 
Bastiat described the difference between his two examples as the ‘seen’ versus the ‘unseen’, and 
pointed out that a good economist needs to think about the ‘unseen’ as well as the ‘seen’.11 
 
Economics is probably haunted by more fallacies than any other discipline. First, it is often 
difficult to determine whether a change in the economy is the result of a change in regulations or 
the result of something else. Second, both bad economists and the populace at large tend only to 
see the immediate and obvious effects of new regulations rather than long term effects which are 
less obvious. The impact of a change in the regulatory environment is usually felt by a specific 
segment of society, which is likely to be vocal in its own defence, while the long term and less 
obvious effects are more widely dispersed across the community at large. When the future 
benefits are dispersed and the short term adverse consequences are concentrated, it is relatively 
easy for a politician like US President Trump to put forward a platform that cherry-picks a few 
facts but distorts the broader picture.  
   
3. How the Economy Works and Why Trade has become a Political Issue 
 
3.1 Schumpeter 
The overall conclusion of this thesis is that consumers stand to benefit from more trade 
liberalization, and will be harmed if recent efforts to reverse liberalization are successful. The 
arguments used in support of this conclusion rely heavily on the insights of Joseph Schumpeter. 
Schumpeter, an Austrian economist and a professor at Harvard University in the early 20th 
century, is best remembered for coining the term ‘creative destruction’ as a shorthand expression 
describing the process of technical change. Although Schumpeter acknowledged that an 
economy could grow if more resources were employed by a fixed array of technologies, he 
                                                 
11 (Bastiat 1845/1996) 
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defined development in terms of the qualitative change in economic activity that occurred when 
technical change made it possible to obtain more output by using a given array of resources more 
efficiently.  
 
Competition among firms drives the process of technical change and creates an economy which 
evolves over time. Schumpeter employed a comprehensive definition of technical change, one 
which has been interpreted as any ‘change in the way things are done’. In the absence of 
government intervention, 12  the pace and trajectory of technical change is dictated by the 
willingness of the market to absorb products and services which improve living standards. 
Higher living standards come chiefly from the availability of the same products (and services) at 
lower cost, or the appearance of previously unavailable products (and services) which benefit 
consumers.  
 
In Schumpeter’s opinion, the dynamism of capitalism is a process of innovation, the subsequent 
investment that accompanies the diffusion of the innovation, and then an inevitable recession. 
John M. Keynes, a British economist, considered recessions an unfortunate side-effect of laissez-
faire capitalism which it was the legitimate business of the state to supress. Schumpeter regarded 
recessions as necessary if the full benefits of the investment boom which accompanies the 
adoption of superior technology are to be realised. A recession is beneficial because it: 
 
…. fulfils what the boom promised. And this effect is lasting, while the 
phenomen[a] felt to be unpleasant are temporary. The stream of goods is 
enriched, production is partly reorganised, costs of production are diminished 
and what at first appears as entrepreneurial profit finally increases the 
permanent real incomes of other classes.13  
 
Thus, Schumpeter’s development process consists of innovative activity which improves the 
productivity of resources, provides entrepreneurial profits in the short run, and increases 
purchasing power and extends the process of specialization and trade in the medium and longer 
term. It is this cycle of innovative booms, and subsequent reorganization, and the absorption of 
new technology that successively reinvigorates capitalism. Schumpeter however, stresses that 
                                                 
12 (Boulding 1969) 
13 (J. A. Schumpeter, 1934/1968) p. 245. 
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this process of reinvigoration occurs only when recessions are ‘normal’, implying that this is not 
always the case. Government intervention frequently prevents the ‘normal’ process of continuous 
adjustment to a constantly changing economic situation. Inevitably, the underlying economic 
reality will become evident, and an ‘abnormal recession’ or a crisis will occur. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union was a prime example.  
 
Government intervention alters the pace and trajectory of technical change, reducing the level of 
consumer welfare relative to that which would be generated by development in the absence of 
government intervention: for example, protectionist measures tend to slow the pace of innovation 
(the rate at which the ‘way things are done’ changes) and hence reduce the competitiveness of 
domestic products in foreign markets. This insight may be rephrased as ‘a tariff is a tax on 
exports’. 
 
Schumpeter’s insight regarding the cause and consequences of crises is particularly relevant to 
this discussion of the implications of recent trends in trade policy for business management. He 
suggested that crises only occurred when government intervention exaggerated the normal ebb 
and flow of economic activity. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, he elaborated on this 
idea, pointing out that any crisis created demand for additional intervention, which would 
increase the amplitude of the subsequent recession, increasing the clamour for still more 
interventions.14   
 
Later, Robert Higgs, an American economist and economic historian, traced the influence of a 
succession of crises on the growth of government in the US in his book Crisis and Leviathan.15 
He argues convincingly that growth in government had been the consequence of a ratchet effect: 
although government involvement in the economy may shrink in the aftermath of a crisis, it does 
not return to its pre-crisis level. It therefore increases over time. The Depression of the 1930s 
was a particularly significant crisis which led to a dramatic increase in government intervention, 
particularly the New Deal policies of President Roosevelt. The impact of the sharp increase in 
tariffs on imports under the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1932, the decision to de-link the US dollar 
                                                 
14 (Schumpeter 1942)  
15 (Higgs 1987) 
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from the gold standard in 1934, and the retaliatory reaction to these policies elsewhere in the 
world are important lessons in light of current US initiatives to restrict imports. Schumpeter 
himself, a professor at Harvard University at the time, wrote of the Depression that “what we are 
witnessing is an economy that is not permitted to work”.16 
 
The ideological support government received for intervention to thwart the destructive phase of 
the development cycle led Higgs to a pessimistic conclusion; “Laissez-faire is unrealisable, 
too…. In today’s world, no substantial group of people is prepared to accept the personal 
responsibilities and to shoulder the personal risks inherent in genuine capitalism – which is, after 
all, as Joseph Schumpeter emphasised, a system of creative destruction” (original emphasis).17 
Yet this ideological support for intervention of this type carries with it an ‘unseen’ cost: it 
enables innovative firms to retain entrepreneurial profits, and prevents the general public from 
capturing the full benefits of economic development.  
 
The final contribution Schumpeter made to our understanding is how an evolving economy may 
be threatened by a growing anti-capitalist sentiment within the population at large. Schumpeter 
blamed some of this trend on the tendency towards large-scale industrial enterprises in which 
employees specialised in a specific function and lost sight of the totality of the process which 
designed, built and sold products in the market. But he singled out “underemployed 
intellectuals”,18 who existed largely thanks to the dramatic improvements in productivity made 
possible by technical change, specialisation, and trade, as the main force propagating anti-
capitalist sentiment among the population. Each time the short term dysfunctional consequences 
of creative destruction distracted (increasingly large) segments of society from the benefits it 
provided in the medium and longer term. As Peter Drucker, a founder of modern management, 
commented in an article comparing Keynes and Schumpeter, “…. [sixty] years since [Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy] appeared have surely proved Schumpeter to be a major prophet”.19  
In the US context, Daniel J. Ikenson, a director at the Cato institute, pointed out that 
scapegoating trade for problems real and imagined is nothing new. He wrote: 
                                                 
16 (Schumpeter  1934/1968) p.16. 
17 (Higgs 2005) p. 297. 
18 (Schumpeter 1943/1968) p.354. 
19 (Drucker 1983) p. 5 
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Blaming the Japanese, Mexicans, Chinese, and other foreigners for domestic woes 
ingratiates politicians to excitable elements of the electorate and helps them direct 
voter anger away from their own records. It has become a kind of quadrennial 
tradition ever since the NAFTA debate took center stage in the 1992 election.20 
 
The recent election of the US President Trump provides a vivid example of this phenomenon. 
The discontent of ‘excitable elements of the electorate’ is significant because it reinforces an 
‘ideology of intervention’ which underlies the ratchet effect of government growth over a 
succession of crises. As Schumpeter maintained, this intervention is not in the best interest of the 
ordinary citizens in the medium and longer term, because it impedes the process of technical 
change which improves productivity and hence living standards. Growth in government is 
expensive, and must be paid for either through higher taxes or debt (a tax on subsequent 
generations), the burden of which falls disproportionately on the middle class. The consumer and 
taxpayer pay higher prices for items consumed, because intervention impedes competition, slows 
or diverts technical change and prevents the transfer of entrepreneurial profits (to the population 
at large via lower prices) and also requires higher taxes (to support a burgeoning public sector).  
  
3.2 Michael Porter 
Michael Porter, who is considered to be one of the most important theorists in the field of 
strategic management, echoes many of the ideas expressed by Schumpeter.21 He argues that a 
nation’s competitiveness depends on the capacity of individual firms to innovate and this 
innovation is driven by competitive pressure. Once a company achieves a competitive advantage, 
it can only sustain it through relentless improvement. If it stops improving, it will be overtaken 
by competitors. He points to the link between innovation and change, and says that the latter is 
often resisted by companies (one of the great examples is the Eastman Kodak Company 
discussed in Chapter 2). 
 
Many requests for governments’ help from business are actually counterproductive in the long 
run and only create requests for more help. Porter argues that one reason governments implement 
counterproductive policies in pursuit of national ‘competitiveness’ is because they have much 
                                                 
20 (Ikenson 2016) 
21 (Porter 1990) 
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shorter time horizons than businesses. It takes a lot longer for a company to create a competitive 
advantage than one election term. Therefore, most government policies favour easy-to-see short 
term benefits like subsidies and tariffs, and these can inadvertently undermine innovation and 
dynamism.  
 
3.3 Protectionism Doesn’t Protect from Technological Change  
The very word “protectionism” is appealing because it implies that those who favor protectionist 
measures want to guard and defend Americans from forces which undermine their economic 
welfare. However, it does not achieve these goals. Measures to protect particular businesses 
don’t shield them from the technological changes that are among the biggest disruptors of the 
economic status quo. No federal government subsidy in 1900 could protect the American horse-
and-buggy industry from the birth of the modern car after Karl Benz built the first prototype in 
Germany in 1885. His technology crossed the Atlantic and Henry Ford eventually developed the 
Model-T. This new technology created wealth for many, jobs for millions, and made 
transportation easier for everyone. 
 
Technological change has also made parts of America’s economy, such as modern 
manufacturing, much more productive. For this same reason, manufacturing probably will never 
provide the same percentage of jobs for the American economy as it did until the 1970s. Tariffs 
and subsidies for American manufacturing won’t change the situation significantly because 
tariffs and subsidies may slow the pace of technical change in the US, but can’t stop that process 
in other jurisdictions. The ‘way things are done’ can and does change in other jurisdictions, and 
American manufacturers have been quick to take advantage by outsourcing components abroad 
and incorporating them into ‘made in America’ products.  
 
American businesses generally respond to competition created by free trade in one of two ways. 
First, they try to out-innovate and out-compete foreign competitors. As a result, some businesses 
not only survive, but grow and prosper. Other businesses will, despite their best efforts, fail. And 
sometimes the competition that drives an American company out of business comes from other 
American companies. The net result for consumers is that they benefit from better and cheaper 
products. 
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Second, businesses facing foreign competition may lobby for government assistance, usually by 
arguing that this is an issue of the national interest because it will save or create American jobs. 
However, the truth is that these requests are driven by the desire to protect their own markets and 
by their inability to make the hard decisions which are key to success in every business. 
Sometimes an entire industry may calculate that it’s more cost-effective for them to spend 
resources on lobbying to secure some sort of government subsidy. This behaviour is referred to 
as ‘crony capitalism’ which, because of its corrupting effects, is even more reason for America to 
resist protectionism. 
 
3.4 Why Businesses Lobby for Regulation  
People often mistakenly assume that supporting free markets or laissez-faire capitalism means 
being pro-business. In French, laissez-faire literally translates to “let do” which broadly means 
leave it alone. True supporters of free markets advocate separating corporations from the state. 
This means rejecting any government handout, protection or the provision of special privileges to 
any business entity. In a true free society, businesses must sink or swim on their own merits. 
Each business must compete in the market, relying only on innovation and entrepreneurship 
rather than government support.  
One of the big misconceptions consumers have about business is that business wants less rather 
than more regulations. In fact, the opposite is true. Why do big corporations lobby for more 
regulation? The late Noble Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman once wrote, “business 
corporations in general are not defenders of free enterprise. On the contrary, they are one of the 
chief sources of danger”.22 In this big government era, it’s become easier for businesses to profit 
through the halls of Congress rather than the marketplace. Echoing these sentiments, a British 
journalist, Matt Ridley adds, businesses “are addicted to corporate welfare, they love regulations 
that erect barriers to entry to small competitors”.23 Firms that face difficult adjustment because of 
more efficient foreign producers often lobby against trade. So do their workers, unions, and 
industrial associations.  
                                                 
22 (Ridley 2010) p.111. 
23 (Ridley 2010) p.111. 
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Lee Drutman, a senior fellow at New America, pointed out a growth of business lobbying in the 
United States since Congress passed a series of regulations to address environmental and 
consumer safety issues in the 1970s. 24  Combined with declining economic performance, 
businesses began to pay more attention to politics and began to hire their own lobbyists. At first, 
they were trying to reduce the impact of regulations. Then this morphed into seeing the 
government as a source of profit and assistance. Now “as the federal government has 
progressively become larger over the decades, every significant introduction of government 
regulation, taxation, and spending has been to the benefit of some big business”.25 
 
The more complex laws become, the more opportunity there is for corporations to influence out-
of-sight, hard to understand rules. In addition, the more complex things become, the harder it is 
for inexperienced bureaucrats to maintain a good understanding of the regulations they are 
overseeing. As a result, they tend to rely on corporate lobbyists for expertise in particular policy 
areas, putting lobbyists at the centre of the policy-making process. Corporations aren’t just 
involved in direct lobbying. They are also connected to other groups like think tanks, industrial 
associations, and special interest groups such as those claiming to champion the environment or 
social justice.  
 
3.5 Trade Deficits 
President Trump has frequently blamed the trade deficit for slowing economic growth in the 
United States. For example, he tweeted on his private Twitter account that, “[t]he US recorded its 
slowest economic growth in five years [in 2016]. GDP up only 1.6%. Trade deficits hurt the 
economy very badly”.26 President Trump’s concern with American trade deficits exemplifies a 
majority political view which is that trade deficits with other countries have only negative 
economic effects on the US economy. In the media, trade deficits are depicted as America’s 
indebtedness to other countries, and hence a sign of the weakness of the American economy.  
 
                                                 
24 (Drutman 2015) New America is a think tank and civic enterprise focusing on American Politics. 
https://www.newamerica.org 
25 (Carney 2011) 
26 (Trump 2017) April 26, 2017. The number of his Twitter followers is 43.8 million as of December 01, 2017.  
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There are other aspects of the “trade deficit” and “trade imbalance” debate besides distorted trade 
balance statistics. At the macro level, a trade account calculation that recognizes all international 
transactions shows no trade “deficits” or “imbalances”. Cash flow expended on goods and 
services (the current account) is mirrored in the cash flow of financial assets (the capital account). 
The ‘balance of payments’ always balances as shown in the formula below.27  
 
a) Current Account + b) Capital Account = 0 = Balance of Payments 
 
Using an example given by Professor of Economics Don Boudreaux, consider the case of a Mr. 
Lee living in China who earns $1 million from selling cloth to American businesses, and then 
spends that $1 million on a home in Tucson (Arizona). 28 This transaction results in a $1 million 
negative entry in America’s current account as a (trade) deficit, and a $1 million positive entry in 
America’s capital account as a surplus. If Mr. Lee purchases US stocks or bonds instead of a 
home in the US, these sold assets are recorded as positive entries in the US capital account, and 
this investment amount counterbalances the negative US current account (trade deficit). In the 
field of international finance, trade imbalances reflect net capital flows between countries, and 
the balance of payments always equals to zero. President Trump does not seem to realize that, 
although Chinese businesses are not buying American goods and services to the same extent that 
Americans are buying Chinese goods and services, they are, however, buying American 
investment assets of equivalent value.  
 
This flow of capital occurs in the reverse direction to the flow of trade in tangible goods and 
services and tends to be ignored in discussions of trade policy formulation. According to 
Douglas A. Irwin, an economics professor at Dartmouth College, this point was stressed 
repeatedly by economists in the 1980s once the prevailing US merchandise trade balance turned 
from surplus to deficit, and a spate of Japan-bashing began. 29   In this instance, Japan was 
accused of taking advantage of the relatively open US market to buy up American assets. Irwin 
stated that “countries with current account surpluses (trade surplus) can buy assets from the rest 
of the world, or use their savings to act as net lenders to other countries (capital account 
                                                 
27 (Perry, 2017c) 
28 (Boudreaux 2016) 
29 (Irwin 1996) p.18 
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deficit)”. 30  As shown in Figure 2, since the early 1980s, the US has had a trade deficit 
counterbalanced by a net foreign investment surplus. 
 
Figure 2 US Balance of Payments, 1983 to 2016  
 
 
 
Source: (U.S. Department of Commerce 2017)  (M. J. Perry 2017c) 
According to an estimate by the American Enterprise Institute, in 2016 Chinese outward, non-
bond investment reached a record high of $170 billion of which about 30% (or $50 billion) was 
invested in the US, mainly in real estate and business acquisitions.31 Also, China is the second 
largest foreign holder of US Treasury bills, bonds, and notes to the tune of $1.059 trillion which 
accounted for 18 % of the US public debt held by foreign countries as of February 2017.32  
Foreign investment in the United States has received a great deal of negative publicity. 
Investment by US businesses in the US is regarded as beneficial whereas investment in the US 
by foreigners is seen in quite a different light, as somehow threatening or undesirable. At best, 
                                                 
30 (Irwin 1996) p.20 
31 (Scissors 2017) 
32 (U.S. Department of the Treasury/ Federal Reserve Board n.d.) As of February 2017, Japan was the largest foreign 
holder of U.S. Treasury bills, bonds, and notes, and the combined holding share by Japan and China was 36.17%.  
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discrimination against investments originating abroad can be attributed to an “anti-foreign 
bias”.33 As professor Boudreaux has explained, a growing US capital-account surplus means 
investors worldwide believe in the American economy’s prospects.34 He has pointed out that an 
inflow of investment funds creates valuable assets, such as machines and factories, increases in 
research and development, and in the process, creates jobs. These investments contribute to 
improvements in the productivity of labor (causing wages to rise) and raise the average standard 
of living for Americans.35  
The opening of a factory in Austin, Texas by Samsung of South Korean company and Apple’s 
competitor in 2007 may be cited as an example. Samsung’s initial investment of US$3.5 billion 
made it the single largest foreign investment in Texas ever.36 The factory is one of the largest 
semiconductor facilities in the US and produces highly advanced flash memory products for 
computers and mobile devices. By 2012, the company employed 2,400 people, and the total 
amount invested in the factory since it opened had reached more than US$17 billion.37  
A political debate regarding trade deficits against specific countries is therefore irrelevant in 
terms of economic growth and job creation. As Irwin has pointed out, if restrictions are placed on 
capital account transactions, countries would be forced to balance their current accounts, since 
these countries could not pay for their goods and services purchased from overseas, and their 
trade volume would be restricted to a minimal level.38 He continued:  
                                                 
33 (Caplan 2007a) 
34 (Boudreaux, 2004) 
35 (Boudreaux, 2004) 
36 (Samsung 2007)  
According to job recruitment site for Samsung at 
https://careers.ap.samsung.com/careers/svc/app/viewSearchJob?reqstnNo=307499&source=Indeed 
Samsung Austin Semiconductor (SAS) is one of the most advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the 
United States. SAS produces digital LSI logic components for tablets, smart phones, and other mobile devices. In 
August, 2012, SAS invested $4 billion to accommodate full System LSI production, bringing our total investment in 
Austin to more than $17 billion. With 2400 employees and 2.3 million square feet of space, SAS is producing a full 
range of design rule devices. 
37 (Samsung 2007) 
38 (Irwin 1996) pp. 21-22. Irwin describes the details of the connection between the current account and the capital 
account, as follows: “The ability of a country to run a current account surplus or deficit depends on the degree to 
which countries allow capital to move between them. This in turn is a function of the international monetary system 
and the particular exchange rate regime in place. In the absence of international capital, that is, of international 
borrowing and lending, domestic savings equals domestic investment, and therefore trade is balanced as exports 
equal imports”. In summary, international capital flows are the underlying causes of swings of the balance of 
payments. For further details see pages 23-26 of Irwin’s paper.  
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Note that these balanced current accounts have nothing to do with whether or 
not a country is open to foreign goods, has unfair trade practices, or is more 
productive or competitive than other countries. If net capital flows are zero, the 
current account will be balanced.39 
 
Consequently, international trade accounts are always balanced in aggregate, and the negative 
connotation applied to “trade deficits” is misleading and should not be interpreted as a sign of 
weakness in the American economy, nor does it necessarily result from unfair trade practices on 
the part of the Chinese or any other trading partner.  
Although it has been emphasized that there is nothing inherently undesirable in running a trade 
deficit, the obvious mechanism available to the Trump administration to reduce a current account 
deficit, should it decide to do so, would be to restrict the flow of capital from abroad. One of the 
most effective ways of doing this would be to reduce the fiscal deficit and limit public sector 
borrowing as the US Government’s borrowing (primarily by selling treasury bills) is one of the 
largest drains on a country’s savings and leads to a huge current account surplus. This current 
account surplus can only be financed by a trade deficit. This is a more accurate explanation of 
the US trade account deficit. Accusing China or other countries of weakening the economy 
should therefore be interpreted as an effort to divert attention away from the underlying cause of 
economic difficulties which, in the US, originates in excessive government spending.40 
In conclusion, the trade policy debate orchestrated by the Trump Administration is flawed 
primarily because it focuses only on trade flows in goods and services while ignoring capital 
flows in financial assets.  
The US President and many US politicians have used flawed statistics and misleading trade 
deficit rhetoric to justify their preference for a protective trade policy. Efforts by politicians to 
implement protectionist trade policy will, if successful, only result in reduced levels of trade and 
investment in the US and lower standards of living for Americans. Such a strategy is hardly a 
recipe for enhancing the prospects of American workers and consumers .41 Furthermore, it would 
                                                 
39 (Irwin 1996) p. 24. 
40 (Irwin 1996) p. 26.  
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inevitably sour relations with major trading partners, and China in particular, whose economies 
are dependent to varying degrees of trade with the United States, and would precipitate 
stagnation of the global economy.42 This would repeat the tactic of dramatically raising tariffs in 
response to the Depression of the 1930s, which is now widely acknowledged to have made that 
economic downturn much deeper and more protracted than it would otherwise have been.  
 
In a Forbes magazine interview, Mark J. Perry, an economist at the American Enterprise Institute, 
pointed out how debates over the level of trade at the national level distract attention from the 
huge benefits of trade that accrue to individuals. He wrote:  
 
Countries don’t trade, only people and businesses trade…a trade deficit from 
an accounting standpoint at the national level when imports exceed exports in 
no way changes the fact that what we call a trade deficit reflects hundreds of 
thousands of mutually beneficial exchanges over a certain period. 43 
 
 
4. Modern Society: Interaction among Four Components with Different Incentives 
 
In society, four main groups interact in such a way as to favour intervention in the economy in 
general and international trade in particular. These include (generally large) businesses, 
consumers, governments and special interest groups. The interactions among these components 
of society are illustrated in Figure 3. The characteristics and behaviour of each group is outlined 
below. 
  
                                                 
42 (Anderson 2016) 
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Figure 3 Interactions of Components of Society 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
4.1 Business 
A key point of this thesis is that large businesses divide their attention between maximizing their 
viability in the business environment in which they operate and exerting effort to alter that 
environment in order to obtain benefits. The former involves competition in the market place 
under existing rules at any given point in time. The latter involves lobbying to change those rules 
in order to obtain such benefits as subsidies, regulations which serve to restrain the entry of 
competitors, tariffs to limit competition from imports and so on.  
 
All businesses – large and small - compete in the market place, offering their products and 
services to consumers, or to other businesses in the form of intermediate goods. However, for the 
purposes of this thesis, the business sector is viewed as being composed of high profile firms. 
The general criterion for inclusion in this segment of society is that the business in question must 
have sufficient profile to exercise some influence over government policy, broadly defined. 
Governments operate at a variety of scales, at different jurisdiction levels (local, state, regional, 
and national), and the number of businesses with sufficient profile to influence the policy making 
process decreases as one moves up the governmental hierarchy. The government most directly 
involved in international trade policy is generally the national government. The three high-
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profile American firms discussed in Chapter 2 – Kodak, Apple and Boeing – are examples of 
firms with sufficient profile to influence policy formulation from the national level down. 
 
It is extremely important to acknowledge that these efforts to influence policy are only 
worthwhile when there is a strong disposition on the part of the governmental body in question to 
intervene in the economic sphere. This predisposition towards intervention on the part of 
government is not something that businesses create through their own efforts. However, once it 
exists they are quick to use it to their advantage.  
 
Efforts on the part of business management to obtain benefits from influencing government have 
traditionally been described as ‘rent-seeking’ but the more evocative term “crony-capitalism” is 
now more commonly used instead. The overall objective of the influence a business exerts on the 
regulatory framework is to reduce competition in the markets in which it operates.44 
 
Market-oriented activities of business management occur in parallel with efforts to influence 
government intervention. Government officials and the general public routinely underestimate 
the complexity of business decision making. It is not easy for any businesses to survive, and the 
management of multinational businesses involves costs and risks on a scale difficult to 
comprehend. For these costs to be worthwhile there must be commensurate potential benefits.  
 
The two fundamental decisions facing any business which offers a product in the market are 
whether to ‘make or buy’ something and, in either instance, where to do so. In a competitive 
market, there is constant downward pressure on prices and opportunities to obtain components at 
lower cost must be identified because other firms in the same business also have an incentive to 
do so. Improved transportation and communication now make it feasible to scour the globe for 
potential suppliers. Many sophisticated products are assembled from components provided by a 
global supply chain where the costs of quality components and the associated transportation 
costs make it worthwhile.  
                                                 
44 (Kingston 2001) p. 99. Kingston criticizes Rodrik (1997) for labeling the globalization that occurs under managed 
trade “marketisation” because it gives the impression that market forces are expanding. He says, “this is the very 
opposite of what is actually happening, which is the generation of more market power [for big business] and new 
forms of it”.  
34 
 
Businesses routinely seek out government incentives to locate component production and 
assembly operations in particular jurisdictions as well as manipulating the regulatory 
environment to limit competition in the markets in which they sell their products. In both 
instances, they exploit a predisposition on the part of various levels of government to intervene 
“for the general good” although, as Adam Smith pointed out, the objectives of business are quite 
the opposite of those of consumers. However, it is important to recognize that the willingness of 
government to intervene in ways which benefit particular companies at the expense of others 
creates uncertainty for business managers beyond the business risks associated with market 
competition. This uncertainty stems from the fact that regulations can and do often change, and 
benefits may be captured by competitors. The usual response of big businesses is to devote more 
resources to the lobbying process.  
 
Under free trade, (i.e. when the predisposition of government to intervene is absent) the 
commercial costs associated with bringing a product to market are minimized as each party in 
the process strives to be more efficient. Free trade in wheat at the end of the 19th century and 
competition among wheat growing countries gave British flour mills access to the raw material 
they needed at the lowest possible price. Competition among millers and bakers passed along the 
benefit of those low prices to consumers. When the era of free trade in wheat came to an end in 
the 1930s, the prices consumers paid for bread rose, and the prices farmers received for wheat 
fell. 
 
Wheat used to make the bread consumed by those working in European factories in the 19th 
century was a relatively homogeneous commodity. The producers of wheat were anonymous 
insofar as the millers who purchased it in Europe were concerned. However, the components 
used in the assembly of modern electronic devices, automobiles and the like today contribute to 
the differentiation of the final products in the market, and a global supply chain therefore 
involves a direct relationship between component suppliers and the seller of the final product. 
Under free trade, creating and establishing these relationships would be difficult enough.  
 
However free trade does not generally prevail, so the creation of international business linkages 
required to source components or products abroad is considerably more complicated. Various 
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impediments to the free flow of goods across international borders have to be addressed. These 
raise prices and reduce competition, because generally only large firms have the resources 
required to keep abreast of the government regulations that complicate trans-border commerce. 
State interference with trade is just another form of intervention which restrains competition. 
Businesses which derive benefits from state intervention in the form of tariffs or subsidies are 
therefore unlikely to pass those benefits along to their customers in the form of lower prices.  
 
4.2 Consumers  
The ‘consumer’ constituency obviously interacts with businesses of all types as the ‘final 
demand’ for goods and services available in the market. Myriad small, often local, businesses are 
classified as a sub-group within the ‘consumer’ segment. The practical distinction between the 
large businesses that operate at the regional, national or international scale and the local 
businesses considered part of the ‘consumer’ sector is based on whether the business is of 
sufficient scale to exert some influence on government policy. Even smaller businesses – farmers 
are a prime example in many jurisdictions – are, however, able to influence policy when they act 
in concert through industry-wide organisations. The characteristics and behaviour of such 
organisations are considered separately below.  
 
To the extent that ‘consumers’ are also employees of businesses of varying scales, they might be 
expected to share the perspective of their employer. There is likely to be widespread empathy 
among employees for the plight of small and medium sized businesses operating at the local and 
regional level (i.e. those classified within the consumer sector). However, when the employer is a 
large multi-branch enterprise, perhaps even with operations abroad, the functions of individual 
employees are extremely specialised and they rarely think in terms of the well-being of the firm 
as a whole. Instead there is likely concern that their function maybe transferred to another 
location, and adversarial relationships between labour and management have become entrenched 
in some industry segments in North America and Europe.  
 
The ‘consumer’ component of society is handicapped when it comes to understanding the 
complexity of business management, international trade, and their economic and sociological 
implications. This lack of understanding makes it susceptible to superficial and often 
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fundamentally flawed conclusions when they are exposed to incomplete or misleading 
information. 
 
The willingness of government to respond to petitions for intervention from businesses and 
special interest groups requires an implicit mandate from the consumer sector which favours 
intervention. Trade policy provides numerous examples where consumers appear to support 
government intervention which is not in their own best interest. Consumers endorse government 
intervention in the (often mistaken) belief that intervention is beneficial in a general or society as 
a whole.45  As will be emphasized, ‘consumer’ opinion on this matter is constantly reinforced by 
the state (which is interested in expanding its role in society) and by the various special interest 
groups (which are seeking benefits for specific sub-sectors of the society, not the good of 
consumers in general). 
 
The ‘consumer sector’ interacts with government in three distinct ways: as voters, as taxpayers 
and as the direct beneficiaries of government programs and services. According to public choice 
theory, the ignorance of voters regarding specific policies of candidates is ‘rational’ in the sense 
that the cost of acquiring information is high, and the likelihood of the vote of a particular 
individual influencing the outcome of an election low. In this sense the ‘political market’ is 
woefully inefficient in comparison with the market for goods and services where consumers have 
an incentive to discover information because payment is direct and individuals bear the 
consequences of their purchasing decision.46 In addition, voters only exert their influence over 
elected officials periodically in the run-up to elections, and are expected to cast their votes on the 
basis of the prospective policy platforms of the various candidates and their parties. However, by 
the time the next election rolls around it is next to impossible for the voter to assess the 
                                                 
45 Tasic (2005) explains this tendency in terms of the evolutionary history of the human species: for the vast 
majority of human history, the survival and well-being of the individual’s social group was recognised as being 
more important than the survival or well-being of the individual. Individual sacrifices need to be made to ensure the 
survival of the group. It is only since Adam Smith helped us to understand that the well-being of society is 
individuals act in their own self-interest. For hundreds of years – at least since Magna Carta of 1215 – ordinary 
people struggled to free themselves from government-imposed restrictions. It is therefore paradoxical that many now 
support government intervention for the sake of the ‘greater good’. The demonization of big business that has 
occurred since the Depression of the 1930s seems to be a crucial factor in this about face.  
46 (Tullock 1989) 
37 
 
performance of the incumbent government in any meaningful way, so the electorate is 
susceptible to ideological arguments.  
 
Professor of Economics at George Mason University, Bryan Caplan argues that, contrary to 
public choice theory, voters are ‘irrational’ in the sense that they act on the basis of four widely 
held, systemic biases.47 The first three of these biases are particularly relevant to discussion of 
attitudes to international trade. Caplan’s systemic biases are: 
 
1. An anti-market bias: notwithstanding Adam Smith, the general public still do not understand 
how markets obtain the public interest from private self-interest. 
2. An anti-foreign bias: people generally underestimate the benefits of interaction with 
foreigners who are regarded as competition or enemies, not potential partners in mutually 
advantageous trade. 
3. A make-work bias: people do not equate prosperity with production and productivity but with 
employment. More jobs are more important than more productivity. 
4. A pessimistic bias: notwithstanding a general rise in living standards, people usually consider 
economic conditions bad and likely to deteriorate.  
 
Although it may be the disadvantaged elements of the electorate who clamour for ‘help’ from the 
state, the chief beneficiaries of government intervention are businesses. The generic term for the 
process whereby businesses benefit from regulation is ‘regulatory capture’. One important aspect 
of regulatory capture is the manner in which the benefits and costs are distributed. The benefits 
are concentrated on a small number of participants in the affected industry, whereas the costs are 
widely dispersed across the taxpaying public. Although the benefits obtained by businesses may 
be considerable (for example, the payments made to keep Americans working in the tire 
industry) the cost of providing those benefits is so small for each taxpayer that it is likely to go 
unnoticed – at least initially.  
 
As taxpayers, the ‘consumer’ sector bears the brunt of the cost of providing government 
employment, intervention, regulation, and services. The cost of government is significant and 
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growing. Although the cost to individual taxpayers for specific government initiatives is small, 
the array of programs has a tendency to grow over time, and there is relatively little attrition: 
each program provides benefits, and therefore creates a usually small but potentially vocal 
constituency who will resist attempts to end their flow. Although the value of the benefits 
supplied by government generally dissipates over time as the economy adjusts around the 
infusion of funds, the costs of each successive intervention accumulate. Sometimes the adverse 
implications of an impending fiscal crisis are anticipated by political entrepreneurs who advocate 
measures for rectifying the situation before a full-blown crisis ensues. This was the case in 
Canada in the early 1990s when the government took steps to reduce the federal deficit from 
‘third-world’ levels. Sometimes, however, the cost of government programs is sufficiently 
onerous to be perceived by the electorate as an election issue. 48 This was the case in the 1984 
federal election in New Zealand which resulted in a dramatic shift in trade policy.  
 
4.3 Government 
Public Choice theory in economics refutes the ‘nirvana fallacy’ that election or appointment to 
government office transforms ordinary people, trying to do the best they can for themselves and 
their families with the limited information they have at their disposal, into omniscient saints 
working tirelessly for ‘the greater good’. In fact, they continue to be driven by their own 
interests:  in the case of professional politicians this generally involves doing what they can with 
the taxpayer funded budgets available to get re-elected. The ever-rising cost of competing for 
political office creates a dependence on those who fund re-election campaigns and influence 
public attitudes. Such special interest groups (see below) become an important catalyst in the 
policy making process.  
 
Government employees also have a vested interest in retaining their positions and expanding the 
budgets which justify their existence. One of the consequences of this logic is that it is very 
difficult to end a government initiative once it has been created. Both the government 
bureaucracy required to implement it and the special interest groups who benefit from it join 
forces in its defence. As has already been mentioned, the complexity of the policy making 
                                                 
48 In Canada, high levels of government spending were a significant factor in the rise to power of the Reform, 
Canadian Alliance and eventually the resurrected Conservative party under the leadership of Stephen Harper (Prime 
Minister from 2006-2015.) 
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process creates opportunities for lobbyists who are only too keen to help the policy makers see 
the alternatives available from the perspective of the business they represent. The ‘help’ 
businesses provide to policy makers and the funds they provide politicians for re-election gives 
them considerable leverage over the outcome of deliberations which affect their profitability. 
 
Notwithstanding the regulatory capture which occurs as a result of the political process, 
politicians and bureaucrats are obsessed with ‘optics’: how their actions are perceived by the 
general public. Considerable expenditure of (taxpayer funded) public money is devoted to 
advertising the importance of government intervention for society as a whole, despite the fact 
that regulatory capture ensures that private interests obtain the benefits at the expense of the 
general public.  
 
4.4 Special Interests 
The final group of participants in this stylized society consists of an amorphous collection of 
special interest groups: industry associations, unions, environmental and other social issue 
related groups. The main purpose of many such special interest groups is to influence policy, 
using popular support and hence the potential votes of ‘consumers’ as leverage. 
 
The mandate government receives from its citizenry for intervention is crucially important if the 
effort businesses and other special interest groups expend to get the rules changed in their favour 
are to be productive. Those on either extreme of the political spectrum recognise the influence 
business exerts on government as being counterproductive for consumer welfare: those on ‘the 
left’ regard it as an inevitable failing of ‘capitalism’, while others label it ‘crony-capitalism’ and 
consider it an unfortunate and regrettable distortion of market interactions.  
  
The burden on taxpayers (and their descendants when government debt levels increase) rises as 
government intervention in the economy increases over time. Taxpayers find themselves paying 
not only for the interventions for which they have agitated but also for the benefits for which 
businesses lobby in order to take advantage of the ‘ideology of intervention’. As will be pointed 
out, instances where taxpayers get to the point where they no longer tolerate the subsidization of 
certain sectors of the economy in order to hide the fact that it is not competitive vis a vis 
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imported alternatives have already prompted some countries to abandon protectionism in favour 
of free trade.  
  
5. The Structure of this Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 investigates whether President Trump’s protectionism policy will achieve its stated 
goal, namely to “Make America Great Again” using three prominent American companies as 
case studies to investigate, in reality, how trade and the global supply chain contribute to 
strengthen their competitiveness.  
 
It looks at Kodak in order to explore how companies must adapt to new technology in order to 
survive and how politicians blame trade for business failure in order to support their own 
domestic agenda. It then analyzes Apple’s successful use of global supply chains to develop 
innovative products and achieve a dominant position in the consumer electronics market. Apple 
also provides an opportunity to explore the problems with trade deficit statistics and shows that 
they are vastly overstated when global supply chains are involved. 
 
The third company, Boeing, is a century old and appears on the surface to be a more traditional 
American company. It was loudly praised by President Trump for its ‘Made in America’ 
Dreamliner airplane. However, it too relies on global supply chains to produce state of the art 
products and relies heavily on international markets for sales. 
 
Chapter 3 examines how consumers and special interest groups advocate in favor of 
protectionism. It discusses two case studies from the agricultural sector, a sector which has 
traditionally been accorded special treatment in terms of public policy. The two case studies, 
which involve palm oil and the ‘buy local’ movement, explore how consumers are influenced to 
support initiatives based in large part on an anti-foreign products bias, both of which are not in 
their own best interest and do not achieve the stated objectives.  
 
Chapter 4 turns to the regulatory environment governing world trade. It provides a brief history 
of how GATT and WTO reduced many tariff rates internationally, but floundered in 2008 when 
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it tried to achieve agreements on agricultural trade and non-trade barriers among more than 150 
countries. Since that time, there has been a growth of both multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements. This has resulted in a proliferation of conflicting rules which both help and hinder 
trade. NAFTA and TPP are profiled as examples of larger regional agreements. The former is 
now under attack by President Trump because it is perceived as being a ‘bad deal’. The latter 
deal was repudiated by President Trump in January 2017. Both of these ‘trade’ deals have a 
strong political dimension and contain terms that go well beyond trade related issues. This 
chapter also examines Brexit and its trade agreement options. In June 2016, Brexit voters gave 
their government a mandate to put consumer interests ahead of EU regulations. Britain could 
take this opportunity to implement a ‘consumer first’ free trade policy in alliance with other 
nations. The best option for the UK is a simple and unilateral trade agreement which could 
benefit not only U.K. consumers but also people in other nations, particularly those in 
developing countries.  
 
Chapter 5 draws conclusions, makes a few policy recommendations and suggests areas for 
further research.  
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CHAPTER 2. “MAKE AMERICAN GREAT AGAIN”? 
 
 
To prohibit a great people, however, from making all that they can of every part of 
their own produce, or from employing their stock and industry in the way that 
they judge most advantageous to themselves, is a manifest violation of the most 
sacred rights of mankind. 
Adam Smith. 1776.49   
1. Introduction 
 
Protectionism is a politically successful strategy despite being “superficial and short-sighted”, 
since it ignores the complexities and dynamics of the global market.50 It will trigger retaliation 
from other nations. The cost of protectionism in America is borne by consumers and businesses. 
Isolating the American economy from the rest of world will impoverish and weaken American 
businesses, and result in job losses and lower living standards. Moreover, higher product prices 
will place a disproportionate burden on poorest citizens in the US.  
 
However, protectionist policies enjoy popular support, since job losses in some industries are 
highly visible and are often attributed to ‘unfair’ competition from other countries (e.g. Kodak 
case). Blaming other countries and globalization is both incorrect and misleading: it is an excuse 
to avoid recognizing the real reasons behind business failures and job losses, and also ignores the 
tremendous benefits which accrue to consumers and businesses from trade and specialization.  
 
The example of Apple Inc., one of the world’s most successful companies, demonstrates the 
complexity and value of the global supply chain, the very real benefits of international trade to 
both business and consumers, and challenges the feasibility of turning back the clock and 
repatriating jobs to America. Apple’s supply chain production data are used to understand the 
flaws and double-counting in conventional trade account metrics. 
 
The third example, Boeing, is a huge, successful US company, lauded by President Trump 
because of its large US based workforce. However, Boeing itself praises the benefits of its global 
                                                 
49 (Smith 1904/1776) Book I, Chapter IV Of Colonies, 66. 
50 (Perry 2017b) 
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supply chain (30% of Boeing parts are made outside the US), and relies heavily on overseas sales. 
It is a good example of how misleading the label ‘Made in the USA’ can be. 
 
Boeing is also an example of how big business extracts valuable concessions from the 
government to enhance its own competitiveness. In 2012, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
ordered the US to halt unfair subsidies and tax breaks to Boeing, judging them to have damaged 
a European rival company, Airbus. Despite making the most out of the governments’ subsidies 
for its own benefit, Boeing accused its Canadian competitor, Bombardier, of illegally selling 
aircraft below their production cost, and persuaded the US government to levy huge anti-
damping tariffs against its rival company. 
 
Many empirical studies on protectionist trade policy have concluded that the costs of 
protectionist trade policies far exceed the benefits. A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis of 31 protectionist cases in the US in the 1980s51 and the more recent example of tariffs 
levied against a Chinese tire manufacturer52 confirm how protected producers capture benefits at 
the expense of consumers. Despite President Trump’s bleak assertions, the US economy as a 
whole has been growing. Like Apple and Amazon, many new companies have been doing very 
well. Schumpeter’s theory of ‘creative destruction’ explains the natural business cycle where old 
businesses and jobs are replaced by new ones and where ‘survival of the fittest’ is determined by 
a business’s ability to adapt to changes in its environment. 
 
2. The Rise of Protectionism 
 
2.1 Why Protectionism is a Popular Political Strategy 
Trade policy has been a prominent issue in recent years and political opposition to international 
trade is on the rise. During the US presidential campaign in 2016, the Republican candidate 
Donald J. Trump made a series of speeches with the theme “Make America Great Again” in 
which he promised to boost US economic growth and create jobs. To protect American jobs from 
the negative effects of globalization, he proposed reversing many years of trade liberalization, 
and vowed that he would “rip up” existing trade agreements, renegotiate the North American 
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Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and impose a 35% tariff on imports from Mexico and a 45% 
tariff on imports from China.53 
 
The Global Markets Forum, which includes more than 50 prominent US economists, regularly 
undertakes a survey of attitudes to free trade.54 In the 2012 survey, 87% of respondents agreed 
that “Freer trade improves efficiency and offers consumers better choices, and in the long run 
these gains are much larger than any effects on employment”. Also, 88% agreed that “On 
average, citizens of the US have been better off with the North American Free Trade Agreement 
than they would have been if the trade rules for the US, Canada and Mexico prior to NAFTA had 
remained in place”.55 In the same survey in 2014, 93% of respondents agreed with the claim that 
“Past major trade deals have benefited most Americans”.56  
 
In the US political arena, trade agreements have been blamed for sending American jobs 
overseas. For example, in 2015, Louise Slaughter, a Democratic Congresswoman who has 
represented Rochester, New York, for nearly 30 years stated that “I’ve never seen a trade bill that 
in any way benefited US manufacturers and workers”. 57 She pointed to Kodak as an example of 
a company harmed by trade agreements, and especially by NAFTA. Since the deal between the 
US, Canada and Mexico went into effect in 1994, Kodak’s Rochester work force shrank from 
39,300 to 2,300 in 2015. 58  During the same period, according to the Connecticut state 
representative Rosa DeLauro, the state lost more than 96,000 manufacturing jobs, and once again 
international trade was blamed for causing job losses in the US59 (This argument is refuted in 
Section 3 of this chapter.) 
 
 
                                                 
53 (Noland, Hufbauer, et al. 2016) p.5. 
54 (University of Chicago Booth School of Management n.d.) IGM Economic Experts Panel consists of more than 50 
experts of economists in the US The panel explores the extent to which economists agree or disagree on major 
public policy issues, and try to represent a broader economist population. 
55 (University of Chicago Booth School of Management, IGM Forum) March 19, 2012. 
56 (University of Chicago Booth School of Management, IGM Forum) November 11, 2014.  
57 (Nocera 2015) 
58 (Nocera 2015) 
59 (Nocera 2015) 
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2.2 The Negative impact of Trade with China on the US 
Although, the majority of economists generally acknowledge the benefits of trade, some also 
highlight the associated trade-offs, adjustments costs, and the divergent impacts on winners and 
losers. For example, in 1994, Krugman and Obsfeld wrote: 
 
International trade has a powerful effect on income distribution…This means that 
international trade tends to make low-skilled workers in the United States worse off 
—not just temporarily but on a sustained basis. 60 
 
These negative effects of international trade have received a great deal of attention, from both a 
political and economic perspective, especially in the wake of China’s economic reforms in the 
1980s and its entry to the world economy. When China joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001, a country of 1.3 billion people entered the global trading system, precipitating 
an unprecedented change in the dynamics of world trade which could not have been foreseen, 
especially in the manufacturing sector.61 According to the World Bank, China’s exports of goods 
swelled nearly 10-fold during the first 13 years after China joined WTO, reaching $2.3 trillion in 
2014.62  
 
Wide ranging effects associated with China’s integration into the global market challenged the 
widely held view among economists that the negative social costs would be small and transitory. 
There have been many studies of the trade effects on US workers and the domestic economy: a 
2016 report by trade and labor economists David H. Autor, David Don and Gordon H. Hanson 
concluded that the negative effects were much larger and lasting longer than previously 
anticipated.63  
 
As the trade of goods has increased with China and other nations, the US has been running a 
huge trade deficit since the late 1980s. In 2012, the amount reached $460 billion, of which trade 
with China accounted for almost 75%.64 According to Martin Neil Baily and  Barry P. Bosworth 
                                                 
60 (Krugman and Obstfeld 1994) 
61 (Goodman 2016) 
62 (World Bank 2017b)  
63 Summary of mainstream economists’ view on international trade and its impacts on employment and wages, 
please refer (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2016) pp. 1-3.  
64 (Baily and Bosworth 2014) p.4. p.13.  
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of the Brookings Institute, job losses from 2000 coincided with the growing trade deficit with 
China, “which suggests to some a causal link in which China trade is the reason for the loss of 
US manufacturing jobs”.65  
 
2.3 Changes in US Manufacturing 
According to a 2014 Economic Policy Institute’s report, between 2001 and 2013, the expanded 
trade deficit with China eliminated or displaced 3.2 million US jobs, three quarters of which (2.4 
million) were in manufacturing.66 These job losses occurred in all states and the District of 
Columbia, but the hardest hit states were California, Texas, New York, and Illinois where jobs in 
various manufacturing industries were concentrated. Computer and electronic components, 
textile and apparel, and furniture were sectors particularly hard hit. The trade deficit in the 
computer and electronic parts sector accounted for 56% of the negative growth during 2001-
2013, and for 39.6% of the total job losses over the same period. The report also pointed out that 
negative effects were not limited to job losses and the associated direct reduction in wages paid. 
Competition with low wage workers from developing countries drove down wages and 
weakened the bargaining power of non-skilled, non-college-educated workers throughout the US 
economy.67 
 
Empirical research by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson further discovered that some American 
communities never fully recovered after manufacturing jobs moved to China. Although, 
economic models had predicted that labor markets would eventually adjust to trade shocks and 
suffer a limited impact, unemployment rates remained elevated and worker incomes depressed 
for at least a full decade after the China trade shock started.68  
 
This occurs in part because movement of labor in the aftermath of changes in regional labor 
demand is slow and incomplete, and because immobility is particularly pronounced among low-
skilled workers.69 Also, labor demand changes depend on industry specialization patterns and on 
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66 (Kimball and Scott 2014) p.2. 
67 (Kimball and Scott 2014) p.3. 
68 (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2016) 
69 (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2016) p.17. 
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the degree of regional exposure to foreign competition.70 In the apparel and furniture industries, 
China is a particularly efficient competitor relative to the US.71 Moreover, a significant share of 
displaced low-skilled workers sign up for permanent disability payments instead of the 
temporary trade adjustment assistance that is made available, thereby increasing the number of 
permanent labor force dropouts.72 Autor, Dorn, and Hanson estimated that between 1999 and 
2011, about 1 million manufacturing jobs were lost, and an additional 1 million job losses 
occurred indirectly in supplier businesses outside these trade exposed sectors.73   
 
However, as pointed out in Chapter 1, job creation and destruction are a natural part of the 
business cycle. Politicians tend to emphasize job losses and ignore job creation in other sectors. 
Although manufacturing employment has declined, there have also been gains in other areas 
such as service and health sector businesses (Figure 4).  
 
As shown in Figure 5, manufacturing jobs peaked in the late 1970s, and throughout the 1990s the 
number was around 17 million. From 2000 to 2010 this sector lost 5.6 million jobs, which was 
the largest decline in manufacturing employment in US history. In other words, manufacturing 
employment had already started to decline well before NAFTA came into effect (1994) and 
before China joined WTO (2001) and entered into world trade with its full force.  
  
                                                 
70 (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2016) p.17. 
71 (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2016) p.28. 
72 (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2016) p.32. 
73 (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2016) p.28. 
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Figure 4 Manufacturing Job Losses and Other Sectors from 2000-2016  
 
Source: (U.S. Department of Labor 2017a)  
 
Figure 5 Number of Manufacturing Nonfarm Employment and its Share of US 
Employment 1939-2016 
 
 
Source: FRED Economic Data, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1Gor 
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Although the number of jobs has been declining, the American manufacturing sector is still 
strong and growing in terms of output value. The US still has the world’s second largest 
manufacturing sector after China (Figure 6).74  
 
Figure 6 World Manufacturing Output, Value added  
 
 
 
Source: (World Bank 2017d) 
 
According to an empirical study by Michael J. Hicks and Srikant Devaraj of Ball State 
University, only 13% of job losses since year 2000 can be attributed to trade. The remaining 87% 
was due to productivity growth in American factories.75 The American manufacturing sector has 
been producing more than ever and expanding: between 2009 and 2015 the sector’s real output 
increased 30%, and the number employed in 2015 was about 12.3 million workers which were 
about the same level as in 2009. Automation and the use of information technology increased 
productivity growth per worker by 20% (Figure 7).76  
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Figure 7 Trends in US Manufacturing: Real Output, Output per Hour per Worker, and 
Employment 
  
Source: (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) 
 
In summary, evidence suggests that adjustment to Chinese trade shock in the US has been a slow 
process, and costs have been concentrated in the regions where those manufacturers were 
located.77 US President Trump’s view was, therefore, at least partially correct: “trade creates new 
jobs in exporting industries and destroys jobs when imports replace the output of domestic 
firms”.78 The surge in animosity towards trade among those who lost jobs to competitive imports 
persists and is difficult to reverse. President Trump was and continues to be successful by 
tapping into anger among working class voters suffering the consequences of job losses in 
manufacturing. 
 
In the political arena, inconvenient facts and numbers are generally ignored. The “Make America 
Great Again” slogan has been very popular among politicians, labour unions, some 
                                                                                                                                                             
parts had strong growth. On the other hand, lower productivity sub-sectors, such as textile and textile product mills, 
apparel, leather, and allied products, registered about a 50% decline of GDP growth between 1998 and 2012.  
77 (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2016) p.33. 
78 (Bivens 2008) 
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manufacturing sector and other businesses that blame trade for their economic predicament. 
Behind the “Make America Great Again” and “Buy American” protectionism, there is the 
implicit assumption that trade is a zero-sum game. In other words, any gain from trade on the 
part of China is mirrored in a comparable loss on the American side of the transaction. Such a 
nationalistic view reflects a tendency to tribalism and ignores the fact that at the world level, the 
size of the ‘pie’ representing goods traded internationally has been getting progressively larger. 
According to World Bank data, between 1995 and 2014, global aggregate manufacturing output 
doubled from $5.8 trillion to $12 trillion.79 About the same period, from 1997 to 2013, US 
manufactured value added increased 48%, while China’s increased by 900% from a low initial 
base (Figure 6).80  
 
3. Kodak and the Myth of Free Trade 
 
The case to which Louise Slaughter, the US Congresswoman representing Rochester, New York, 
referred (see page 44 above) shows how simplistic and erroneous explanations can be used to 
support protectionist policies. She blamed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
for the rapid demise of the Eastman Kodak company.81 Yet the Kodak case is a “picture-perfect” 
example of a business failing due to its inability to keep pace with new technology, coupled with 
poor business management. Trade agreements in general, and NAFTA in particular, had little or 
no impact on the firm’s competitive advantage.82 
 
An economist in the US Department of Commerce, John Tschetter wrote a report in 2010 
arguing that international trade encouraged structural changes in domestic industries that resulted 
in increased efficiencies, economies of scale and more productive investments that enhanced the 
competitiveness of foreign and US producers alike.83  
 
In today’s complex and unpredictable world, businesses have to be competitive and innovative to 
keep up with rapid changes in technology, consumer tastes, and market dynamics. As discussed 
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81 (Nocera 2015) 
82 (Economist 2012) 
83 (Tschetter 2010) p.4. 
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in Chapter 1, if a company cannot keep pace with these changes, and misjudges the future 
trajectory of the sector in which it is participating, it will fail regardless of its size and the nature 
of its business. Kodak, formerly a giant, high-tech American company, provides a classic 
illustration of this reality.  
 
3.1 Kodak and Technical Change 
Companies must remain competitive to survive. Faced with changes to the business environment, 
they must adapt and innovate to seize the business opportunity. There are many Kodak case 
studies demonstrating how new technology combined with ill-equipped management can have 
devastating consequences for even a well-established blue-chip business.84 
 
Kodak was founded by George Eastman in 1880.85 The company ruled the imaging industry 
through innovation for more than a century. By 1976, Kodak accounted for 90% of film and 85% 
of the camera sales market in the US However, the company found itself in trouble in the late 
1990s.86 Kodak went through a series of restructurings between 1983 and 2007, but these failed 
to address the underlying problems. In the late 1990s, its share price began to decline as a 
consequence. The number of employees dropped by 100,000 between 1973 and 2012 as jobs 
were slashed (Figure 8).  In 2012 Kodak filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.87  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 The most comprehensive analyses of the demise of Kodak’s business is written by Lucas and Goh (2009), Gilbert 
and Bower (2002) and Anthony (2012). 
85 (Lucas and Goh 2009) p.49 
86 (Lucas and Goh 2009) p.49 
87 (Reuters 2012) 
53 
 
Figure 8 Kodak’s Employees and the Share Price between 1973 and 2012 
 
 
 
Source:  (Economist 2012) (original data from company reports by Thomson Reuters) 
 
The number of photos taken in the world increased from 1 billion photos in 1930 to 350 billion 
in 2011.88 In the late 1990s, the camera market started to change rapidly. Analog cameras were 
supplanted by digital ones around 1997 (Figure 9), and in 2003, the number of digital cameras 
sold surpassed film cameras.89 Then, revolutionary change hit the camera business with the 
advent of smart phones. Smart phone production took off exponentially around 2003,90 and 
resulted in a double-digit decline in the production of digital cameras.91  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 (M. Zhang 2011) 
89 (Lucas and Goh 2009) p.51 
90 (M. Zhang 2015) 
91 (M. Zhang 2015) 
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Figure 9 Changing Camera Production 1933-2014 
 
 
Source: (M. Zhang 2015) 
 
Digital technology has completely taken over film photography, and Kodak announced the 
cessation of Kodachrome film production in 2009. 92  In combination with advances in 
information and communication technologies, digital photography brought fundamental changes 
to the entire process of capturing, displaying and transmitting images. Smart phones rapidly 
became a ‘must have’ – a versatile tool of daily life with which to talk and text, listen to music, 
take pictures and videos, and interact through social media in ways previously unimaginable.  
 
3.2 Why Kodak Failed to Adapt 
Kodak’s management seriously underestimated how quickly the demand for this new technology 
would grow, and did not adapt their business to these industry-wide trends quickly enough. The 
key reasons for its failure to adapt were:93  
                                                 
92 (Cade 2013) 
93 (Lucas and Goh 2009)  A business model researched by the Harvard Business School professor, Clayton M. 
Christensen beginning in 1995. Please see details on the model in pp. 46-49. As for an information on Professor 
Christensen please see http://www.claytonchristensen.com/ 
55 
 
1. Kodak didn’t understand the commerical potential of digital technology  
2. It faced the classic incumbent’s dilemma  
3. It had a rigid, bureaucratic culture to change 
4. It failed to capitalize on its core capabilities 
 
1. Kodak didn’t understand the commercial potential of digital technology 
Kodak’s brand traditionally stood for film. The company failed to understand that it was actually 
in the imaging business and that film was just one way of displaying an image. It was Kodak that 
invented the world’s first digital camera in 1975 and the first megapixel imager in the mid 1980s. 
The transformation from conventional photography to digital photography took about two 
decades. However, Kodak misjudged the potential of digital technology and believed its 
traditional film business would endure. It regarded this film-less technology as an enemy, an evil 
juggernaut that would kill the chemical-based film and paper business rather than an opportunity. 
9495 Kodak began moving slowly into the digital market but found that it was too late. 
 
2. It faced the classic incumbent’s dilemma  
Kodak had a strong brand and a long history of success associated with film. It had very high 
profit margins and lots of cash in the bank. Existing success leads to complacency and is a 
deterrent to innovation. 
 
3. It had a rigid, bureaucratic culture 
In a Harvard Business School study, Gilbert and Bower explain that when management and 
workers face a disruptive innovation and perceive a new technology as a threat, they respond 
aggressively in defense of the exisiting business model.96 When a company responds to a threat 
by more vigorously pursuing a previously successful strategy it is a recipe for disaster. To quote 
the Japanese business management guru, Keniche Ohmae “rowing harder doesn’t help if the boat 
is headed in the wrong direction”.97 The alternative is change, which is often difficult. Creating a 
new business model, committing resources to innovation via a series of staged investments, and 
                                                 
94 (Mui 2012) 
95 (Mui 2012), (Lucas and Goh 2009) p.5 
96 (Gilbert and Bower 2002) 
97 Quoted in (Brown 2000). 
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giving business units the autonomy to purse new ventures are examples of tactics used by 
successful businesses to evolve in unison with changes in the market situation.98   
 
The Kodak corporate culture valued harmony, not challenges. In fact, both managers and the 
workforce were  still clinging to the old paradigm. In Kodak’s case, this is precisely the reason 
the company failed: its bureaucracy and hierarchically-oriented management culture were deeply 
ingrained throughout the company. Each employee did everything according to the company rule 
book. For example, “Meetings were held prior to meetings to discuss issues and establish 
agreement in order to avoid confrontations, which were considered un-Kodak like”.99 When it 
came to decisions, managers avoided risks, and instead developed procedures and policies to 
maintain the status quo. 100  The net result was “paralysis”, and the emergence of digital 
photography as the technology of the future was not evident to Kodak until it was too late.101 Its 
long and distinguished legacy and a complacent company culture inhibited the firm’s ability to 
adapt.102 This deficiency was particularly harmful because it affected middle managers, who 
dealt with the day to day business. 
 
Kodak hired a series of new CEOs from outside the company and expected them to turn the 
company into a high-tech growth company. However, the old-line manufacturing culture 
continually frustrated their efforts. Although they were able to facilitate a change in the culture at 
the very top of the hierarchy, they were unable to change the mentality of a huge mass of middle 
managers who did not understand the digital world.103 A former Kodak employee explained the 
insurmountable difficulties which prevented the transformation of the company in the following 
terms: 
Kodak wanted to get into the digital business, but they wanted to do it in their 
own way, from Rochester and largely with their own people. That meant it 
wasn’t going to work. The difference between their traditional business and 
                                                 
98 (Gilbert and Bower 2002) 
99 (Lucas and Goh 2009) p.54 
100 (Lucas and Goh 2009)p.54 
101 (Lucas and Goh 2009)p.54 
102 (Lucas and Goh 2009) p.53  
103 (Lucas and Goh 2009) p.53 
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digital is so great. The tempo is different. The kind of skills you need are 
different…but they didn’t want to force the pain on the organization.104 
 
Henry C. Lucas and Jie Metin Goh of the Robert H. Smith School of Buiness, University of 
Maryland explain Kodak’s failure in terms of the complacency of  management and the culture 
of company rather than the innovative challenges of digital technolgy itself. They conclude their 
study: 
The most important observation is that management has to recognize the 
threats and opportunities of new information and communications technologies 
and marshal capabilities for change. This change effort involves attacking core 
rigidities and the culture of the organization, and bringing all levels of 
employees on board, or the change effort will fail. ...The unanswered question 
is when confronted with a major technological discontinuity, can managers and 
organizations change a business model that has been successful for more than a 
century? 105 
  
4. It failed to capitalize on its core capabilities 
Kodak had a number of great capabilities (assets in facilities, knowledge, researchers, investment, 
and management).106 However, its capabilities in film blinded those involved to the potential of 
digital processes. The Kodak brand and legacy were built on its success in developing processes 
for manufacturing high-quality film and printing paper. Although Kodak had a number of 
technological and research assets including knowledge of chemistry, film production, and 
patented processes, it could not utilize these assets to create new businesses or products when the 
digital world began expanding rapidly. In the end, “almost a century’s experience in film 
inhibited rather than facilitated a shift to new technology”.107  
Kodak’s imaging patents had been “the object of desire” among technology giants. Ultimately, 
its inability to adapt to changing market conditions was a tragedy. In 2012 Kodak sold many of 
its patents for approximately US$525 million to a group of technology companies including 
Apple, Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Samsung, Adobe Systems and HTC.108 
 
                                                 
104 (Lucas and Goh 2009) p.53. 
105 (Lucas and Goh 2009) pp.54-55 
106 (Lucas and Goh 2009) p.48  
107 (Lucas and Goh 2009) p.53 
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3.3 Kodak vs. Fujifilm: Heterogeneity is a Key Source of Robustness 
Kodak was like a big ship which could not alter course easily to explore a new market. In 
contrast to Kodak’s failure, its long-time rival, Fujifilm, made a nimble and ultimately successful 
transformation when faced with the challenge of digital technology. It provides a great counter 
example of a company that evolved by creating new businesses.  
  
The Japanese company Fujifilm was founded in 1934, and Fujifilm and Kodak had much in 
common.109 Both of them were in the photography film business with high profit margins in the 
near monopolies they held in their domestic markets. In the late 1990s, they both realised that 
digital technology posed a threat and that they needed to change their business before they were 
rendered obsolete. While Kodak was slow and reluctant to move forward, Fujifilm responded 
with a series of radical reforms. These included partnering with new companies, investing 
heavily in R&D, and the acquisition of 40 firms.110 What distinguished Fujifilm’s approach from 
Kodak’s was its strategy of experimenting with completely new business fields, such as 
pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, in which it could utilize existing capabilities in chemistry and 
materials. Fujifilm’s exploratory efforts and attempts to diversify paid off. The contrast between 
Fujifilm and Kodak is stark. When the camera film market peaked in 2000 and shrank by 90% 
over the following 10 years, Fujifilm grew steadily; Kodak declared bankruptcy in 2012.111 
 
In another Harvard Business School study, Reeves, Levin and Ueda pointed out that when a 
company experiences an environmental shock, ‘heterogeneity’ is a key factor which influences 
the ‘robustness’ of the company and hence its ability to survive the shock. These authors 
emphasized that ‘heterogeneity’ means not only a diversity of businesses, but also a diversity of 
people, ideas, and endeavours.112 In Kodak’s case, although they hired new talent and tried out 
different ideas and businesses, the firm’s traditional allegiance to the film business prevented 
many managerial employees from responding enthusiastically to the challenge of creating a new 
business.  
 
                                                 
109 (FujiFilm n.d.) 
110 (Reeves, Levin and Ueda 2016) 
111 (Reeves, Levin and Ueda 2016) 
112 (Reeves, Levin and Ueda 2016) 
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In contrast, Fujifilm went through a painful management transformation, but did so quickly and 
thoroughly enough to reinvent its business structures. For example, in the 2000s Fujifilm entered 
many new businesses such as health care diagnostics, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics where their 
knowledge of chemistry and imaging technology could be leveraged.113 In 2015, Fujifilm had 
sales revenues of US$22 billion and a net income US$1.1 billion,114 which was a remarkable 
result in comparison with the restructured Kodak which had only US$1.8 billion revenue and a 
net loss of US$80 million in that year.115 
 
3.4 Competitiveness is About Innovation 
To return once again to the US political arena, Louise Slaughter, the Democratic 
Congresswoman representing Rochester, New York, blamed NAFTA for Kodak’s demise.116 
However, as we see above, it’s clear that Kodak’s failure was self-inflicted, and was not caused 
by trade agreements, nor imports from other nations. A professor at MIT, David Autor 
reluctantly acknowledged in an interview that much of the decline in US manufacturing 
employment was driven by technology advancement, not by globalization.117 For politicians and 
people who lost jobs in the process, this reality is hard to swallow. 
 
4. Apple Inc. and the Global Supply Chain 
 
In this section, we focus on growing intra-industry supply chains, and explain why President 
Trump’s proposed policies, which isolate the American economy from the rest of world, will 
make American businesses and consumers worse off. 
 
As cross-border investments and international supply chains have proliferated, the nature of trade 
has changed from the classical inter-industry trade to intra-industry trade. Inter-industry trade, 
which previously dominated international commerce, involves the exchange of one type of good 
(e.g. a car) for another type of good (e.g. food). Intra-industry trade is the exchange of similar 
type of goods (e.g. exporting and importing automobile parts). Thus, one product crosses many 
                                                 
113 (FujiFilm n.d.) (Fujifilm 2016)  
114 (Fujifilm 2016)   
115 (Statistics Portal 2017d)  
116 (Nocera 2015) 
117 (Autor 2016) In his 2016 study, he  did not mention the importance of technological change on American labor 
market.  
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national borders in the process of production (e.g. iPhones, automobiles, and T-shirts.) Many 
countries, especially developed countries like the US, are heavily engaging in intra-industry trade, 
which has been growing significantly in both size and importance. As a result of globalization, 
about a half of the value of US imports consists of intermediate goods and capital equipment of 
purchases by US producers.118 If President Trump’s protectionist trade policy restricts many 
imports, the policy will cause many problems for American businesses. Historically, 
protectionist policies have ended up protecting a few at the expense of exporters, small 
businesses, and consumers.119 
 
4.1 Why Apple and the iPhone are Successful 
“Designed by Apple in California, Assembled in China”  
In January, 2017 Apple iPhone celebrated its 10th anniversary. From the moment Apple’s CEO 
Steve Jobs unveiled an iPhone in 2007, it became legendary. It reinvented and revolutionized the 
phone with new technologies: a mobile device with a clear wide screen, touch screen controls, 
and connectivity to the internet.120 Although media and investors were skeptical about iPhone’s 
future sales at that time, since its introduction Apple has sold more than one billion iPhones.121 
Apple Inc. was founded in 1976 by Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak and Ronald Wayne. Its 
headquarters is located in the middle of Silicon Valley, Cupertino, California. In 2016, Apple 
became the world's largest information technology company in revenue terms with $216 billion 
in sales. To put this in perspective, this amount is bigger than the 2017-2018 California state 
budget.122 According to American investment research company Morningstar, in 2017 Apple is 
the largest publicly traded company in the world with a market capitalization of $825 billion and 
with gross sales over $200 billion.123 Apple employed 116,000 full-time workers worldwide, 
50,000 of whom resided in the US in 2016.124  
                                                 
118 (Ikenson 2016) 
119 (Irwin 1996) pp.9, 12-13.  
120 (Berr 2017) 
121 (Berr 2017) 
122 (Carroll and Respaut 2017) 
123 (Morningstar 2017) (Apple Inc 2016a) P.39. In 2016, Apple had net income US$46 billion dollars (20% net 
profit with US$216 billion net sales.)  
According to (Manyika and Chui 2014) study measured value added and productivity. This study compared Detroit 
(then a major centre of a traditional manufacturing industry) in 1990 with Silicon Valley in 2014. In 1990, the three 
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Apple is a technology innovation icon, and probably one of the most researched companies in the 
world. Between 2009 and 2012, more than 1,500 published articles mentioned both Apple and its 
innovations.125 In fact, a report by the business consulting company McKinsey, pointed out that 
among 750 companies in their database, Apple was the only global player creating new markets 
continuously through disruptive innovation, and one of only three to derive more than 5% of its 
annual growth from 1999 to 2008 from this source. 126  The report concluded that Apple’s 
successful business model derived from: 
Apple does deserve its place in today’s hierarchy of esteemed companies by 
virtue of its unique accomplishments; its innovative products, services, and 
business models; its culture; and its processes and capabilities in areas such as 
supply chain management—not to mention the extraordinary leadership of its 
cofounder and current executives.127 
Apple’s success derives in large part from its powerful global supply chain. Apple undertakes 
product design for both hardware & software, development, and marketing in-house in the US 
However, the company doesn't manufacture iPhone components nor does it assemble phones on 
its own.128  Instead, it contracts out the manufacturing of its components to many different 
technology companies around the globe. These manufacturers specialize in particular fields, such 
as display, camera, and battery (Figure10). Some parts, like the RAM (random-access memory) 
and the A9 processor are even supplied by the rival smartphone manufacturing company 
Samsung.129 All components are transported from various manufacturing locations to assembly 
facilities, mostly in China, where the iPhones themselves are produced (Figure 11).130 
                                                                                                                                                             
biggest companies in Detroit had a market capitalization of $36 billion, revenues of $250 billion, and 1.2 million 
employees. In 2014, the three biggest companies in Silicon Valley had a much higher market capitalization of $1.09 
trillion, generated about the same revenues of $247 billion, but involved 10 times fewer (137,000) employees. In 
other words, in the 21st century, a unit of wealth is created by a much smaller work force compared to a few decades 
ago thanks to digitalization and globalization which enable companies to increase productivity exponentially with 
much smaller marginal costs than the more traditional manufacturing such as the automotive industry.  
124 (Morningstar 2017) 
125 (Capozzi, Kellen and Smit 2012) 
126 (Capozzi, Kellen and Smit 2012) 
127 (Capozzi, Kellen and Smit 2012) 
128 (Minasians 2016) 
129 (Gould and Villas-Boas 2016), (Finance Online 2014) According to this report, about 85% of iPhone 5s is 
assembled in China.  
130 (Kakaes 2016) 
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Figure 10 Where the main parts of iPhone 6s come from 
 
 
 
Sources: (Gould and Villas-Boas 2016) 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
There are detailed infographics on where iPhone parts are sourced and facts about iPhone supply chains created by 
CampareCamp and FinancesOnline at:  
http://comparecamp.com/how-where-iphone-is-made-comparison-of-apples-manufacturing-process/ 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/228315 
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Figure 11 Supply Chain Map of Apple Inc. 
 
Source: (SupplyChainOpz 2013) 
Figure 12 Supply Chain Planning at Apple Inc.  
 
 
Source: (SupplyChainOpz 2013) 
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Apple is the brain behind a complex network of vast international operations. A simplified 
supply chain map indicates the scope of its operations, including: research and development, 
marketing, and various other functions (Figure 12). 
By contracting out most of its manufacturing on a global scale, Apple frees up resources to focus 
on its strengths: design and marketing.131 Apple’s list of suppliers for all products (iPhone, iPad, 
Macintosh computer) includes more than 700 manufacturers located in 28 countries, of which 
nearly half – 346 are located in China.132 The way Apple works closely with strategic suppliers 
confers a competitive advantage on the firm: successful international collaboration ensures that 
parts from around the world work together to make Apple’s iOS an effective and robust 
operating system.133 In 2015, IT research firm Gartner ranked the Apple’s supply chain as the 
best in the world for the seventh year in a row.134  
Apple practises supply management with precision in order to keep down costs. According to a 
detailed cost analysis for iPhone done by Teardown.com, the total bill of materials (BOM) and 
manufacturing (assembly and test) for a 16-gigabytes model iPhone 6, was $227 (Figure 12). In 
2014 the average retail price of an iPhone 6 was around $650.135 Among component parts, the 
most expensive were the display $41.50 (18%) followed by the A8 processor $37.00 (16%), and 
the baseband and transceiver chips $27.50 (12%).136 After considering warranty and other costs, 
Apple’s profit margin was estimated to be as high as 59%.137  
 
For technology companies, the cost of labor is minimal compared with the expense of 
components. For iPhone 6’s, the assembly and test cost amounts to $11 (Figure 13), of which the 
assembly cost alone is around $4 per phone (1.7% of the materials and manufacturing cost). For 
the iPad, a somewhat larger product, the estimated assembly cost (in 2010) was around $9 and 
                                                 
131 (Barboza 2016a) 
132 (Kakaes 2016) All suppliers are those making parts for iPhones, iPads and Macs. 
 (Finance Online 2014)https://financesonline.com/how-iphone-is-made/ 
133 (Gould and Villas-Boas 2016) 
134 (Gartner 2017)From 2016, Apple was categorised in the Master Class to which companies are classified if their 
composite score places them in the top 5 rankings for at least 7 out of the past 10 years. In 2016, only Apple and 
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135 (Young, et al. 2014) (Rassweiler 2014) 
136 (Young, et al. 2014) (Jones 2014) 
137 (Jones 2014) Excluding licensing, royalties, software, and other expenditures such as product development and 
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the total material cost $250.60 (excluding software, royalties and licensing fees), while the retail 
price was $499.138 
 
Figure 13 Cost Comparisons for the iPhone 5S, and Estimated Costs for the iPhone 6 and 
iPhone 6 Plus 
 
 
Source: Teardown.com 
 
4.2 China’s Role in iPhone Production 
In China: an average factory worker’s monthly salary is between $300 and $450 (2,000 and 
3,000 yuan) depending on the location of the factory.139 For example, a minimum monthly salary 
for a factory worker in Shanghai was $327 (US$1.90/hour, 2190 yuan) in 2016.140 In the US, the 
                                                 
138 (IHS Technology 2010) 
139 (China Labour Bulletin 2017) Monthly salary based on the standard work week of 40 hours. 
(China Labor Watch 2016)   
140 (China Labour Bulletin 2017) Monthly salary based on the standard work week of 40 hours. 
(China Labor Watch 2016) This report investigated the working condition at Pegatron Corporation with about 
70,000 factory workers in Shanghai, making products for Apple. They investigated more than 1,000 pay stubs and 
found: 1. Workers hourly rate is US$1.82. 2. Work hours of more than 10 hours a day, 6 days a week. 83% of 
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minimum monthly wage is $1,160 (US$7.25/hour) based on the Federal Fair Labor Standards 
Act.141  
 
However, Apple relies on Chinese manufacturers not only for a labor cost, but also for Chinese 
factories’ flexibility and scalability of production along with a skilled workforce. These criteria 
cannot be matched by counterparts located in the United States, so domestic manufacturing and 
assembly operations are not a viable option for most Apple products.142  
 
For example, Foxconn, owned by the Taiwanese manufacturer Hon Hai Group, is the world’s 
largest electronics contract manufacturer.143 In mainland China, Foxconn employs more than one 
million workers in 30 factories.144 It started to operate the world’s largest iPhone assembly 
factory in Zhengzhou, China in August 2010.145 
After specialized manufacturers produce components of the iPhone, all parts are shipped to 
contract manufacturers mostly in China, who then finish final assembly, testing and packaging 
(F.A.T.P).146  
In Zhengzhou, Foxconn produces about half of the world’s iPhones with a maximum potential 
production capacity of 350 iPhones production per minute or 500,000 iPhones a day.147 The 
factory covers 2.2 square miles, more than 1.5 times the size of Central Park in New York, and 
can employ up to 350,000 workers.148 There are 94 production lines on the site, and the finishing 
process takes about 400 steps to assemble the iPhone, including polishing, soldering, drilling and 
fitting screws.149 
                                                                                                                                                             
workers monthly overtime hours exceed 80 hours. 3.In October 2015, 71% of worker’s average weekly working 
hours exceeded Apples 60 hour per week maximum limit.  
141 (U.S. Department of Labor 2017b) 
142 (Kakaes 2016) (Duhigg and Bradsher 2012) 
143 http://www.foxconn.com/  Foxconn, owned by Taiwan’s Hon Hai Group, is one of the world’s biggest contract 
manufacturers - building and assembling for leading brands like Apple, Dell and Hewlett-Packard. 
144 (Leng 2017) 
145 (Barboza 2016a)  
146 (Barboza 2016b) Some assembly is done in Brazil. Also, according to Minasians (2017), in 2016, a discussion 
took place between the CEO of Apple, Tim Cook and Indian government officials about manufacturing in India.  
147 (Barboza 2016b) 
148 (Barboza 2016b) 
149 (Barboza 2016b) 
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4.3 China’s Comparative Advantage in iPhone Production 
China offers comparative advantages in a number of key areas: 
1. Flexibility and scalability with speed 
2. Abundant supply of semi-skilled workers 
3. Government incentives  
4. Access to the world’s largest consumer market, China 
5. Efficient logistics and inventory management 
 
1. Flexibility and Scalability with Speed 
When Apple’s sales took off after the introduction of the iPod in 2001, Foxconn had expertise, 
industrial skills and resources to meet the demand created by such a popular product. Its factories 
could quickly produce prototypes, increase production and, during peak periods, hire hundreds of 
thousands of workers. 150  Apple’s former executive Joe O’Sullivan explained, “They have 
brilliant tooling engineers, and they were willing to invest a lot to keep pace with Apple’s 
growth”.151 
 
There are many stories of how Chinese factories made tight timelines when required to do so. 
The most famous story dates from 2007. Apple’s founder, Steve Jobs noticed that the glass on 
his prototype iPhone was scratched by the keys in his jeans’ pocket, and demanded the use of 
scratch-proof glass on iPhones minutes before its launch in the world market. In a Shenzhen 
factory with 230,000 employees, Foxconn mobilized 8,000 workers within 30 minutes to start a 
12-hour shift replacing the glass screens on iPhones Within 96 hours, the plant was producing 
over 10,000 iPhones a day.152 Within three months from the launch, Apple had sold one million 
iPhones. 153 
 
Moreover, it is a logical decision to have an assembly factory located in China where it is in 
close proximity (in both the communication and spatial senses) to more than 300 of Apple’s 
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Chinese contractors.154 Thus, the rate of production at the Foxconn factory can be adjusted 
quickly to market demand without the time loss which usually results from a shortage of one or 
more components.  
 
In addition to the Chinese suppliers, there are more than 70 American companies in Apple’s 
supply chain. These American companies also have factories throughout the globe, and many of 
these are in Asia. Corning Inc. is based in Corning, New York, and manufactures a damage-
resistant screen cover glass. Corning built factories in Japan and Taiwan as demand grew.155 For 
Corning, these moves made sense because producing the glass close to assembly factories saved 
the time involved shipping its product from its US factories to Asia by boat which takes around 
35 days.156 Another example is Texas Instruments Inc. based in Dallas, Texas, which operates 
many facilities in Malaysia, Japan, the Philippines, Mexico, Germany, and Scotland.157 It is also 
important to note that some parts are made in the USA by foreign companies, such as those 
produced by Samsung in Austin, Texas (as mentioned on page 29).158  
 
Apple’s supply chain demonstrates how the global trade network is intertwined, and that it is not 
that simple to label products as “Made in the USA”.  
 
2. Semi-skilled workers 
In 2017, there will be about 8 million college graduates in China. Foxconn plans to recruit 
12,000 college graduates, plus 6,000 vocational school graduates. The founder Terry Gou’s goal 
is to transform Foxconn from a labor-intensive processing factory into a technology giant with 
upgraded talent. In his words, “When we are making new products, we need highly educated 
people”.159  
 
China offers an abundant supply of both low-level and mid-level skilled workers to 
accommodate fluctuating demand easily. In contrast, the US labour market lacks the capacity to 
                                                 
154 (Kakaes 2016) All suppliers are those making parts for iPhones, iPads and Macs. 
 (Finance Online 2014)https://financesonline.com/how-iphone-is-made/ 
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scale up production. For example, Apple’s executives estimated that the time needed to hire 
approximately 8,700 engineers to manage 200,000 assembly workers for iPhone production 
would be as long as nine months in the US, compared to 15 days in China.160 Thus, the US 
labour market can’t match China’s.  
 
3. Government incentives  
As China’s largest private employer, Foxconn has enviable negotiation leverage with Chinese 
governments and has obtained a “preferential policy” for its operations in return for its 
investment in the country. In the case of its Zhengzhou operation, these “preferential policies” 
affected multiple facets of the company’s operations, involving infrastructure, finance, labour, 
taxes, incentive bonuses and export logistics.161  
 
A bounty of perks from the local government were estimated to be worth more than $1.5 billion 
to Foxconn (Figure 14). Most importantly, the Chinese government set up a customs facility in a 
bonded zone next to the factory where the land is regarded as foreign territory, thereby 
exempting Foxconn from costly and cumbersome taxation and trade regulation.162 These benefits 
affect all stages of company operations from the planning and building of factories, to production, 
and post-production logistics. The scale of these incentives and the speed with which they were 
provided by the Chinese government would be impossible to replicate in the US. 
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Figure 14 Benefits supplied to Foxconn by the Zhengzhou government 
 
 
Source: (Barboza 2016a) 
 
4. Access to the world’s largest consumer market 
Apple routinely generates about two thirds of its annual revenue from iPhone sales. No other 
product, including the Mac computer, iPad or other services come close to generating the same 
level of revenue as the iPhone. 163 1n 2016, the American market was the most profitable 
geographical region, accounting for about 40% of its annual income. Europe has traditionally 
been the second largest market, and the source of 20% of its revenue.164 However, in the second 
quarter of fiscal 2015, Apple’s revenue in China surpassed its revenue in Europe for the first 
time. Since then, despite intense competition from Chinese domestic smartphone vendors, the 
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country has been the Apple’s second largest market.165 Although economic growth in China has 
been slowing down recently (on top of strict Chinese government policies against foreign 
companies), with a population of 1.37 billion,166 China will inevitably evolve into one of the 
world’s biggest consumer markets and therefore offers great future growth potential in the high-
end smartphone market. Thus, having its manufacturing hub in China is strategically important 
in the sense that it provides Apple with enviable access to the world’s largest consumer market.  
 
5. Efficient logistics and inventory management  
After assembling all of the components, testing and packaging are done at the Foxconn 
Zhengzhou facility, and the finished products are transported to the Chinese customs facility 
located just outside of the factory. At customs, the products are sold to Apple Inc., and then 
resold to Apple affiliates around the world. Many multinational companies, including Apple, 
believed that shipping goods out of Chinese territory, and shipping them back to China again was 
a waste of time and resources.167 Thus, during the planning stage of the Zhengzhou factory, 
Foxconn successfully negotiated with the Chinese government to have an efficient system in 
which final products are processed electronically as exported and imported at the customs 
facility next to the factory gate in the bonded zone. 168   
Officials stamp iPhones as “export” (from China) and then re-stamp them as “imports” (from 
overseas to China) at the customs facility. Once the products are declared as imports, a 17% 
Value Added Tax (VAT) and other national taxes are levied.169 IPhones are then transported by 
trucks which can hold up to 36,000 iPhones, worth about US$27 million per load, to Apple’s 
national distribution centers in Shanghai and other cities.170  
For overseas markets, iPhones are shipped mainly by freight carriers from the airport just three 
miles away from the factory. 171  Boeing 747s can easily carry 150,000 iPhones each flight. 
Shipments by air are destined for consumers who buy from Apple’s online store, or to US 
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warehouse facilities which include Elk Grove, Calfornia and a logistics hub in Louisville, 
Kentucky (Figure 11 on page 63). 
 
It takes about two days for the 590-mile journey (950 kilometers) from Zhengzhou to Shanghai 
by road transport, and about three days for the 6,300-mile (10,139 kilometers) journey to get the 
product to a store in San Francisco.172 
With this flexibility and scalability of Chinese production and logistics capability, Apple 
manages to have a disciplined and extremely efficient inventory management. Former Chief 
Operating Officer Tim Cook transformed Apple’s supply chain. He viewed inventory as 
“fundamentally evil” and noted that inventory would lose 1% to 2% of its value each week under 
normal conditions, and lose more value even faster when economic times were tough.173 In 2012 
Apple’s days of inventory (how long it will take to sell through the company’s current inventory) 
was only 5.3 days, while Dell’s days of inventory was 10.2 days and Motorola’s was 29 days.174 
By minimizing inventory and maximizing production when demand increases, Apple can deliver 
a product just days after the launch announcement compared to other companies these require 
weeks and months.175 
 
In 2016, Apple sold 211 million iPhones, 46 million iPads and 18 million Mac computers. All of 
them were manufactured overseas.176  
 
4.4 Measuring the China-US Trade Deficit using the iPhone Case Study  
As pointed out in Chapter 1, trade deficits are a red herring in debating the pros and cons of free 
trade. In addition, conventional trade metrics do not accurately take into account trade flows 
resulting from complex international supply chains. 
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At the end of March 2017, President Trump signed an executive order calling for a “90-day 
country-by-country and product-by-product study” of America’s $500 billion annual trade deficit 
in 2016, of which $300 billion derived from the lopsided trade flows with China.177 President 
Trump condemned trade deficits for destroying millions of jobs and stealing wealth from the US,  
as though it were a recent phenomenon which his administration would swiftly address. In fact, 
the US has been running trade deficits with the rest of the world since the 1970s, i.e. for almost a 
half a century.178  
 
According to a 2010 Asian Development Bank study, trade deficits are a misleading metric for 
measuring a country’s commercial health in a global context. 179  The report revealed that 
intertwined global supply chains made the calculation of actual trade imbalances difficult and 
that conventional trade statistics greatly inflate bilateral trade deficits between countries. The 
report estimated that the iPhone 3G imported into the US contributed $1.9 billion to the trade 
deficit with China in 2009. This was equivalent to 0.8% of the US trade deficit with China that 
year (Figure 15).180 Conventional trade metrics credited the full value of an iPhone ($178.9 per 
unit) as China exports to the US; however, about 95% of this originated outside China, these 
contributions were from Japan, Germany, and South Korea.181  The trade account should be 
calculated based on only the value added to the final product in China. If, for example, only the 
cost of $6.50 per unit for assembly, testing and packaging, multiplied by 11.3 million units sold 
the value of iPhones exported from China to the US would be only $73.45 million instead of 
$1.9 billion. Given that some of the lower value components are also made in China, these 
should be added to the calculation. Using value added as the basis for the trade balance 
calculation, Chinese manufacturers contributed only around 4% of the $1.9 billion deficit 
formally identified as the iPhone 3G contribution to the trade imbalance between China and the 
US.  
  
                                                 
177 (Donnan and Mitchell 2017) (U.S. Department of Commerce 2017) 
178 (Donnan and Mitchell 2017) 
179 (Xing and Detert 2010) 
180 (Xing and Detert 2010) p. 5. Total iPhone export amount from China was calculated as 11.3 million iPhone units 
exported to the US with a manufacturing cost US$178.96 each.  
181 (Xing and Detert 2010) p. 5.  
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Figure 15 IPhone and the US trade deficit 
 
 
 
Source: (Xing and Detert 2010) 
 
Using this value-added trade statistics approach, the ADB report estimated that in 2009 
American manufacturers supplied about 6% of the components and parts of the iPhone 3G, 
valued at $121 million ($10.50 per unit, and multiplied by 11.3 million sold).182  Thus, the 
contribution made by the US to iPhone components exported to China was $121 million. When 
this amount is compared with the amount of value added while the product was being assembled 
in China ($73 million), the US had a $48 million iPhone trade surplus with China in value added 
terms instead of the $1.9 billion cited in US trade statistics (Figure 15). 183  In effect, the 
components provided by American manufacturers were shipped back to the US as part of a 
finished iPhone and thus made a “round trip” as they were first exported and then reimported. 
                                                 
182 (Xing and Detert 2010) p. 5. The authors mentioned that it was possible that these American companies produced 
the components outside of the US However, in their paper, they counted the American company’s production value 
as American export to China.  
183 (Xing and Detert 2010) p.4. U.S. company component added value was calculated based on US$10.5 per unit 
multiplied by 11.3 million units sold or US$121 million. U.S. trade surplus calculation: U.S. value added US$121 
million minus Chinese value added of US$73 million.  
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Conventional trade statistics double counted as both an export from the US and an import to the 
US. The value of these exports would not be a component of the value exported from China 
using value added as the basis for trade statistics.184 
 
Figure 16 Unit sales of the Apple iPhone worldwide from 2007 to 2016 (in millions) 
 
 
Source: (Statista: the Statistics Portal 2017c) 
 
In 2015, Apple sold 231 million iPhone units worldwide (Figure 16). Applying the value-added 
calculation method for Apple iPhone 6’s sales in 2015, the assembly and test cost performed in 
China was $11, which accounted for only 4.8% of the value of the material and manufacturing 
cost of $277 (Figure 13 on page 65). The assembly cost alone was around $4 per phone, or about 
1.7% of the value added of the full manufacturing cost. Again, the cost of labor is minimal 
compared with the expense of components and other supply chain functions. If the value added 
base method had been adopted for trade in iPhone 6s, roughly only 5 % of $25 billion, or about 
$1.25 billion, would be credited as exports from China to the US.185  
The Asian Development Bank report concluded:  
                                                 
184 (Xing and Detert 2010) p.5. 
185 Calculation formula: 231 million iPhone sales times 40% = 92.4 million iPhones could be imported into the US 
in 2015. 92.4 million iPhone times $277/ cost per phone= $25.59 billion. This is one estimation for iPhone imports 
from China to the US and the amount of $25.59 billion could be included as U.S. trade deficit based on the 
conventional trade statistics. Based on the value-added method, iPhone exports of 92.4 million units times $11 
(Apple iPhone 6’s, the assembly and test cost performed in China at approximately $11 per unit) = $1,016 million.  
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The sharp contrast between the two different trade deficit measurements 
indicates that conventional trade statistics are not consistent with trade where 
global production networks and production fragmentations determine cross-
country flows of parts, components, and final products. Bilateral trade 
imbalances between a country used as a final assembler and its destination 
markets are greatly inflated by trade in intermediate products. These statistics 
provide a distorted picture about bilateral trade imbalances. The Sino-US 
bilateral trade imbalance has been greatly inflated.186  
 
This Apple case demonstrates how traditional trade statistics, which are based on a final 
product’s value when it is exported to a destination, fail to reflect the complexities of global 
supply chains where many steps such as design, manufacturing and assembly of products involve 
multiple countries. Many products exported from China are technically the products of American 
companies, and in 2010 a Wall Street Journal article pointed out that if trade statistics were 
adjusted to reflect the actual value contribution to a product by different countries, the size of the 
US trade deficit with China would be cut in half. 187 
 
4.5 Reshoring Apple Jobs 
Many American politicians, including President Trump and President Obama, have wondered if 
Apple could manufacture some devices in the US instead of China or other countries.188 Since 
the presidential campaign, President Trump has called for manufacturing jobs to be brought back 
to the US, which leads people to believe in returning jobs in assembly lines, such as General 
Motors’ assembly factory in Detroit in its heyday decades ago. However, this image of 
production is just a small part of the vast manufacturing industry and does not represent the 
whole manufacturing world. The world has changed since then, and these jobs cannot be 
recaptured. Is it even possible or desirable for Apple to bring iPhone manufacturing back to the 
US? The obvious answer is ‘no’. Even if it were possible, it would not be in Apple’s interest to 
do so.  
 
                                                 
186 (Xing and Detert 2010) p. 6.  
187 (Batson 2010) 
188 (Duhigg and Bradsher 2012) 
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Offshore manufacturing enables Apple to take advantage of an abundant supply of workers, just 
in time component availability, and manufacturing knowledge. Chinese factories offer Apple the 
flexibility it needs to produce a competitive product, particularly an ability to rapidly increase 
manufacturing volume in tandem with demand. These comparative advantages are impossible to 
replicate in the US. Also, global supply chain management enables Apple to have a disciplined 
and extremely efficient inventory management system which gives it a strong competitive edge 
in the tough global market. This global supply chain, including outsourcing, assembling and 
other manufacturing functions, is a complicated and sophisticated operation, and its complexity 
and benefits are often not fully understood and are completely omitted from the political debate.  
 
Companies like Apple, which are selling products which are in great demand, have little choice 
but to rely on outsourcing on a global scale to meet demand. In the past, large electronics 
companies such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Apple designed and manufactured their own 
products primarily for the domestic market. However, as globalization advances and technology 
become increasingly sophisticated, products are assembled from components sourced beyond 
national and firm boundaries.189  
Realistically, no single country is the source of all innovation. Thus, many companies need 
specialized partners to bring innovative products to market in sufficient quantities to satisfy 
global demand.190 The global supply chain system enables Apple to access suppliers who can 
offer the best quality components at competitive prices. Were Apple forced to make its products 
in the US, the company would lose its competitive advantage. The value added to the economy 
of the world as a whole and the US in particular, would be significantly diminished or vanish.  
According to one analysis of the distribution of economic value from Apple iPad and iPhone’s 
global sales,191 in 2010, Apple captured the largest gross profit margin of 58.5% for iPhone4 and 
30% for iPad. South Korean manufacturers such as LG and Samsung who supplied some of the 
expensive components like displays and memory chips followed with a gross profit margin of 
between 5% and 7% of (Figure 17 and Figure 18).192 The rest of the sub-contractors’ share of 
                                                 
189 (Linden, Kraemer and Dedrick 2009) 
190 (Linden, Kraemer and Dedrick 2009) 
191 (Kraemer, Linden and Dedrik 2011) 
192 (Linden, Kraemer and Dedrick 2009) 
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gross profits were rather small, especially those captured by Chinese manufacturers, which were 
in the order of only 1.8% to 2%.193 In general, companies whose components are innovative and 
embody proprietary technology obtain higher profit margins. The total cost of inputs and 
materials were relatively modest and amounted to only 21.9% of the price of iPhone 4, compared 
to Apple’s 58.5% profit margin. For an iPad, the corresponding percentages are 31% for the cost 
of inputs and materials, and 30% profit margin.  
In other words, Apple earns high margins by specializing in product design, software 
development, product management and marketing in the US. On the other hand, Chinese sub-
contractors handled the high-volume but low value-added functions, and their earnings were 
much smaller compared to the firms which manufactured the more sophisticated componentry. 
Apple’s innovation and management ability are critical, and these functions remain within the 
US headquarters because it would be difficult and expensive to replicate these competences 
elsewhere.  
Figure 17 Distribution of value for iPhone, 2010 
 
 
Source: (Kraemer, Linden and Dedrik 2011) 
                                                 
193 (Kraemer, Linden and Dedrik 2011) 
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Figure 18 Distribution of value for iPad, 2010 
 
 
Source: (Kraemer, Linden and Dedrik 2011)  
 
By contracting out high-volume, low-wage labor functions to China, Apple is able to price its 
iPhones and iPads within the budgets of a large swath of consumers, and, as a result, many spin-
off businesses have been created. As Ikenson of the Cato Institute has pointed out:  
 
Had all of the components been produced and all of the assembly performed in 
the United States, prices would be higher and this would have prevented those 
devices from becoming quite so ubiquitous, and the incentives for the 
emergence of spin-off industries, such as apps, accessories, Uber, and Airbnb, 
would have been muted or absent. 194 
 
As of January 2016, Apple estimated that it was supporting and creating 1.9 million American 
jobs, including the considerable community of application creators, software engineers and 
entrepreneurs building applications for iOS, as well as non-information technology jobs 
supported directly and indirectly through the “app” economy.195  
                                                 
194 (Ikenson 2016) 
195 (Apple Inc. 2016b) 
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In effect, Apple has established a “designed in the US and made in China” global supply chain 
model, and generates enviable profit margins. It invests more than 10% of its gross profit in 
technology and research to develop the next generation of innovation.196  
Since the Internet came into our daily lives in the late 1980s, the business world has been shifting 
in a direction it was previously impossible to imagine. New businesses such as Google, Amazon, 
Facebook, Uber, Instagram, and Airbnb have emerged. The digital revolution and new 
technology have radically changed the business environment, and the way businesses operate 
today is totally different from a couple of decades ago. The fundamental difficulty of trade issues 
is “to see what you don’t see”. Apple’s global supply chain is a prime example of modern 
international manufacturing networks that are invisible to the consumers. Delivery of innovative 
devices, with reasonable retail prices and high profit margins in a competitive market, requires 
global partners and collaboration.  
 
5. Boeing: Business Survival Requires Cooperation and Collaboration  
 
In the next section, the case of the Boeing aerospace company is used to explore how 
globalization and the associated supply management chain enables a more traditional American 
manufacturing company to successfully adapt to a changing business environment. This example 
contrasts sharply with the Kodak case.  
 
5.1 Boeing Profile 
Boeing is one of the two largest aerospace firms in the world and America’s largest single 
exporter (according to conventional trade statistics). Boeing celebrated its 100th anniversary in 
2016. 197  Boeing is more of a traditional manufacturing company than Apple and does some of 
its assembly in the US where it employed 150,500 workers in 2016.198 
 
                                                 
196 (Apple Inc 2016a) p. 39. According to 2016 annual report, Apple’s gross margin rate was 39% (net sales $215 
billion cost of sales $131 billion, thus gross revenue $84 billion), and research and development expense was $10 
billion and net income after taxes was $46 billion (21% of net profit margin).  
197 (Boeing 2017a) p33. According to 2016 annual report, Boeing’s total revenue was $94.57 billion, gross revenue 
of $5.83 billion (gross margin rate at 6.1%), research and development expense of $4.62 billion, net income of $4.89 
billion (net profit margin rate at 5 %), and total assets of $90 billion.  
198 (Boeing 2017a) p.19. As of December 31, 2016. 
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In February 2017, President Trump visited Boeing’s factory in South Carolina, which is one of 
two locations where Boeing's latest 787 Dreamliner is assembled. The facility employs 
approximately 7,500 people. 199  In front of an audience of Boeing workers and dignitaries, 
President Trump vowed to protect US manufacturing jobs and said, “We want products made by 
our workers, in our factories, stamped with those four magnificent words: Made in the USA”. 200 
 
The 787 Dreamliner is assembled in the US and the product is therefore ‘made in the USA’. 
However, what President Trump does not see is that about 30% of the parts and components of 
this ‘Made in America’ product is purchased from foreign companies that make up Boeing’s 
global supply chain.201 The Dreamliner 787 has about 2.3 million parts which range from the 
‘fasten seatbelt’ signs to the huge jet engines supplied either by General Electric in the US or 
Rolls-Royce in the UK.202 Its wings and batteries originate in Japan, wing tips in South Korea, 
and floor beams in India. A further long list of components is supplied by many off-shore firms 
(Figure 19). In fact, the Dreamliner is so much a product of international collaboration that it 
could be called a “flying symbol of an inter-connected world economy”.203   
 
Through Boeing’s extended global supply chain, the company spent $28 billion and procured 
783 million parts from 5,400 factories worldwide in one year (Figure 20).204 These ‘made in the 
US’ planes are delivered to more than 60 airlines worldwide. In 2016, Boeing earned 
approximately 59% of its revenues from non-US customers.205 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
199 (B. Zhang 2017) (Boeing 2017d)http://www.boeing.com/company/general-info/ 
200 (B. Zhang 2017) 
201 (Boeing 2017c) 
202 (Boeing 2017c)  (B. Zhang 2017) (Boeing 2017a)The latest model 787-10 Dreamliner with maximum capacity 
330 passengers with expected first delivery in 2018. 
203 (B. Zhang 2017) 
204 (Boeing 2017c) 
205 (Boeing 2017a) 
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Figure 19 Global Origins of the Boeing Dreamliner 
 
 
 
Source: (B. Zhang 2017) 
 
Figure 20 The Boeing Extended Global Supply Chain 
 
 
 
Source: (Boeing 2017b) 
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According to Boeing’s website, potential suppliers (tier 1 suppliers) are assessed with respect to 
a range of rigorous criteria, including  quality of products, financial health, geographic location, 
on-time delivery and overall customer-supplier relations.206 Also, the necessary skill to manage 
sub-tier supply chain contractors (tier 2 and other downstream manufacturers) who provide raw 
materials and other items to the first-tier Boeing suppliers, is a key criterion. Including these sub-
tier suppliers, the total number of suppliers could be in the thousands.207  
 
5.2 Global Trade and its Impact on the American Economy  
The aerospace industry provides other instructive examples of how globalization benefits the 
American economy. For example, the American aerospace equipment company, Triumph Group 
Inc., headquartered in Pennsylvania, manufactures a wide range of components from aircraft 
wings to helicopter cabins, supplies various systems for its own use and the global OEM 
(original equipment manufacturer) market, and offers after sales services.208 In 2016, about 38% 
of its net sales comes from sales to Boeing and other revenue come from US-based customers.209 
Triumph’s CEO, Daniel J. Crowley, pointed out that they were under intense pressure from 
Boeing and Airbus to supply reliable components for passenger aircraft as required: “[w]hen we 
usually have challenges to deliver… it’s because of lower-tier suppliers’ capacity shortfall”.210 
Triumph has 6,000 smaller, lower-tier suppliers in its own production supply chain. In the first 
financial quarter of 2017, the profit of Boeing’s European rival company, Airbus, declined by 
more than 50% because delivery of its aircraft was held up by technical glitches identified in the 
                                                 
206 (Boeing 2017c) 
207 (Kavilanz 2013)  According to the article, details on the world suppliers list: Italian firm Alenia Aeronautica -the 
center fuselage: French firm Messier-Dowty -the aircraft's landing-gear system; German firm Diehl Luftfahrt 
Elektronik- the main cabin lighting; Swedish firm Saab Aerostructures- the access doors; Japanese company Jamco- 
parts for the lavatories, flight deck interiors and galleys. 
208  (Triumph Goup Inc. 2016) p.3, (Investopedia n.d.) According to Investopedia, a definition of ‘Original 
Equipment Manufacturer- OEM’ is a company whose goods are used as components in the products of another 
company, which sells the finished items to users. These firms are referred to as value added resellers (VAR) and 
work closely with the OEM. 
209 (Triumph Goup Inc. 2016) pp.6-8, 31. The company is a tier 1 and tier 2 aerospace components and system 
supplier. The company specializes in metallic and composite aero-structures and structural components, and 
manufactures a wide range of components from aircraft wings to helicopter cabins for the global OEM markets. The 
company also offers repairs, maintenance, and overhaul services. As of March 31, 2016, Triumph employed 14,602 
workers of whom 9,341 were production workers in the US Revenue for the year ending March 31, 2016 was 
$3,886 million.  
210 (Hollinger 2016) 
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engines manufactured by the American supplier Pratt & Whitney, and by shortages of interior 
fittings and seats also supplied by an American business, Zodiac Aerospace.211  
 
Like Apple, Boeing and its suppliers have been investing heavily to establish a tight network of 
suppliers with the overall objective of collaborating in order to produce reliable, competitively 
priced products which can be delivered in a timely manner. Boeing and its many suppliers take 
on significant risk developing their products, investing in production capacity, taking on long 
term contracts, and accepting unlimited liability while maintaining price competitiveness.212 In a 
competitive market environment, participants survive by being innovative, having diverse 
product portfolios and controlling costs. 213   
 
President Trump’s hardline stance on globalization threatens American firms which have 
invested heavily in global supply chain cooperation and partnerships.214 Imposing import tariffs 
and limiting global trade would be effective for only a short period, and protect only a few 
American producers and some jobs. Eventually, trade restrictions would reduce business 
competitiveness, undermining the competitiveness of ‘made in America’ products in the 
international market and weakening the American economy as a whole.  
 
In 2016, American companies sold $2.2 trillion worth of goods and services overseas, and 
American businesses and consumers purchased $2.7 trillion worth of imports.215 The total value 
of international trading activity ($4.9 trillion) accounted for 26% of the total value of US GDP 
($18.5 trillion). America’s three biggest trade partners were Canada, Mexico, and China, and the 
combined total trade value with these partners ($1.65 trillion) was more than one-third of the 
total value of US trade ($4.9 trillion).216 More importantly, in terms of employment, more than 
27 million Americans, or about one in five, had jobs that were directly supported by global 
trade.217 
 
                                                 
211 (Katz 2017) 
212 (Hollinger 2016) 
213 (Hollinger 2016) 
214 (White House 2017a) 
215 (M. J. Perry 2017a) 
216 (M. J. Perry 2017a) 
217 (M. J. Perry 2017a) 
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International trade is a vital part of the US economy and has a positive impact on each of the 50 
states.218 Based on 2015 data, five states, Michigan, Louisiana, South Carolina, Tennessee and 
Kentucky generated more than one third of their GDP from international trade.219 These states 
have a significant presence in the manufacturing (auto and aerospace) and energy related 
industries. In 2016, exports of $150 million in automotive vehicles, parts and engines were the 
largest category of US exports, followed by commercial aircraft exports of $121 billion.220 These 
manufacturers are highly integrated into global supply chains and have a huge economic impact 
and contribute significantly to employment in many US states. For example, the aerospace 
manufacturer Boeing in Washington State accounted for 60% of the exported value from the 
state in 2015, and employed about 35,000 non-management workers. 221  
 
Besides the aerospace sector, the auto industry is the most highly globalized industry. In general, 
imported auto parts constituted more than 50% of ‘Made in the USA’ vehicles sold under US 
brand names such as GM and Ford in the US. The North American auto industry relies heavily 
on cross-border trade. For example, manufacturers in Michigan purchase many parts from 
Mexico and export finished products to Canada, taking advantage of NAFTA. These industries’ 
practices blur the distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ products and expand their factory 
floors beyond national borders, which are becoming irrelevant in the 21st century business 
environment.222  
 
6. Creative Destruction in Action 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Joseph Schumpeter introduced the term “creative destruction”. He 
pointed out that capitalism was a complex system in which two distinct processes operated 
simultaneously: a static component (in which technology was constant and where growth could 
be obtained by utilising the given technology over more resources) and an evolutionary 
component in which technology changed over time increasing the efficiency with which a given 
                                                 
218 (M. J. Perry 2017b)  
219 (M. J. Perry 2017b) 
220 (Amadeo 2017) 
221 (M. J. Perry 2017b) (Hammerand 2017) 
222 (M. J. Perry 2017b) 
86 
 
quantity of resources were utilized. When describing the ‘evolutionary’ component of the 
economic process, he wrote in his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy:  
 
Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or method of economic change and not 
only never is but never can be stationary…The opening up of new markets, 
foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop to 
such concerns as US Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation—if I 
may use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a 
new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about 
capitalism.223 
 
He stated that this evolutionary character of capitalism came from “the new consumer goods, the 
new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, [and] the new forms of industrial 
organization that capitalist enterprise creates”.224 
 
History is littered with examples of creative destruction: automobiles replacing horse carriages, 
electric lights replacing gas lamps, cell phone devices replacing digital cameras, internet news 
replacing newspapers, and Uber replacing traditional taxi services. Michael Munger, a professor 
of economics at Duke University, has described this process as “[e]conomic competition implies 
the replacement of inferior systems of production and distribution by more efficient mechanisms; 
new and better ideas work through killing off the old ways, the old firms, and the old jobs”.225  
 
This “creative destruction” is, in essence, the same concept as Darwinian “survival of the fittest”. 
Indeed, obsolete businesses have been replaced constantly by new ones. For example, the 
Fortune 500 is the list of companies which are incorporated and operate in the US and ranked by 
total revenues for their respective fiscal years.226 Since 1955, the year in which the first Fortune 
500 list was created, more than 1,800 companies have appeared on the list.227 Comparing the first 
                                                 
223 (Schumpeter 1943/1968) pp.82-83. 
224 (Schumpeter 1943/1968) p.83. Schumpeter also wrote “[w]hereas a stationary feudal economy would still be a 
feudal economy, and a stationary socialist economy would still be a socialist economy, stationary capitalism is a 
contradiction in terms” (Schumpeter 1951: 174).  
225 (Munger 2015) 
226 (Fortune 500 n.d.)  
227 (Fortune 500 2017) 
87 
 
1955 Fortune 500 list to the 2016 one, there were only 60 companies (12%) that appeared in both 
lists (see table below).228 In other words, over 61 years, 88% of companies have fallen out of the 
Fortune 500 list of public companies. Some merged with other companies but many (including 
Kodak) went bankrupt and ceased operating.229  
 
Table 1 The 60 Companies that Appeared in the Fortune 500 in both 1995 and 2016 
 
 
Source: (M. J. Perry 2015) 
 
Another analysis undertaken by the business consulting firm Innosight, looked at the changes 
that have occurred in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 list over the past half century.230 The 
businesses included in the S&P 500 list are the most valuable public companies traded on the US 
stock exchange.231 According to the report, companies in the S&P 500 Index in 1965 stayed in 
                                                 
228 (M. J. Perry 2015) 
229 (M. J. Perry 2015) 
230 (Anthony, Viguerie and Waldeck 2016) p.2.  
231 According to Investopedia, the S&P 500 Index is an index of 500 American companies with market capitalization 
value about $2.5 billion. The 500 companies included in the S&P 500 are selected by the S&P Index Committee, a 
team of analysts and economists at Standard & Poor's. These experts consider various factors when determining the 
500 stocks that are included in the index, including market size, liquidity and industry grouping. The S&P 500 is 
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the index for an average of 33 years, in 1990, average tenure in the S&P500 had narrowed to 20 
years, and it is forecast to shrink to 14 years by 2026 (Figure 21).232 The report stated that 
“Shrinking lifespans are in part driven by a complex combination of technology shifts and 
economic shocks, some of which are beyond the control of corporate leaders. But frequently, 
companies miss opportunities to adapt or take advantage of change”.233  
 
Figure 21 Average company lifespan on S&P 500 Index in years (rolling 7-year average) 
 
 
Source: Innosight (Anthony, Viguerie and Waldeck 2016) 
 
In the 6 years between 2009 and 2015, well-known names such as Eastman Kodak, J.C. Penny, 
the New York Times and US steel were replaced in the S&P 500 list by Facebook, PayPal, 
Netflix and Illumina, all companies with new products and services (Table 2).234 In 2015 alone, 
28 companies (5.6%) were replaced, and at the predicted rate of ‘churn’, about half the S&P 500 
                                                                                                                                                             
widely regarded as the most accurate gauge of the performance of American equities with significant capitalization. 
Source: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sp500.asp 
232 (Anthony, Viguerie and Waldeck 2016) p. 2.  
233 (Anthony, Viguerie and Waldeck 2016) p.4.  
234 (Anthony, Viguerie and Waldeck 2016) p. 3.  
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firms will be replaced over the next 10 years. 235 Most important, since 1965 more than 1,600 
companies appeared on the list at one time or another. However, only 64 companies (12.8%) had 
“endured on the list for all of the past 50 years”. 236 Among them are big manufacturers like 
Boeing, General Electric, and Caterpillar, and consumer businesses such as Coca-Cola, 3M, and 
Proctor & Gamble.  
 
Table 2 S&P 500 turnover from 2009 to 2015 
 
 
 
Source: Innosight (Anthony, Viguerie and Waldeck 2016) 
 
According to Mark J. Perry, an economist at the American Enterprise Institute, “[t]he constant 
turnover in the Fortune 500 is a positive sign of the dynamism and innovation that characterizes 
a vibrant consumer-oriented market economy, and that dynamic turnover is speeding up in 
today’s hyper-competitive global economy”.237 The constant churning of the Fortune 500 and 
                                                 
235 (Anthony, Viguerie and Waldeck 2016) p. 3.  
236 (Anthony, Viguerie and Waldeck 2016) p. 3.  
237 (M. J. Perry 2015) 
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S&P 500 companies occurs because, over time, business products and services are constantly 
evolving. Only companies, that deliver high quality products and services to customers at low 
prices with great after sales services, can survive in the competitive market. Consumers vote with 
their dollars and choose those products with better quality and lower costs. Ultimately, 
consumers are huge beneficiaries of Schumpeterian creative destruction.  
 
On the other hand, this “survival for fittest” environment is tough on those businesses that are 
rendered obsolete and even tougher on their employees. In many cases, companies miss 
opportunities to adapt or evolve in response to changes in the market environment thereby 
making their eventual demise inevitable. Kodak, for instance, continued to apply existing 
business models to new markets, failed to respond to disruptive technologies and to invest in new 
growth areas. In the longer term, only companies that continually find ways to reinvent 
themselves, and transform themselves from their historic core business into new ventures are 
able to “control their own” futures.238   
 
As technology advances, societies become wealthier, and the capital markets shift “resources 
from declining sectors to more valuable uses as workers, inputs, and financial capital constantly 
strive to maximize their returns”.239 Old jobs have been replaced by new more productive jobs 
which contribute more value to the economy (Table 3).  
 
While technology replaces some jobs, it also creates new work in industries that were 
unimaginable in the past. According to a report issued by the business consulting firm McKinsey, 
“[o]ne-third of new jobs created in the United States in the past 25 years were types that did not 
exist, or barely existed, in areas including IT development, hardware manufacturing, app creation, 
and IT systems management”. The report concludes that overall, the net impact of new 
technology on employment can be strongly positive.240  
 
 
 
                                                 
238 (Anthony, Viguerie and Waldeck 2016) p.8. 
239 (Cox and Alm 2008)  
240 (Manyika, Technology, jobs, and the future of work 2017) 
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Table 3 Job Destruction and Job Creation from 1900 to 2016 
 
Job Destruction Year Number of 
employees 
Year  Number of 
Employees 
Carriage and harness makers 1900 
           
109,000  2016       Less than 5,000 
Cobblers 1900 
           
102,000  2016 Less than 5,000   
Blacksmiths 1910 
           
238,000  2016 Less than 5,000   
Railroad employees 1920 
        
2,076,000  2014                235,000  
Farm workers 1910 
     
11,533,000  2016                533,000  
 
Job creation         
Auto mechanics 1900 
                       
-    2016                647,380  
Engineers 1900 
              
38,000  2016            2,499,050  
Truck, Bus and Taxi drivers 1900 
                       
-    2016            3,863,100  
Computer 
programmers/scientists/analysts etc. 1900 
                       
-    2016            3,997,370  
Pharmacists 1970 
           
114,590  2016                305,510  
 
Source: Cox and Alm 2008, US Department of Labor Occupational Employment Statistics at 
https://www.bls.gov/oes/    
 
New technology and globalization have been changing the nature of businesses across all 
industries and occupations. In the 21st century, a global supply chain is used not only in 
manufacturing industry but also in various other industries, including banking, accounting, legal 
services, auto manufacturing, and pharmaceuticals. 241 However, economic and technological 
changes have not been always welcome. An economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas W. 
Michael Cox and an economics writer Richard Alm wrote in their article Creative Destruction:  
 
[o]ver the past two centuries, the Western nations that embraced capitalism have 
achieved tremendous economic progress as new industries supplanted old ones. 
Even with the higher living standards, however, the constant flux of free 
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enterprise is not always welcome. The disruption of lost jobs and shuttered 
businesses is immediate, while the payoff from creative destruction comes 
mainly in the long term. As a result, societies will always be tempted to block 
the process of creative destruction, implementing policies to resist economic 
change.242 
 
As there is always some support for the status quo and resistance to change, this is particularly 
true in the political arena, where attention is frequently attracted by lost jobs rather than the new 
jobs created. They continue: 
 
[a]ttempts to save jobs almost always backfire. Instead of going out of business, 
inefficient producers hang on, at a high cost to consumers or taxpayers. The 
tinkering short circuits market signals that shift resources to emerging industries. 
It saps the incentives to introduce new products and production methods, leading 
to stagnation, layoffs, and bankruptcies. The ironic point of Schumpeter’s iconic 
phrase is this: societies that try to reap the gain of creative destruction without 
the pain find themselves enduring the pain but not the gain.243 
 
The graphic below (Figure 22) compares sales revenue for nine companies in their seventh year 
of operation in inflation adjusted dollar in 2016 value. Surprisingly Google’s revenue ($6.1 
billion in 2005) or Uber Technologies Inc.’s ($6.5 billion in 2016) were much larger than those 
reported by Microsoft and the retail giant Walmart in their 7th year in existence.244 
As technology advances, the economy is increasingly integrated at a global scale and is heavily 
dependent on digital telecommunication. The costs associated with starting a business and the 
other fixed and operation costs can be dramatically reduced, and businesses can grow rapidly 
around an innovative idea which is readily accepted in the world market.  
 
 
 
                                                 
242 (Cox and Alm 2008) This article is an introduction to a new edition of Schumpeter’s, In Capitalism, Socialism, 
and Democracy. Please see at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/CreativeDestruction.html 
243 (Cox and Alm 2008) 
244 (M. J. Perry 2017c) 
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Figure 22 Company Sales Revenue at Year 7 in Inflation Adjusted 2016 Dollars 
 
 
 
Source: M. J. Perry (2017c)  
For example, Uber’s 7th year of operating revenue of $6.5 billion in 2016 was more than 46 times 
greater than Walmart’s sales in its seventh year in 1982. 245  The nature of business is 
fundamentally different, as a comparison between the retail giant Walmart and the transportation 
provider Uber highlights. Each new business innovation renders many existing businesses 
obsolete. Much of the justification for protection of existing businesses and the employment they 
provide amounts to a counterproductive action to slow or halt the process of technical change.  
6.1 Make Work Bias 
Modernization inevitably causes certain types of jobs to disappear. The process of technical 
change over time increases productivity. All the economies of the so called ‘developed’ countries 
have experienced a shift away from labor intensive agriculture, to less labor-intensive 
manufacturing and then to more service-oriented industries. These shifts brought many benefits 
including higher wages, better working conditions, and quality of life improvements.  
 
In the US, some manufacturing jobs have disappeared, but this has been the trend for decades. 
President Trump’s obsession with bringing back manufacturing jobs to America reflects a 
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concept described by Caplan (see Chapter 1) as a “make work bias”.246 Politicians tend to judge 
economic performance not by productivity, but by number of jobs. Looking back through 200 
years of American history, one can see the shift in the labour force. In 1870, a majority of the 
workforce, 53%, were farmers and at that time one farmer could only support five people. In 
2016, less than 2% of the workforce was engaged in the agriculture sector, and one farmer could 
feed 168 people.247 More important than the decline in the number of farmers, is the increase in 
their productivity and efficiency. In 2015, American farmers produced 262% more food with 2% 
fewer inputs (labor, seeds, feed, fertilizer, etc.) compared with 1950.248   
 
Politicians would be ridiculed if they exhorted their citizens to go back to farming on the land 
with horse power to “Make America Great Again”. Efforts to turn back the clock by repatriating 
manufacturing jobs are just as ludicrous, apart from the fact that those who have recently lost 
their jobs in manufacturing are a significant political constituency, whereas the descendants of 
displaced farm labour are generally gainfully employed in other sectors of the economy.  
 
The objective of President Trump’s policy should be to encourage the evolution of the economy 
instead of focusing on employing more people in positions that are no longer economically 
viable. The strength of the economy does not depend on the number of people employed, but on 
the value added to the economy by the people who are employed.  
 
7. The Invisible and Inconvenient Truth of Global Trade for President Trump 
 
7.1 Correlation between Imports and Exports 
An analysis of the economic impacts of trade on each American state’s GDP demonstrates how 
imports (inputs) and exports (final products) are interrelated and affect the US economy as a 
whole. Since the US is already well-integrated into global supply chains for inputs, parts, and 
other supplies (Boeing and GM), and for final products (Apple iPhone), it is safe to say that US 
imports generate US exports and vice versa.  
 
                                                 
246 (Caplan 2014) 
247 (World Bank n.d.), (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1949) p.63. 
248 (American Farm Bureau Federation 2017) 
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No country has only exports or imports. Trade involves exchange, whether those exchanges 
involve goods and services only, or involve financial capital for payments and investments. In 
general, major exporting countries are also major importing countries (Figure 23).  
 
Figure 23 The Financials of Exporting & Importing (based on 2010 data) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Visually 2017) 
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The top ranked international trading countries have more or less comparable levels of exports 
and imports in terms of value. The fundamental reason for this is that imports and exports are 
“two sides of the same coin”.249  Historically US exports and imports values have moved in 
tandem (Figure 24).  
 
Figure 24 US Exports and Imports from 1990-2015 
 
 
 
Sources: (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis): Original data from US Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Bureau of 
the Census. 
 
Government trade policies, which have a reduction in imports as their objective, would 
eventually adversely affect exports. Similarly, although unlikely, any policy which sought to 
reduce exports would eventually reduce the level of imports. President Trump’s argument 
centers only on imports and therefore misses the big picture in the globalized trade world. As 
Irwin has stated, “If a government undertakes policies that systematically reduce the volume of 
                                                 
249 (Irwin 1996) According to Irwin, this correlation has been debated since the 1840s in England, with respect to 
whether repeal of the Corn Laws, legislation that limited British grain imports, would increase exports. More 
historical debate regarding this matter is in Irwin’s paper.  
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imports, it also systematically reduces the volume of exports. The reasons may be indirect and 
less than obvious, but they are still present and have to be reckoned with”. 250 
 
7.2 A Tax on Imports is Equivalent to a Tax on Exports 
Another point which is usually ignored in the political discussion of trade policy and generally 
escapes the attention of the general public is that a “tax on imports is equivalent to a tax on 
exports”. Any constraint on imports acts, in effect, as a constraint on exports”.251 President 
Trump criticized the 1994 NAFTA trade deal as a “one-sided deal”, and stated that Mexico’s 
trade surplus with the US since 1995 was evidence that Mexico was “taking advantage” of 
access to the US market.252  
 
Based on 2016 US trade data, more than half of all goods imported from overseas into the US 
were orders from American manufacturers and businesses, and most of these items were used as 
intermediate goods for the production of final goods which are made available on the open 
market. As Table 4 below shows, these intermediate goods included capital goods (industrial 
machines, semiconductors, equipment machinery, tools, parts etc.) and industrial supplies 
(chemicals, petroleum products, lumber, plastics, metals, etc.). Capital goods accounted for 27% 
of US goods imports, industrial supplies for 20%, and automobile parts & engines (excluding 
finished vehicles) accounted for 7%.  
 
On the other hand, imported consumer goods such as apparel, cell phones, toys, games, etc. as 
ready-to-use final products accounted for only 26% of the total goods imported (Table 4 and 
Figure 25). In other words, American businesses are the largest consumers of imports by a large 
margin, and US consumers are relatively minor purchasers of imports.  
 
 
  
                                                 
250 (Irwin 1996) p.9.  
251 (Irwin 1996) p.2.  
252 (Bartash 2017) 
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Table 4 US Imports and Exports by End-Use Category and Commodity 
 
2016 (in billion dollars)      
% Share of Goods 
Traded 
End-use category Imports Exports Imports Exports 
Capital goods  589.98 519.36 27% 36% 
Cars, parts, engines 147.19 78.91 7% 5% 
* Finished vehicles 203.06 71.06 9% 5% 
Industrial supplies 443.77 397.76 20% 27% 
Consumer goods 583.79 193.65 26% 13% 
Foods, feeds, beverages 130.26 130.73 6% 9% 
Other 90.89 63.16 4% 4% 
Total 2209.92 1459.84 100% 100% 
Source:  (U.S. Department of Commerce 2017) 
 
Figure 25 US imports and Exports by End-Use Category and Commodity 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on US Department of Commerce’s data. *in billion dollars in 2016 data. 
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Mexico has benefitted from the substantial growth of its automobile industry since NAFTA came 
into effect in 1994.253 In 2015, the US bought more than $40 billion worth of OEM auto parts 
from Mexico, which were used by American manufacturers in the assembly of their products 
(Figure 26).254  
 
Figure 26 Trade between the US and Mexico in 2015 
 
  
Source: (Bartash 2017) 
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254 (Bartash 2017) 
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If imports from Mexico were to be subjected to import tariffs and the other restrictive measures 
President Trump has proposed, component prices would rise. This would occur whether or not 
the parts in question continued to be imported from Mexico, which would inevitably be the case 
in the short term, or whether in the medium or longer term these components were manufactured 
in the U.S either by automakers themselves or by third party domestic component suppliers. GM 
and Ford assembly plants in Michigan would incur increased costs for their inputs. In the end, 
increases in the price of imports would result in higher prices for vehicles assembled in the 
United States, and ultimately lead to reduced sales, and job losses in the businesses affected. 255   
 
Mexico benefited from NAFTA and has become a major producer of automobiles, electronics 
and appliances, and more Mexicans are employed in these sectors as a consequence of American 
offshoring. Labor intensive functions are visible targets for segments of the American public and 
for politicians. However, it is worth remembering that American manufacturers benefit hugely 
through outsourcing these functions and the resultant intra-industry trade, because their 
productivity and competitiveness in the world market are significantly enhanced. American 
businesses have many options when it comes to where and when they procure inputs and where 
they allocate investment. Selling more “Made in America” products needs more foreign partners 
and imports of raw materials and components. 
 
Restricting imports and imposing tariffs on parts, components, equipment and finished products 
would reduce the competitiveness of American businesses. The sales volume of products such as 
Boeing aircraft, GM cars, and Apple iPhones would decline. Such restrictive trade measures 
would also lead to the reallocation of resources such as investment away from export-oriented 
manufacturers toward industries which are protected in various ways from foreign competition.  
 
History is littered with cases where protective measures which benefit only a few politically 
influential producers have negatively impacted other US businesses. For example, US Steel 
successfully lobbied for protection from imports in 1984. Although these measures were 
intended to protect the steel industry, they adversely affected industries which consumed steel 
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such as Caterpillar and other “metal-bashing” businesses.256 In the past few years, US anti-
dumping duties on hot-rolled steel flat products cases against seven countries have been debated. 
In August 2016, the US Department of Commerce determined that the US steel industry was 
materially injured by imports, and announced antidumping and countervailing duty orders on 
imported steel.257 In response, the American Institute for International Steel (AIIS) expressed 
concern about the scope and nature of the investigation, and published a warning statement: 
 
“…protectionist policies that would limit the availability of steel and drive up 
its price,…While this competition may indeed reduce the profits of domestic 
manufacturers, other steel-related businesses and consumers benefit from not 
having to pay the artificially high prices that would result from measures that 
restrict trade”.258 
 
Another example which dates from the mid-1980s occurred when the US implemented an anti-
dumping agreement with Japan involving the high technology industry which manufactured 
dynamic random access memory (DRAM) semiconductors.259 This measure tried to protect the 
American semiconductor industry but instead harmed US based computer manufacturers such as 
IBM and Hewlett-Packard which had many foreign competitors.260 The Computer System Policy 
Project (CSPP) was formed in response by the companies which used DRAM as a key 
component to counter the lobbying power of the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA).261   
 
These cases should be borne in mind because they show how restrictive trade policies have an 
adverse impact on the viability of individual businesses and in aggregate, on the national 
economy. In addition to the impact on the export prices of “Made in America” products and 
hence on the volume of exports, these policies reduce the living standards of Americans by 
denying them access to foreign finished goods and “Made in America” products at competitive 
prices. Furthermore, restrictions on foreign imports benefit foreign competitors who continue to 
                                                 
256 (Irwin 1996) p.16 
257 (U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration 2016) Antidumping duties against Australia, 
Brazil, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and countervailing duties against Brazil, 
South Korea and Turkey.  
258 (American Institute for International Steel 2017) AIIS is the only steel related trade association which for over 
sixty years has supported free trade. 
259 (Irwin 1996) p.16.  
260 (Irwin 1996) p.16.  
261 (Irwin 1996) p.16.  
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have access to reliable and cost-effective inputs and components, and weaken the American 
manufacturers who compete in the international market. Hence, it is quite possible that Boeing 
aircraft would be displaced by Airbus, and Apple iPhones would lose a significant share of the 
global market to its rival companies such as the Chinese firm Huawei and the Korean firm 
Samsung. If Boeing were to lose business to foreign rivals, it would adversely affect 140,000 
employees in the US, and more than 13,600 US business partners including production suppliers, 
non-production vendors and subsidiaries of companies these represent an additional 1.5 million 
jobs in the US.262 
 
7.3 Consumer Welfare 
Adam Smith wrote the following about the role of the consumers in trade and economic 
activities:  
 
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interests of 
the producer ought to be attended to, only so as it may be necessary for 
promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident that it 
would be absurd to attempt to prove it. But in the mercantile system, the 
interest of the consumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; 
and it seems to consider production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end 
and object of all industry and commerce. 263   
 
Smith criticized government policies for protecting producers and neglecting consumers. In any 
protectionist trade environment, consumers are “evidently sacrificed” and obliged to pay higher 
prices for products caused by the regulation. He continued:  
 
A great empire has been established for the sole purpose of raising up a nation 
of customers who should be obliged to buy from shops of our different 
producers all the goods with which these could supply them. 264 
The point of the above statement is that raising consumer welfare should be the ultimate purpose 
of the national governments. The export of American goods and services to the world are of 
significant importance to the national economy and, moreover, imported components make many 
                                                 
262 (Boeing 2017b) 
263 (Smith 1904/1776) Book IV, Chapter VIII, Conclusions of the Mercantile System. Section IV. 8.49 
264 (Smith 1904/1776) Book IV, Chapter VIII, Conclusions of the Mercantile System. Section IV. 8.53.  
103 
 
American-made products more competitive as well as improving the standard of living for 
consumers.  
Imported consumer goods, from electronics to clothing to toys, give consumers greater buying 
power and a broader array of products from which to choose. Imported food means that seasonal 
variation in the availability of home grown food is a thing of the past and year-round access to a 
wide range of tropical products originating outside the US (bananas, avocados and coffee, to 
name some of the more popular items) is ensured.  
In the US, a basic 21-inch color TV entertainment center from the Sears Christmas catalogue 
cost $750 in 1964 (Figure 27), which was about $5,800 if the price is expressed in 2016 
dollars.265  
Figure 27 Silvertone 21-inch color TV $749.95 in the 1964 Sears Christmas Catalogue 
  
 
 
Source: (M. J. Perry 2016) 
 
According to Perry, instead of just one color TV, as Figure 28 below shows, today’s $5,800 
could buy 12 electronics items including five kitchen appliances (refrigerator, gas stove, washer 
and dryer, and freezer) and seven state-of-the-art electronics devices (a Samsung 55 inch Smart 
                                                 
265 (M. J. Perry, 2016) 
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HDTV, a Toshiba Satellite 15.6″ laptop computer, a Garmin 5 Inch GPS, a Canon EOS Rebel 
T5i DSLR Camera, a Sony 1,000 Watt, 5.1-Channel 3D Smart Blu-Ray Home Theater System, 
an Apple iPod Touch 64GB MP3 Player (6th generation), and an Apple iPhone 7 Plus. 
 
Figure 28 What $5,800 would buy in 2016 
 
 
 
Source: (M. J. Perry 2016)  
 
 
What does this fall in prices indicate? First of all, TV prices have been going down drastically. In 
general, prices of goods in high demand fall, since more businesses invest in production to fill 
that demand and successively improve the productivity of the assets they use. In 1964, in order to 
purchase a Sears 21-inch color TV for $750, an American working for the average hourly wage 
of $2.56, had to work for 293 hours (7.6 weeks, or almost two full months).266 In 2016, to 
purchase $500 Samsung 55-inch Smart HDTV, an American employed at the average hourly 
                                                 
266 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017) Average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees, 
total private, seasonally adjusted data. In, November, 1964 data, an average hourly and weekly wage were $2.56 and 
$98.82 respectively.  
105 
 
wage of $21.74, had to work for only 23 hours or three days.267 In 2016, there were 1.59 billion 
TV sets in the world.268  
 
Another example is that of the mobile phone, the first commercial version of which was released 
by Motorola in 1983.269 The Motorola Dyna TAX 8000X model cost an American buyer $3,995 
and one could talk for about 30 minutes before the battery needed recharging. Thirty-two years 
later, in 2015, more than 4 billion people or more than 60% of the world population were using 
mobile phones.270 In fact, more people have access to mobile phones than proper toilets.271  
 
Falling prices mean more purchasing power for consumers, and reflect the opportunity 
consumers now have to obtain a great deal of more food, clothing, appliances, and convenient 
services, such as ordering items through Amazon, compared to the past. As John Tamny, an 
economic and financial journalist put it:  
 
The declining prices are a sign of rising living standards for all simply because 
they represent increased access to formerly unattainable goods and services, 
along with looming access to products we don’t yet know we want. Who was 
"demanding" the internet in the early '90s, Uber in the '00s, or an iPhone (that 
mobile phone experts roundly dismissed) in 2004? 272 
 
7.4 Protectionism is not the Solution 
Over the last half century, many products that were beyond the imagination of most people have 
been created through technological innovation and high levels of productivity. Consumers have 
been able to obtain a variety of goods with lower prices, higher quality, and good after-sales 
service. The living standards of the majority of people have improved considerably as a 
consequence. If consumers were stuck in 1964 when people had to work for two full months to 
purchase a TV, it goes without saying that the market for other luxury items such as mobile 
phones with many functions, iPads, and lap top computers would be extremely limited.  
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269 (Goodwin 2017) 
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Donald Boudreaux (2016), an economics professor at George Mason University, has pointed out 
that trade is the most efficient mechanism through which consumers obtain goods and services 
they need at minimum cost (inputs).273 Taking advantage of the division of labor and trade, 
consumers work and earn money at their specialties and then transform their hard-earned money 
into the goods and services they desire. Thus, an ability to engage in trade benefits all who 
voluntarily participate, exactly as Adam Smith observed more than 200 years ago. 
 
As Adam Smith put it, the wealth of a nation, in terms of economic growth and rising living 
standards, depends on improvements in the welfare of all its citizens. In turn, these 
improvements in consumer welfare create new businesses and competition. To maximize these 
welfare improvements, the national interest is best served when it is aligned with consumer well-
being and not with the interests of uncompetitive producers.274   
Any trade policy restricting imports impoverishes consumers because it restricts consumer 
access to goods produced at the lowest possible cost and thereby from having the additional 
purchasing power that would exist if such products were accessible.275 Trade sometimes takes 
place within a country where it is restricted to interaction among fellow citizens; however, when 
trade with foreigners is possible, “it doesn’t matter whether [that] production takes place on the 
same side, or the other side, of imaginary lines we call city, state and national borders vis-à-vis 
the location of the consumer”.276 There is no reason to restrict trade which benefits consumers on 
the basis of production locations. 
The powerful forces of international trade and global competition encourage businesses to 
manufacture goods like TVs, laptops, and appliances using global supply chains. When utilizing 
resources in the world, businesses are able to take advantage of economies of scale and the 
division of labor. Low value-added functions such as assembly can be undertaken where labor 
costs are cheaper, freeing up resources that can be devoted to high value-added functions such as 
product development, research, and managing an effective global supply chain. A variety of 
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innovative and high-quality products and services are created and offered to consumers at the 
lowest possible cost.277 
Trade policies focusing on national territories are becoming more obsolete, and ignore 
complicated and intertwined global supply chains. As is often the case, the political framework 
lags behind and fails to grasp the reality of the 21st century business environment. According to 
Larry Elliot in an article in the Guardian newspaper, “[p]olitical decision makers are too often 
caught in traditional, linear and non-disruptive thinking or too absorbed by immediate concerns 
to think strategically about the forces of disruption and innovation shaping our future”.278 
According to President Trump’s website, trade deals have caused the demise of blue-collar towns 
and cities. He stated that, “[b]y fighting for fair but tough trade deals, we can bring jobs back to 
America’s shores, increase wages, and support US manufacturing”. 279 President Trump believes 
that starting trade wars with other countries and implementing protectionist measures will 
improve the American economy. However, many economists and empirical studies on 
protectionist trade policies in the past suggest otherwise. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
undertook an empirical study of 31 US protectionist trade cases in the 1980s.280 During the 1980s, 
protectionist measures were pushed and implemented worldwide due to “various economic 
problems” including the large and persistent balance of trade deficits in the US, the hard times 
experienced by several industries and the slow growth of many foreign countries. 281  These 
economic problems are “déjà vu all over again” in the current economic situation in America.  
According to the Federal Reserve Bank research involving 31 protectionist measures, the policy 
cost consumers $64 billion (in 1986 dollars) per year (Table 5).  
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280 (Coughlin, Chrystal and Wood 1988) 
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Table 5 Case Studies of Trade Protection in the US in 1980s 
 
Source: (M. J. Perry 2017e)282 
  
                                                 
282 Original data from (Coughlin, Chrystal and Wood 1988)  
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The textiles and apparel industry incurred the largest loss of $27 billion per year (1986 dollars). 
In 25 of the 31 cases, consumer losses were more than $100 million per annum.  
In 2016 dollars, the average cost per job saved was $516,208. In 28 of the 31 cases, the cost was 
more than $100,000 per year, which was far higher than the annual salary paid for the job. In 
four cases: benzenoid chemicals, carbon steel, specialty steel, and bolts, nuts and screws, the cost 
per job saved exceeded $1 million annually. 283  Domestic producers were the primary 
beneficiaries of these protectionist policies (Table 5). However, the report also mentioned that 
foreign producers benefited from the policies too, because their product prices became 
reasonable compared to artificially high US domestic prices, and improved their competitiveness 
relative to US products.  
The report continued:  
[t]he empirical evidence is clear-cut. The costs of protectionist trade policies 
far exceed the benefits. The losses suffered by consumers exceed the gains 
reaped by domestic producers and government. Low income consumers are 
relatively more adversely affected than high-income consumers. Not only are 
there inefficiencies associated with excessive domestic production and 
restricted consumption, but there are costs associated with the enforcement of 
the protectionist legislation and attempts to influence trade policy. 284 
Another significant case in 2009 involved imposition of import tariffs on Chinese tires levied by 
the US.285 These tariffs were introduced in response to a petition from the United Steelworkers 
union which represents tire manufacturing workers. It claimed that the domestic tire industry was 
materially injured by imports from China because they caused “market disruption”. President 
Obama imposed punitive tariffs on tires imported from China, raising the rate from 4% to 35% in 
September of 2009 (and then reducing the rate to 30% in 2010, and then 25% in 2011).286    
 
This case is typical of ongoing Chinese-US trade disputes, and US political efforts to ‘insource’ 
jobs back to America. However, the research shows that these protectionist measurements saved 
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a maximum of 1,200 of American tire builders’ jobs whose annual average salary was $40,070. 
The total cost to American consumers was around $1.1 billion in 2011. In other words, the cost 
per job saved was over $900,000 annually which was paid by American taxpayers. 287   
 
American domestic tire producers gained some benefit from this protectionist policy. But the 
union members who lost jobs received only a small share of the “money extracted from the 
pockets of American households”. 288 The major beneficiaries of these country specific tariffs 
turned out to be other low-end tire producers in Asia and Mexico whose tires were substituted for 
Chinese supply. 289  Basically the tariffs did not have any material impact on American tire 
businesses, and had an adverse effect on the American economy. US consumers spent more on 
tires, thereby limiting their ability to spend on other retail goods. The loss of jobs attributable to 
this scaling back of domestic retail spending was estimated to be 2,531.290  Adding further to the 
loss, China retaliated by imposing anti-dumping duties on US exports of chicken parts, costing 
the American poultry industry an estimated $1 billion in lost sales.291 
 
The research concluded:  
 
Admittedly, targeted protection can be highly popular with US trade unions 
and individual firms. In some circumstances, denying China access to the US 
market might help reform Chinese policies. But tire safeguards provoked 
Chinese retaliation, not compliance. In this instance safeguard tariffs extracted 
more than one billion dollars annually from American households, causing a 
net loss of jobs in the American economy, when job losses in the retail sector 
are off set against job gains in the manufacturing sector. Collecting a billion 
dollars in taxes or tolls, and spending the money on renewing dilapidated 
infrastructure, would create some 7,000 jobs in construction and many more in 
manufacturing, a far better outcome for the US economy. …The best thing 
about the tire tariffs is that they expire in September [2012].292 
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Why then are such costly protectionist policies repeatedly advocated by politicians, unions, some 
industry associations, voters, and even many economists when empirical studies suggest that 
such policies amount to the nation imposing those policies self-inflicted harm on its economy? 
Mark J. Perry, an economist at University of Michigan explained:  
From a political viewpoint, protectionism has an obvious payoff because it 
generates political support, votes, and financial contributions for protectionist 
presidents and politicians from the beneficiaries - domestic industries and their 
workers - who are protected from foreign competition by government fiat. 
Fortunately for the protected industries and their political enablers, the groups 
that shoulder the burdens and costs of protectionism - millions of dispersed 
consumers and thousands of invisible, hard-to-identify workers who lose their 
jobs - are unorganized and therefore completely disregarded by protectionist 
politicians.293 
Indeed, protectionist policies benefit some groups that are visible, identifiable and measurable. 
This provides great opportunities for smartphone shots of President Trump294 while harming the 
most important group, American consumers (especially low-income households). Politicians 
who are interested in re-election respond to the demands of politically powerful groups while 
dispersed consumers, particularly the poor, don’t have a strong voice.  
Economic theory and much empirical evidence shows that the costs of protectionism accruing to 
American consumers will always be greater than the benefits realized by the protected industries 
and their workers. Moreover, protectionist policies result in lower economic growth rates than 
the rates otherwise associated with free trade policies.295 
7.5 The Benefits of Global Partnerships 
 
Aerospace giant Boeing, which has survived long enough to enter the second century of its 
business history, discussed in its 2016 annual report how challenging it is to adapt and excel in 
the competitive world market:  
 
                                                 
293 (M. J. Perry 2017d) 
294 (Waldmeir 2017) 
295 (Coughlin, Chrystal and Wood 1988) p.14.  
112 
 
We aspire not only to be the best in aerospace, but also an enduring global 
industrial champion—a top performer in every aspect of our business, 
delivering superior value to our customers, employees, shareholders, 
communities and partners. This bold goal requires that we set—and achieve—
higher expectations for our work and recognize that we now compete with 
companies in other sectors for capital, influence, talent and positioning in a 
business environment that is getting tougher, more complex and more global 
every day. These realities—and the aggressive existing and emerging 
competition we face in the aerospace industry—demand that we relentlessly 
drive productivity and affordability to win in our markets and fuel our 
investment in the products and services that will drive future growth.296   
 
These companies that strive and are successful are adding value and wealth to society by creating 
new demands, new goods and services, and new jobs and businesses. 297  Contrary to the 
perceptions of the general public and politicians, global market competition and the 
transformation it provokes are not zero-sum games. Businesses are not just replacing and stealing 
each other’s business, but rather adding a greater volume of transactions and more value to the 
economy. Consequently, the size of the world economy has been growing for decades. Trade and 
increasing reliance on global supply chains are the mechanisms on which this growth depends. 
Boeing’s 2016 annual report talks about achieving its goals by:  
 
...leveraging the unique competitive advantage we have in operating as One 
Boeing…such as engaging our supply chain to reduce costs and improve 
quality, breaking the cost curve on our development programs, implementing 
advanced manufacturing and design technologies, and creating global scale and 
depth by growing our presence and partnerships in key markets around the 
world.298   
 
No single country is the source of all innovation. Maximizing global partnerships and 
collaborations which facilitate the scaling-up of production to meet global demand are necessary 
for businesses to optimize investment, and to increase productivity through economies of scale 
                                                 
296 (Boeing 2017a) p.7.  
297 (Schwab 2016) p.37.  
298 (Boeing 2017a) p.8. 
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and the division of labor.299 In the long run, high productivity and new innovations create more 
added value and profits. These are necessary for businesses to have sustainable growth.  
 
As long as the US market remains dynamic and open, many US companies will be successful. 
This success brings significant benefits to the US economy, which is shared by consumers, 
investors and those in high-paying jobs. However, once those successful companies become 
complacent and fail to invest in order to adapt to changing market conditions such as in Kodak 
case, the global market will quickly shift resources away from the US to more promising 
opportunities elsewhere. Global business operations increasingly blur the distinction between 
“domestic” and “foreign” products, to the point of making them irrelevant. When it comes to 
global competition and the allocation of resources, the importance of local, national and regional 
boundaries fade, and all businesses in the world are both prospective partners and competitors. 
Whoever can offer great products with the best prices will succeed and survive in the globalized 
world.  
 
8. Conclusion – Will Protectionism Help? 
 
Is President Trump’s trade policy, protecting and subsidizing existing manufacturers to prevent 
job losses, an effective strategy?  Historical evidence suggests the answer is no.  
 
First, manufacturing output in the US has increased even as employment has fallen due to 
increased automation and productivity. Therefore, subsidizing manufacturing businesses 
probably leads to more automation, and less jobs for low-skilled workers. Second, there have 
been significant variations in economic performance among sub-sectors within the 
manufacturing sector. For example, lower productivity sub-sectors such as textile and textile 
product mills, apparel, leather, and allied products, recorded about a 50% reduction in their 
contribution to GDP between 1998 and 2012.300 China, Vietnam and other developing countries 
have a comparative advantage in these labor-intensive businesses.  
                                                 
299 (Ikenson 2009) p. 1. 
300 (Hicks and Devaraj 2015) p.4. 
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American low skilled workers cannot compete and do lose jobs eventually against this global 
reality. Unless these workers upgrade their skills in other business areas and increase their 
mobility, they will not be able to obtain new jobs with equal or better conditions. After all, only 
10% of the work force is employed in the manufacturing sector. Many service sectors such as 
education and health services, professions and business sector, have increased employment and 
experienced healthy economic growth (Figure 4 on page 48). Can this political obsession with 
manufacturing be justified? Does it make sense economically and socially?  
There are significant unintentional consequences of the “Make America Great Again” and “Buy 
American” protectionism policies which adversely impact American consumers. The US has 
relatively low tariffs, less than 2% on average. However, in 2016, average tariff rates on apparel 
and clothing accessories (11%), footwear (14%), and vegetables (11%) rose for basic 
necessities. 301 Together with these import tariffs, other non-tariff measurements such as 
government subsidies on industries and restrictive requirements for trade (rules of origins, local 
content requirement etc.), these costs have been disproportionately burdensome for low income 
American consumers and small businesses. Also, restricting access to the American market for 
developing countries impedes their development, and in return constrains the expansion of global 
markets for US products and services.  
 
Simplistic anti-trade ‘sound bites’ attract lots of attention. However, economic benefits that 
accrue from expanded trade are easily and intentionally ignored by politicians, labor unions, 
uncompetitive industries and often by the media. Offshoring and outsourcing assembly and other 
functions make high-profile targets of some constituencies of American voters, and politicians 
are keen to take advantage of this public discontent. However, attempting to bring back low-
value added functions to the US is not an effective economic policy because it diminishes the 
productivity and competitiveness of American business. Also, targeting the trade deficit without 
understanding the interrelationship between the flow of goods and services, and the flow of 
capital is also misleading. Protectionist trade policies premised on false arguments can only harm 
the US economy.  
                                                 
301 (World Trade Organization) Tariff Analysis Online data base. http://tao.wto.org/report/TariffAverages.aspx 
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The American economy, job creation, and the standard of living of each American are enhanced 
by global trade. Involvement in global trade provides American consumers with the best possible 
products available at competitive prices.302  Nonetheless, President Trump never mentions the 
potential impact on the welfare of American consumers in any of his pronouncements on trade 
policy.  
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, protectionism is a politically successful strategy 
despite being a “superficial and short-sighted” policy which ignores the complexities and 
dynamics of the global market. 303  Isolating its own economy from the rest of world will 
impoverish and weaken the United States, and lead to job losses and a reduced standard of living 
for many US citizens. President Trump’s mantra “Buy American, Make America Great Again” is 
seductive, but it will make “America weak again, not great again”. 304   
  
                                                 
302 (M. J. Perry 2017b) 
303 (M. J. Perry 2017b) 
304 (M. J. Perry 2017d) 
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CHAPTER 3. PROTECTIONISM AGAINST FOREIGN PRODUCTS:   
A CASE AGAINST OIL PALM PRODUCTION AND A CRITIQUE OF 
THE “FOOD MILES” PERSPECTIVE 
 
By means of glasses, hotbeds and hotwalls, very good grapes can be raised in 
Scotland, and very good wine too can be made of them at about 30 times the 
expense for which at least equally good can be brought from foreign countries. 
Would it be a reasonable law to prohibit the importation of all foreign wines, 
merely to encourage the making of Claret and Burgundy in Scotland?  
 
Adam Smith, 1776. 305 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In a free market, competition forces economic actors to optimize resources to survive. 
Specialization, trade and technology all increase food production leading to surpluses and a 
higher standard of living for all. Consumers and activists are sometimes bamboozled into making 
choices for social or environmental reasons which (they claim) can’t be measured by mere 
economics but which go against their own best interests and the interests of those they are trying 
to ‘help’. This chapter examines how self-serving special interest groups often use such 
arguments to persuade well-meaning people to support interventions in the market. It 
demonstrates how these interventions fail to achieve social and environmental goals, and how 
unfiltered prices lead to better environmental outcomes as well as higher standards of living for 
producers and consumers.  
 
The first section examines the oil palm production case where special interest groups tried to 
influence French consumers to support a tariff on palm oil (largely from Malaysia and Indonesia) 
using arguments about health, social justice and the environment. Although not easy, it is 
possible to measure such claims. This chapter debunks the criticism that palm oil is a less healthy 
option than other vegetable oil alternatives and shows that oil palm plants have much higher 
yields per acre than other alternatives. Reducing palm oil production in favour of other 
alternatives would therefore result in more cultivated land, less efficient use of other resources, 
                                                 
305 (Smith 1904/1776) Volume1, Chapter II, 122.  
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higher costs to consumers, and less income for small, poor farmers in developing countries who, 
consequently, might resort to illegal logging or other less desirable activities. 
 
The second section focuses on the ‘food miles’ concept which encourages consumers to “buy 
local”, (and even to pay more for the local products) and discourages the consumption of 
imported products because of concerns ranging from rising energy costs and perceived 
environmental degradation to health to social and economic issues. This chapter shows how 
measurement is possible (although complex and not easy for consumers to understand), and does 
not support these claims. It uses examples, such as New Zealand versus UK apples, to show how 
the unfiltered market price provides the best indicator of the most efficient use of resources, and 
leads to making the most out of natural conditions (climate, land and water availability). Thus, 
pursuing comparative advantage by growing agricultural products at the most economical 
location is the best option to reduce human impact on the natural environment, use less land, and 
improve the quality of the environment and the economic circumstances of producers and 
consumers.  
 
2. A Case against Oil Palm Production and Palm Oil 
 
2.1 Taxing Palm Oil for the “Greater Good” 
In June 2016, France’s National Assembly finally scrapped a new tax plan, the “Nutella tax” on 
imported palm oil which is used in the famous chocolate spread. 306  The tax bill was first 
approved by the Senate under pressure from environmental groups. The main justification for 
this additional tax was that oil palm plantations cause deforestation and undermine 
biodiversity.307  
 
Another argument used to pass this tax bill was that palm oil was one of the least taxed vegetable 
oils in France. Under an existing special tax on oils for food consumption, the tax rate is 
determined by weight; palm oil however, was already taxed more heavily than olive oil.308 The 
                                                 
306  (Farand, Chloe. 2016) "France moves to cut "Nutella tax" after protests”. Independent, March 19.  
307 (De la Hamaide, Sybille. 2016) "French parliament scraps planned extra tax on palm oil”. Reuters, June 23.  
308 (Coquart, Patrick. 2016) "Will the French Avoid €11 Million in Additional Taxes on Palm Oil?" EPICENTER. 
European Policy Information Center, May 23.  
 Based on Coqueart’s calculation in March 2016, the special taxes on oils intended for consumption were €103.71 
per ton for palm oil, €113.24 for copra and palm-kernel oils, €170.13 for peanut and corn oils and €188.96 for olive 
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new “Nutella tax” was based on ‘how and where products were produced’, in other words, on 
subjective environmental ‘sustainability criteria’. Sustainability criteria can’t be clearly identified 
and the degree of emotion and concern on these subjects varies considerably among countries. 
These criteria are arbitrary and inconsistent.  
 
Does this punitive tax policy, targeting only one type of vegetable oil based on the production 
method, make sense? Is it possible for political measures to protect the environment without any 
unintended consequences? Indonesia and Malaysia, the world’s two largest producers, claimed 
the tax bill was discriminatory and contravened international trade rules.309 Their economies rely 
heavily on the agricultural sector, and the tax burden would have ‘put thousands of small farmers 
out of work’. 310  Even more importantly, why should consumers pay more for alternative 
products?  
 
According to a 2015 Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) report, government policy 
interventions that discriminate against foreign commercial interests have increased. 311  For 
instance, during 10 months in 2015, a total of 539 measures that harmed foreign trade interests 
were taken by governments worldwide. More than 80% of them were implemented by G20 
countries.312  France was among the worst in the list in terms of the number of times they 
discriminated against foreign commercial interests. 313  Among industries, the agricultural 
products sector was the second most frequently hit.  
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
oil. Calculated tax rates tax based on prices per ton were 17% tax for palm oil, and 4.6% for olive oil. Palm oil 
would have been taxed at 32% with this tax plan.  
309  (De la Hamaide, Sybille. 2016)  
310  (De la Hamaide, Sybille. 2016)  
311 (CEPR 2015) The Tide Turns? Trade, Protectionism, and Slowing Global Growth. The 18th Global Trade Alert 
Report, London: CEPR Press. p. 17. 
These interventions include:  1. (Directly) import restriction including tariff increases, import quotas, and import 
bans. 2. Public procurement measures where government contracts are shifted away from foreign bidders to local 
firms. 3. Export taxes and restrictions. 4. Export incentives, including subsidised trade finance. 5. Bailouts and non-
export related fiscal incentives (including tax breaks and subsidies). 6. Other measures. 
312 (CEPR 2015) p.19.  
313 (CEPR 2015) p.19.  
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2.2 Background 
 
Human beings have used oils and fats for thousands of years as a source of food, illumination, or 
as lubricants for machinery and soap. 314  At the turn of the 20th century, improvements in 
refining technologies and long distance transportation turned palm oil into a globally traded 
commodity and a dominant force in the global vegetable oil market.315 According to the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) data, in 2014/15, palm oil contributed more than 30% 
of the world vegetable oil production, the bulk of which (above 85%) was produced in Malaysia 
and Indonesia.316  
 
Palm oil has long been denigrated by its opponents (who were often historically producers of 
alternatives, in this case it was soy bean producers) as being “impure, unhealthy, outright 
dangerous, and a threat to the environment”.317  As with all other agricultural production in 
history, palm oil production takes place on formerly ‘wild’ land. Western non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have been especially active 
in denouncing the expansion of this industry as the cause of massive deforestation and a loss of 
habitat for precious wildlife such as orangutans.318  
 
Their campaigns have affected many corporate policies. Nestlé excluded the Indonesian paper 
and palm producer, Sinar Mas Agro Resources and Technology, from its supply chain. Since 
2010, one of the largest grocery retailers in the world, Carrefour has purchased Green Palm 
certified oil for its own brand of products sold in France, and committed itself to purchasing only 
Certified Sustainable Palm Oil by 2015.319 For its part, another mass French retailer, Casino 
banned palm oil from all its food products due to health concerns, while committing itself to 
                                                 
314 (Berger, K.G and S.M. Martin. 2000) Palm oil. The Cambridge World History of Food. In Eds. Kenneth F. Kiple 
and Kriemhild Coneè Ornelas. Cambridge University Press. Chapter II.E.3. p.397. 
315 (Berger, K.G and S.M. Martin. 2000) 
316 (USDA Foreign Agriculture Service) Production, Supply and Distribution Online. 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/ 
The nine major vegetable oils in this dataset are coconut, cottonseed, olive, palm, palm kernel, peanut, rapeseed, 
soybean, and sunflower oil.  
317 (Gustafsson, Fredrik. 2007) The Visible Palm: Market Failures, Industrial Policy and the Malaysian Palm Oil 
Industry. Almqvist & Wiksell International. p.87 
318 (Greenpeace 2007) Cooking the Climate. Greenpeace UK Report.  
319 (Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 2012) Carrefour Launches First RSPO Trademarked Cooking Oil in 
Indonesia, RSPO newsletter, July 12.  
120 
 
purchasing only certified ‘sustainable’ supplies for its other non-food products. In the meantime, 
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) published its “Palm Oil Buyers’ Score” which assessed the 
palm oil buying practices of 130 plus major retailers and consumer goods manufacturers.320 
 
In the following section, we will examine oil palm production from a broader perspective. While 
it is not perfect, palm oil displays a number of advantages over actual and potential alternatives 
in terms of its versatility, productivity, price and volume availability. These attributes make it a 
superior product. Boycotting palm oil would fail to deliver any environmental and economic 
benefits, while severely hurting the growth prospects of impoverished communities.  
 
2.3 Health and Nutritional Value 
 
Commercial palm oil is extracted from the fruit of the oil palm tree (Elaeis guineensis) native to 
West Africa, a botanical relative of the coconut.321 Palm oil use goes back at least 5,000 years to 
ancient Egypt, 322  but only became a truly global commodity over a century ago when its 
production took off in other parts of the world characterized by tropical climates with high 
annual rainfall located within 10° of the equator.323  
 
The oil palm produces two different types of oils: crude palm oil (CPO) from the fibrous 
mesocarp324 and crude palm kernel oil (CPKO) from seed kernels whose composition is actually 
closer to coconut oil.325 Between 80% and 90% of palm oil production is destined for human 
food consumption either as frying and cooking oil or as an ingredient in a wide range of food 
products. The remaining 10% is consumed by various industries, from biodiesel to cosmetics and 
pharmaceutical producers. The unique property of palm oil when compared to its most common 
alternatives (typically rapeseed (canola) and soybean oils) is that it is semi-solid at room 
                                                 
320 (WWF 2016) Palm Oil Buyers’ Score Card 2016, Measuring the Progress of Palm Oil Buyers. 
http://palmoilscorecard.panda.org/ 
321 (Wood. B.J. 1987) Growth and production of oil palm fruits In Gunstone. F.D. ed., Palm oil. Critical Reports on 
Applied Chemistry Volume 15. John Wiley & Sons. p.12. 
322 ((Berger, K.G and S.M. Martin. 2000) P.397. 
323 (Wood. B.J. 1987) 
324 Only olive oil and palm oil are extracted from the mesocarp (i.e., the fleshy middle layer of the pericarp of a fruit, 
between the exocarp and the endocarp). 
325  (O'Keefe, Sean Francis.2000) An Overview of Oils and Fats with a Special Emphasis on Olive Oil. The 
Cambridge World History of Food. Eds. Kenneth F. Kiple and Kriemhild Coneè Ornelas. Cambridge University 
Press. p.381. 
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temperature with a specific origin melting point between 33ºC and 39ºC.326 This makes it an 
ideal product to work with.  
Palm oil has often been accused of being less healthy than other alternatives. To better 
understand the issue, however, one must first get acquainted with some basic nutritional facts. 
Fats consist mainly of four types of fatty acids: polyunsaturated fatty acids (PUFA), 
monounsaturated fatty acids (MUFA), saturated fatty acids (SAFA) and trans fatty acid (TFA).327 
In France and elsewhere, the use of palm oil in food preparation has been criticized because it 
contains saturated fatty acids which can increase the levels of the LDL (low density lipoprotein) 
cholesterol.328 In general, zero TFA, less SAFA, and more MUFA and PUFA, oils are healthier 
options.329  
Palm oil is a healthier source of solid fats than hydrogenated vegetable oils (soybeans or 
rapeseed oils). To make soybeans or rapeseed oils solid or semi-solid at room temperature and 
thus more resistant to oxidation, partial hydrogenation is needed. In the process, artificial trans 
fatty acids are formed. The intake of trans fats has been linked to heart disease, increased levels 
of unhealthy LDL cholesterol and lowered levels of ‘good’ HDL (high density lipoprotein) 
cholesterol.330  Palm oil’s “trans fat free” property makes it a much better substitute for many 
animal fats like tallow or other partially hydrogenated vegetable oils.331  
Products rich in saturated fats have qualities such as better oxidative stability and a high melting 
point which make this ingredient creamier and especially suitable for confectionary 
manufacturers. Practically, there are significant trade-offs since less saturated fat means less 
functionality, less flavor and texture, less stability and higher costs.332 Once all trade-offs are 
                                                 
326 Malaysia Palm Oil Council (MPOC) This unique property derives from its approximate 1:1 ratio of unsaturated 
to saturated fatty acids. It contains 40% oleic acid (monounsaturated fatty acid), 10% linoleic acid (polyunsaturated 
fatty acid), 45% palmitic acid and 5% stearic acid (saturated fatty acid).  
More information at http://www.mpoc.org.my/The_Oil.aspx. 
327  (FEDIOL) Facts on Fats. http://www.fediol.be/data/1330349750TRYPT%20FACTS%20ON%20FAT.pdf 
328 (Miserey, Yves. 2010) L'huile de palme, mauvaise graisse omniprésente, Le Figaro, February 9. 
329 (FEDIOL) Innovation in Processing and Reformulation of Vegetable Oils and Fats, FEDIOL Nutrition Factsheet. 
http://www.fediol.eu/data/1324550245Factsheet%20Innovation%20in%20processing%20%26%20reformulation%2
09Dec11.pdf 
330 (Miserey, Yves. 2010) 
331 Trans fat free is a property that makes palm oil a substitute for many animal fats like tallow or other partially 
hydrogenated vegetable oils such as soybean and rapeseed oil. 
332 (FEDIOL)  
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factored in, palm kernel oil, palm oil, or a blend of these with other liquid oils are typically the 
most practical and economical options.333 For example, there is a growing demand for palm 
kernel oil products as ingredients in the production of non-hydrogenated trans-fat free 
margarine.334 As for nutrition, the bottom line is that, as the founder of modern toxicology, 
Doctor Paracelsus, observed nearly five centuries ago, it is the dose that makes the poison. 
Palm oil is also stable at high heat and rich in anti-oxidants, carotenes (vitamin A) and vitamin E. 
These characteristics make it ideal for frying, and extend the shelf life of the food products in 
which it is used. It significantly boosts the nutritional and health content of foods, especially in 
developing countries.335 Apart from food usage, tocotrienols (a type of vitamin E) is found in 
abundance in palm oil. It is used by, among others, the high-end cosmetics manufacturer 
Crabtree & Evelyn as an active ingredient to increase sunscreen efficiency by reducing UV ray 
penetration which causes cellular ageing.336 Due to innovations in processing and reformulation, 
there is an increasingly wide range of uses for palm oil products. 
 
2.4 Low Inputs, Low Land Usage and High Yields 
 
From 1980 to 2011, the annual world production of palm oil increased more than 10-fold, from 
4.5 million tons to 55 million tons.337  Much of this expansion took place in Indonesia and 
Malaysia because of good growing conditions, and advances in cultivation, refining and 
transportation technologies.338 In 2011, Malaysia and Indonesia produced 36.3% of the total 
global edible oil supply using only 5.3% of the area planted to oilseeds, a result entirely 
attributable to the high productivity of palm oil production.339 According to Oil World 2007 data, 
oil palm yielded an average of 3.72 tons of oil per hectare compared to 0.40 tons and 0.72 tons 
                                                 
333 (FEDIOL) 
334 (MPOC) The Oil. http://www.mpoc.org.my/The_Oil.aspx 
335(Malaysia Palm Oil Board) http://econ.mpob.gov.my/economy/exporters/EID_exporter.htm 
336 (Ching, Tee 2012) Palm Oil’s ‘secret, bountiful yield’. New Sunday Times, April 22. 
337 (Corley, Hereward and Tinker, Bernard. 2003) The Oil Palm (4th Edition). Blackwell Science. p.13.  
(MPOC) Palm Oil Fact Slides, Resource Centre. http://www.mpoc.org.my/Palm_Oil_Fact_Slides.aspx 
338 (Berger, K.G and S.M. Martin. 2000) p.397; (Erixon, Fredrik. 2012) The Rising Trend of Green Protectionism: 
Biofuels and the European Union. ECIPE Occasional Paper. No. 2/2012 European Center for International Political 
Economy. p.18. 
339 (MPOC)  
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respectively for soybeans and rapeseed (Figure 29).340 In other words, oil palm trees produce 
almost 10 times more oil per hectare than soybeans and more than 5 times more oil than rapeseed.  
 
Figure 29 Average Annual Oil Yield for Major Edible Oil Crops 
  
Source: (Oil World 2012) 
 
Figure 30 Energy input and output ratio341 
 
Source: (Wood B.J. et al.1991) 
                                                 
340 (Oil World. Oil World Statistics by ISTA Mielke GmbH).  
341  (Wood B.J. et al. 1991) 
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In terms of unit of input per unit of output, oil palm also requires significantly less fertilizers, 
pesticides and fuel per unit produced than rapeseed and soybeans, in the end delivering over 
three times more oil per unit of input (Figure 30).342   
 
Along with this high productivity, South East Asian and South American countries also have the 
lowest production costs for edible oil crops (the EU and other countries have higher costs 
attributable to a range of factors, from high fertilizer usage to higher taxation).343 According to 
Oil World, the crude palm oil price was on average 10% to 30% lower than soybean and 
rapeseed oils.344  
 
Another advantage of oil palm production is the relative reliability of its supply. While all large-
scale agricultural production is subjected to various natural hazards (from droughts and floods to 
frost and hurricanes), oil palm is a perennial plant that is productive year-round and has a useful 
life of between 20 to 25 years. Modern breeding techniques and ever more sophisticated 
production technologies have delivered an affordable, versatile and high-quality supply. All of 
these combined advantages of palm oil explain its success in world markets. 
 
2.5 Palm Oil and Deforestation 
 
All agricultural activities involve conversion of what were once ‘wild’ areas. In many cases, 
however, the increased production of a particular agricultural commodity can be achieved by 
switching production on a plot of land that is already cultivated. This has been the case for palm 
oil.  
 
In Malaysia for instance, the surface area devoted to palm oil production in 2011 was about 5 
million hectares, a fivefold increase since 1975. Approximately 1.39 million of those hectares 
were the result of conversion from other tree crop production such as rubber, cocoa, and coconut. 
It is also worth pointing out that while the surface area devoted to palm oil production increased 
by a factor of five, total production increased more than 16 times between 1975 to 2011 (from 
                                                 
342 (Wood B.J. et al. 1991) The energy balance of oil palm cultivation, Proceedings of the 1991 PORIM 
International Palm Oil Conference. 
343 (Erixon, Fredrik. 2012) p.19. 
344  (Oil World. Oil World Statistics by ISTA Mielke GmbH).  
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1.1 million ton to 16.6 million tons) because of much higher yields.345 A case can thus be made 
that improvement in yields since 1975 actually ‘spared’ perhaps as many as 15 million hectares 
of land.  
 
Activists from advanced economies, who are quick to denounce deforestation in faraway lands, 
should also keep in mind that, perhaps as much as nine tenths of all deforestation caused by 
human beings since the emergence of civilization occurred before 1950.346 People needed to 
clear massive amounts of forested land in order to provide themselves with shelter, food, warmth 
and a multitude of objects.  
 
The significant increase in the use of coal in the early decades of 19th century, however, marked 
the beginning of a reversal of this trend which was later accelerated by the advent of natural gas 
and petroleum. These not only acted as substitutes for the use of biomass fuels, but also 
drastically improved agricultural productivity and eliminated the use of draught animals, which 
consumed a significant portion of agricultural crops.  
 
France was perhaps the first major country to experience what has since been termed a “forest 
transition” as its forest area expanded by one-third between 1830 and 1960, and by a further 
quarter since 1960. Similar trends, although of varying intensity and scope, have been occurring 
in all major temperate and boreal forests and in every country with a per capita Gross Domestic 
Product exceeding US $4,600.347 This is also the case for some developing economies, most 
notably China and India, which have not yet reached this threshold.348 Only with a more efficient 
use of land and increased wealth will they be better able to devote more resources to the 
protection of ecosystems. Fortunately, with economic development and its attendant productivity 
gains, and development of substitute products, reforestation has become a trend in all advanced 
economies. 
                                                 
345 (MPOC) Palm Oil Fact Slides, Resource Centre. 
346 (Williams, Michael. 2001) The history of deforestation. History Today (July), pp. 30-37. For a more scholarly 
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2.6 The Consequences of Boycotting of Palm Oil Products 
World population growth, improved standards of living and biofuel mandates mean that the 
demand for vegetable oil is bound to increase significantly in coming decades.349 Any deliberate 
move to reduce palm oil production in locations like Malaysia and Indonesia thus inevitably 
implies a shift in production towards lower yielding and more expensive substitutes.350 These 
would have a few unavoidable consequences:  
1) Increases in land and resources requirements 
A Plant physiologist, R.H.V. Corley calculated several scenarios to meet future vegetable oil 
demand using various alternative sources of supply. According to his medium variant scenario in 
which 9.2 billion human beings in 2050 consume 25 kg per person per year of vegetable oil, total 
global demand will be 240 million tons - about 30% more than the 2016 production level. This 
additional demand will require between 12 and 19 million hectares devoted to palm oil 
production or 95 million hectares devoted to soybean production.351 Of course, as discussed 
above, soybean production will not only require significantly more land, but also more inputs 
such as fertilizers, pesticides, water and fuel.  
 
2) Higher price of foods and consumer products in the EU 
Palm oil is used in the production of many food and consumer products. A switch to costlier and 
less reliable substitute oils would negatively affect both manufacturers and consumers. 
 
3) Undermining the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and sustainable palm oil 
sources 
Sensational anti-palm oil campaigns have tarnished the image of both the product and its 
producers, resulting in retailers and manufacturers switching away from palm oil. These 
campaigns undermine the market for certified “sustainable oil” at a time when the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) has been expanding its scope. In 2017, 19% of the world’s palm 
oil production (12 million tonnes) was certified “sustainable”. With their all or nothing stance, 
                                                 
349 (Corley, R.H.V. 2009) How much palm oil do we need?  Environmental Science and Policy. Vol.12. Issue 2, 
pp.134-139. 
350 (Corley, R.H.V. 2009)  
351 (Corley, R.H.V. 2009) 
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negative campaigns hinder real progress in the industry, and prevent the realization of 
meaningful and sustainable economic, environmental and social benefits in both developed 
countries and developing countries.352 
 
4) Delaying economic development in Malaysia and Indonesia  
In both Malaysia and Indonesia, the palm oil industry represents a viable and significant growth 
industry. In Malaysia, the industry provides employment to more than half a million people, and 
livelihood to approximately one million people working with this industry.353 Any restrictions on 
this industry will primarily affect small farmers who lack alternative employment and might 
resort to less desirable activities such as (often illegal) logging.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
Today, most oil palm activists pressure manufacturers and retailers to boycott palm oil on 
environmental grounds. Since oil palm spares more land and delivers more accessible, abundant 
and affordable calories to people worldwide than any other source of vegetable oil, such an 
attitude is short-sighted. It will ultimately fail to achieve the alleged broader goals of 
environmental remediation and improvements in the living standards of poorer populations. 
 
Given a significant increase in the demand for vegetable oil, the real question is how this strong 
demand can be met most efficiently, economically and sustainably. The emphasis should be on 
encouraging better agronomic practices and improving governance in less advanced 
economies.354 Whether these are voluntary or required by law, sustainable policies also need to 
be based on sound science, and to be workable and verifiable throughout the supply chain.355 
Human ingenuity has long delivered, and can continue to deliver, ever greater output ever more 
efficiently, in the process providing both economic and environmental benefits. The palm oil 
industry is no exception. 
 
                                                 
352 (Corley, R.H.V. 2009) 
353 (MPOC) http://www.mpoc.org 
354 (OECD-FAO 2012) Agriculture Outlook 2012-2021 Summary.  
355 (FEDIOL 2010) FEDIOL Views on Sustainability, May 03. 
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3. A Critique of the “Food Miles” Perspective 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In his bestselling popular science book, Twinkie, Deconstructed, 356  writer Steve Ettlinger 
demystifies the origins, complex manufacturing processes, and numerous uses of some of 
America’s most common ingredients and food additives. He takes his readers on a journey to 
locations as diverse as sugar plantations in Florida, oil fields and vitamin manufacturing plants in 
China, phosphate mines in Idaho, chemical plants in Louisiana and Switzerland, and many others. 
In doing so, he gives them a glimpse of how thoroughly globalized our modern food production 
and distribution system has become. The mind-boggling reality described by Ettlinger explains 
many public anxieties that frequently surround the modern agri-industrial supply chain.  
 
Due to concerns such as rising energy costs, perceived environmental degradation, health and 
economic welfare, there has been renewed interest in the promotion of locally produced food. 
‘Food miles’ is the term used by activists seeking to discourage the consumption of items 
produced in remote locations.  
 
This section examines the origins and validity of this concept and the movement it has 
engendered. Because of its British origins and comparatively greater impact in Western Europe 
than in North America, much of this discussion will revolve around European Union (EU) cases, 
but our argument and recommendations are equally valid in the US context.357  
 
The evidence suggests that food miles are, at best, a marketing fad, but one which so severely 
distorts the environmental impacts of agricultural production that it could be liable to prosecution 
under false advertising statutes. More importantly, it constitutes a dangerous distraction from the 
real and serious issues that affect modern food production.  
 
The first part of this section discusses the origins of recent food activism and summarizes the 
food miles perspective. The second part provides a concise history of food production with 
                                                 
356 (Ettlinger, Steve 2007)  
357 See, for example (Weber, Christopher L., and H. Scott Matthews 2008) 
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emphasis on the main drivers behind the globalization of this industry. The third part summarizes 
the available evidence on the environmental impact of food transport and documents how 
selecting items based on their country of origin is not a criterion which helps consumers behave 
in a more environmentally sustainable manner. 
 
On the contrary, this thesis suggests that food purchases from more productive places (typically 
with lower prices) have many advantages, including more efficient use of capital, energy, and 
labor; reduced environmental impact; and significant economic benefits for producers and 
workers in less developed regions. The final part of this section offers some policy 
recommendations regarding both the food miles perspective and agricultural policy in general.  
 
3.2 The Recent Food Activism Movement 
 
3.2.1 From ‘Organic’ and ‘Fair Trade’ to ‘Slow’ and ‘Local’ Food  
‘Organic’, ‘fair trade’, ‘slow’, and ‘local’ are associated with movements these stated goals urge 
consumers to express their preferences or opinions against the offerings of large multinational 
corporations and conventional retailers. Interestingly, since the cooptation of the organic and fair 
trade movements by corporations ranging from Nestle to Wal-Mart, activists have shifted their 
focus to the food miles issue.  
 
The term ‘food miles’ was coined by Tim Lang, City University (London) Professor of Food 
Policy, and two of his colleagues to refer to the distance food items travel from producers to 
consumers. From their perspective, the further food and other agricultural products are 
transported, the more fossil fuels are burned and the greater the adverse impact on the 
environment. Lang later explained his thinking in the following terms: “We wanted people to 
think about where their food came from, to re-inject a cultural dimension into arcane 
environmental debates about biodiversity in farms”. 358 
 
The food miles movement has gained much momentum in the last decade and a half, especially 
in the United Kingdom where it has a reached and influenced a broad audience of environmental 
                                                 
358 (Lang, Tim 2005) “Origin Unknown”, The Guardian, August 3.  
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activists, producer associations, retailers, media personalities, and governmental organizations.359 
In 2005, the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) produced one 
of the first substantial reports on the concept.360 The following year ‘food miles’ became part of 
the green strategy of large food retailers when Tesco’s CEO, Sir Terry Leahy, announced his 
company’s pledge to reduce CO2 emissions by targeting air-freighted products.
361  
 
Working with the Carbon Trust company,362 Tesco launched a £500 million eco-plan to reduce 
the company’s carbon footprint, an initiative that was followed by Marks & Spencer’s similar 
£200 million five-year plan. In March 2007, both retail giants introduced their new “air freighted” 
label as an interim measure to induce consumers to buy more local, low carbon products and 
fewer air-freighted products. In the meantime, the Soil Association, the self-described “leading 
[UK] campaigning and certification organization for organic food and farming”,363 announced 
proposed changes along similar lines to its standards for air-freighted products (Figure 31). 
Figure 31 ‘Air freighted’ Label 
 
 
Source: Natural Choices, http://www.naturalchoices.co.uk/Carbon-footprint-labeling-finally?id_mot=7   
                                                 
359 Significantly, however, a 2006 study of consumer awareness of the food miles issue in the UK found that only 
about a third of shoppers were familiar with the concept. See (MacGregor, James, and Bill Vorley, eds. 2006) “Fair 
Miles? Weighing environmental and social impacts of fresh produced exports from Sub-Saharan Africa to the UK 
(Summary)” Fresh Insights 9 (London: IIED & DFID, October 2006). 
360 (Smith, Alisa, Paul Watkiss, Geoff Tweedle, and others 2005) The Validity of Food Miles as an Indicator of 
Sustainable Development. DEFRA: ED50254 Issue 7, July.  
361 TESCO is the UK’s largest grocer and is also the world’s third largest grocery retailer with group sales of £56 
billion in 20016/17, operating in 12 international markets and employing over 476,000. https://www.tescoplc.com. 
362 The Carbon Trust was set up by the UK government in 2001 as an independent company. Its mission is to 
accelerate the move to a low-carbon economy by working with organizations to reduce carbon emissions and 
develop commercial low-carbon technologies.  
363 According to its press releases, the Soil Association verifies the organic credentials of 70 % of the UK’s $4 
billion organic produce market and certifies products on the basis of three principles: minimizing pollution and 
waste; incorporating social justice and rights; and ecologically responsible production. 
https://www.soilassociation.org.  
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In the United States, the popularity of the food miles movement led to the selection of the term 
‘locavore’ (originally coined in 2005 by Seattle based writer Sage van Wing) as the Oxford 
American Dictionary’s word of the year for 2007. Locavores shop at farmers’ markets or even 
grow or pick their own food because they value the alleged greater freshness, taste, nutritional 
value, and safety of locally grown foods. Implicit in this movement is that this lifestyle combines 
healthy eating with a high standard of environmental stewardship. Not surprisingly, this 
perspective has created a trend among gourmet restaurants, where prominent chefs like Alice 
Waters of Chez Panisse (California) rely on local suppliers for ‘pure and fresh ingredients’.364 
The locavore mentality is further reflected in the development of magazines such as Backyard 
Poultry, websites such as thecitychicken.com and backyardchickens.com, and public television 
programs such as “Growing Local, Eating Local”.365   
 
3.2.2 The Case for Food Miles  
The case put forward by food mile activists can be summed up under four types of alleged 
benefits:366    
 Environmental: Because locally grown food items travel shorter distances than those 
produced in more remote locations, they are said to generate less CO2 and other 
greenhouse gas emissions. More diversified local food production systems are also 
viewed as more environmentally sustainable than large, export-oriented systems where 
only a small number of crops may be planted.  
  
 Social: The globalization of the food-supply chain is said to have eroded the community 
ties that once existed between geographically proximate food producers and consumers. 
Rebuilding these ties would generate significant social benefits.  
 
 Health: There is much concern over the safety and quality of conventionally-produced 
food grown or raised in countries with lower health, safety, and environmental standards. 
                                                 
364 Waters is also a strong advocate of farmer’s markets and sustainable production. http://www.chezpanisse.com  
365 See http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/344/index.html  
366 For statements to this effect, see (Pirog, Rich 2004) “Food Miles: A Simple Metaphor to Contrast Local and 
Global Food Systems”, Hunger and Nutrition (Summer 2004), and (Paxton, Angela 1994) The Food Miles Report: 
The Dangers of Long Distance Food Transport. 
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Food produced in closer proximity to consumers in more developed economies is also 
often viewed as fresher and therefore more nutritious and better tasting.  
 
 Economic: Locally produced food improves the economic circumstances of (mostly 
small-scale) farmers who otherwise struggle in the face of international competition, 
along with the fortunes of smaller stores which cannot access the international food 
market as easily as large food retail chains, thereby improving the economic viability of 
rural communities and independent retailers in advanced economies.       
 
While intriguing, the food miles perspective fails to address the rationale behind the development 
of our modern agricultural production and distribution systems. In other words, why is it that 
past consumers in advanced economies unambiguously rejected not only the rural lifestyle, by 
moving en masse out of farming-related activities, but also increasingly favored food items 
produced in ever more remote locations? To provide some context to the current debates, we 
now turn to a brief history of the main drivers behind the latter shift.  
 
3.3 On the Development of Modern Agriculture and Food Supply Networks 
 
3.3.1 From Subsistence to Commercial Agriculture 
The distinction between subsistence agriculture and commercial agriculture is fundamental to 
any discussion of food production. In subsistence agriculture, food is consumed in the 
community in which it is produced. Crops are stored at the end of the growing season and drawn 
down until the next harvest, while domesticated livestock provides some variety in the diet and 
serves as a form of insurance against crop failure. Because of bad weather, plant and agricultural 
diseases, pest infestations, and an inability to draw on the surplus food generated in other 
agricultural regions, individuals living in subsistence agricultural production systems were, and 
still are, subjected to recurring famines and starvation. This situation only began to change on a 
significant scale in Western Europe in the late 18th century with the development of the mass 
transport of foodstuffs and large-scale storage facilities.  
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Commercial agriculture, on the other hand, implies some reliance on trade with producers in 
more remote locations. A typical example occurs between communities specializing in raising 
livestock and those primarily involved in crop production. Increasingly sophisticated commercial 
relationships between specialized producers, often indirectly linked through intermediaries, 
underlie the concept of development. Once specialization in agriculture raises productivity to 
levels where adequate food can be generated by a decreasing proportion of the population, 
individuals are increasingly free to develop expertise in other fields and collectively contribute to 
improving living standards in other ways.  
 
Agricultural producers in advanced economies generally specialize in a few crops or in one type 
of livestock, purchasing either all or the vast majority of their own food and other necessity items 
from retail outlets like any urban family. Because of the high productivity made possible by 
modern technologies, however, they often generate enough surplus to enter international trade 
where, along with exports from other lines of business, they create the capacity to import 
products—including foodstuffs—which are produced more efficiently abroad, contributing to a 
higher standard of living for all parties than would otherwise be the case.  
 
The most advantageous locations for the production of particular agricultural products obviously 
depend on a number of factors ranging from transportation costs, links to markets, and political 
stability to the availability of land, financial capital, and labor. Most crops and livestock, 
however, can be produced across a wide variety of conditions using different techniques. The 
world trade market and the price system then provide a benchmark against which to compare 
these alternatives and enable selection of the most efficient one.  
 
Of course, this does not imply that different approaches cannot coexist. For example, wheat is 
grown labor intensively on postage stamp-sized irrigated land plots in Kyrgyzstan, extensively 
on “mechanically elaborate but agronomically primitive” large scale, dry-land farms in Canada 
and Argentina, and in Europe on intensively managed, smaller-scale holdings that use numerous 
mechanical applications of fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides to generate yields that are 
typically significantly higher than those obtained without those inputs. Of course, different wheat 
varieties used for different purposes—such as the production of bread, pasta or cake—are more 
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suited to some physical environments than others, but again, trade markets spontaneously reward 
the most efficient and productive arrangements in each case. Similar differences and complex 
arrangements exist across a wide variety of food commodities.  
 
Agricultural producers typically have limited scope to influence the price they receive for their 
products, so their profitability depends heavily on the success of their efforts to reduce 
production costs. In a market economy, the suitability of a given location as a source of a 
particular food is ultimately expressed in terms of the total cost of production at that location. 
For example, while it is possible to grow bananas in Iceland, this was never done on a large scale 
because they have always cost much less when shipped in from tropical countries. 367 
Unfortunately, however, because of the strategic importance of the rural vote, the apparently 
simple concept of raising food where it is least expensive to do so is complicated by a broad 
spectrum of government interventions that have long distorted prices through subsidies, 
regulations, and constraints. These together make it very difficult to determine underlying 
production costs. As an illustration, if government subsidies are paid on the basis of land farmed, 
the value of land rises to reflect not only its productive potential, but also its economic potential 
as a means of accessing government assistance. From the consumers’ perspective, the price of 
domestically produced agricultural products is reflected not only at the supermarket, but also in 
the proportion of the taxes allocated to farm-related programs.  
 
State spending on agriculture is often both high and ineffective.368 Among nations, agricultural 
policy is a major source of friction, and it is no coincidence that trade in agricultural products is 
the major impediment to reduce constraints on international trade. Suffice it to say that trade and 
development policies that affect agricultural commodities further complicate efforts to determine 
the cost structure of agriculture in both exporting and importing countries.  
                                                 
367  Banana production did and does take place in Iceland as an experiment to use water from hot geysers 
productively, but prohibitive costs have always ensured that the total volume remains insignificant.  
368 U.S. agricultural policy is so notoriously complicated that U.S. agricultural economist Vernon Ruttan has referred 
to farm bills as “a full employment act” for his colleagues. For U.S. farm spending, see (Pasour, E. C. Jr. 2005). In 
his book Plowshares and Pork Barrels: The Political Economy of Agriculture, he pointed out that in 2002, spending 
by the US Department of Agriculture on initiatives designed to increase the prices received by farmers amounted to 
$37.8 billion, while initiatives to reduce producer price cost taxpayers $11.4 billion.  
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3.3.2 Yes, We Have Lychees! The Modern Food Supply Chain 
Historically, the food trade has been driven by the urbanization process and its accompanying 
lifestyle changes. The first food items shipped on a large scale and over long distances to urban 
populations were, for the most part, valuable and easily preserved commodities such as cereals, 
sugar, coffee, tea, and cocoa. 369  As transportation (trains and steel ships) and preservation 
technologies (canning and refrigeration) improved, new items such as meat were increasingly 
shipped over long distances under the control of increasingly large food conglomerates. Among 
fresh fruits and vegetables, as early as the 1870s, bananas—which could tolerate long-distance 
transportation370—were produced and shipped over thousands of kilometers by what would in 
time become major distributors like Dole, Chiquita, and Del Monte. As urban populations grew 
and became wealthier, so did the demand for fresh fruits and vegetables. By the 1920s, the US 
production and distribution system had become sufficiently sophisticated to supply lettuce and 
tomatoes year-round.  
 
In the 1980s, two major developments—the extension of seasonal production using alternative 
production systems (large-scale greenhouses) and the diversification of production locations—
provided increased variety and a year-round steady supply of fresh fruits and vegetables. These 
advances were further reinforced by product capacity expansion, a growing awareness of the 
nutritional benefits associated with fresh products, and the establishment of large scale, 
temperature controlled logistic systems (refrigerated containers and cold-storage facilities). As a 
result, the range, quality, volume, price, and reliability of traded varieties increased rapidly, 
especially for exotic fruits and vegetables (such as lychees, passion fruit, and Chinese cabbages), 
salad greens (such as arugula and chicory), and baby vegetables. 
 
                                                 
369  (Friedland, William H. 1994) The Global Fresh Fruit and Vegetable System: An Industrial Organization 
Analysis”, in The Global Restructuring of Agro-Food Systems, ed. Philip McMichael. New York: Cornell University 
Press, 173–189.  
370 The innovation that facilitated the long-distance transportation of bananas by sea was the use of ripening rooms 
near the point of retail sale where green bananas were ripened in a methane-rich atmosphere.  
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According to a World Bank report,371 the volume of fruits and vegetables (including processed 
products) traded worldwide increased 30 % between 1990 and 2001. While the monetary value 
of world imports grew 7 to 8 % annually during the 1980s, it dropped to 2 to 3 % a year during 
the 1990s because of a decline in world prices for many products and the stagnation of EU 
imports due to market saturation.  
 
The growth rate for the demand for some products, especially tropical fruits such as papaya, 
mango, and pineapple, has nonetheless remained constant at around 8% annually during the 
1990s. The European Union (28-member states), NAFTA (the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico), China, India, and Japan now dominate the world trade in fruits and vegetables. The 
European Union is one of the largest fruit and vegetable markets for non-EU countries, 
especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. Intra-regional trade is also significant in NAFTA 
countries, which are the world’s second largest fruit and vegetable market. As incomes rose and 
diets diversified, some major food exporters have also become significant importers of a wide 
variety of food products since the 1990s.  
 
For developing economies, fruits and vegetables—both fresh and processed—are not only 
important items in agricultural trade, but also, in many cases, the agricultural segment with the 
greatest growth potential. Significant successful countries in the world market in 2016, are China, 
India, Mexico and Vietnam in vegetable exports, and Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico in fresh-
fruit exports.372 In all cases, exporters supply products that are not grown or are not in season in 
importing countries.  
 
Fruit and vegetable markets are strongly demand driven and are ultimately a function of 
consumers’ income levels and population composition and dynamics. Population size, age, and 
ethnic composition affect the overall demand for specific items. Some important trends include 
the following:  
                                                 
371 (Diop, Ndiame and Steven M. Jaffee 2005) “Fruits and Vegetables: Global Trade and Competition in Fresh and 
Processed Product Markets”, in Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries, eds. M. Ataman Aksoy and 
John C. Beghin. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005, 237–257. 
372 World Integrated Trade Solution data: https://wits.worldbank.org/  
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People with higher incomes increase expenditures on a wide array of fruit and vegetable products, 
while simultaneously creating a demand for processed products, and reliable year-round 
availability. 
 More leisure hours and the increased availability of leisure activities raise the opportunity 
cost of preparing meals at home. 
 
In short, the global trade in fresh fruits and vegetables is demand driven, highly competitive, 
dynamic, and requires significant capital and labor investments. Private and large scale global 
supply chains, with vast amounts of experience, knowledge and capital, and government policies 
favouring trade are necessary for success in this market.  
 
Because food miles activists fail to understand or address the numerous factors that have shaped 
our modern food supply chain, their main claims and prescriptions for sustainability have little 
validity.  
              
3.4 The Case Against Food Miles 
The most problematic aspect of the food miles perspective is that it ignores productivity 
differentials between geographical locations. In other words, activists assume that producing a 
given food item requires the same amount of inputs independently of where and how it is 
produced. The distance traveled between producers and consumers, along with the mode of 
transportation used, becomes the only determinant of specific food item’s environmental impact. 
But any realistic assessment must reflect both transport to final consumers and the total energy 
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions associated with production. While the complexity of 
“seed-to-plate” processes is quite mind-boggling, researchers have shed much light on the issue 
using the so-called Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) methodology.373 The following summarizes 
their main findings, beginning with the transportation component that is at the heart of the local 
food debate. 
 
                                                 
373 For a broad and accessible introduction to the purpose, scope, and limits of LCA, see the webpage of the 
Environmental Protection Agency. http://www.epa.gov  
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3.4.1 Environmental Effect: Energy and CO2 Emissions  
1. Transportation Mode/Load  
The Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in the UK published what is 
probably the most comprehensive analysis of the food miles controversy.374 Researchers used 
two measurements for food transport: vehicle kilometers (the distance traveled by vehicles 
carrying food and drink regardless of the amount being transported) and ton kilometers (distance 
multiplied by load).375 They obtained the following results: 
 
1) Vehicle kilometers: 82% of the estimated 30 billion food miles associated with UK-consumed 
food are generated within the United Kingdom, with car transport from shop to home 
accounting for 48% and heavy goods vehicles (HGV, tractor-trailer combinations) for 31% 
of food miles. Remarkably, air transport amounted to less than 1% of food miles.  
 
The large share accounted for by cars is the result of individual families making many small-
volume trips to transport food from store to home. Comparatively, these cars are much more 
inefficient than bulk transportation modes that move food from the point of production to the 
retail location.  
 
Figure 32 Vehicle kilometers 
 
Source: DEFRA 
                                                 
374 (Smith, Watkiss, Tweedle, and others 2005)  
375 Here a ton is used to indicate the metric measurement of 1000 kilograms (kg), where 1 kg = 2.2 lbs.  
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2) Ton kilometers: Sea transport accounts for 65% of food miles, but this doesn’t mean that this 
mode of transport is the most polluting in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. Transportation 
by sea is a highly energy-efficient way to move goods, and its “vehicle” kilometers account 
for less than 1% of total vehicle kilometers. In other words, moving New Zealand apples to 
the UK using highly efficient, diesel-powered container ships consumes very little energy per 
apple when compared to moving them by car from a supermarket to a relatively nearby 
residence.  
 
Figure 33 Ton kilometers 
 
Source: DEFRA 
 
 
3) CO2 emissions: Food transportation in the UK accounted for 1.8% of total CO2 emissions in 
2002, with tractor trailers and air transportation (including both import and export products) 
respectively accounting for 57% and 10% of this total, and sea transport accounting for 12%.  
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Figure 34 CO2 emissions 
 
  
Source: DEFRA 
 
In short, according to the DEFRA report, food miles (or “vehicle kilometers”) and environmental 
burden (in terms of CO2 emissions) are not directly correlated. While air freight is typically 
singled out by activists as the most environmentally damaging and most energy-intensive mode 
of food transport, it is actually a minor contributor to total CO2 emissions (10%). 
 
In the United States, a LCA (Life Cycle Analysis) study confirmed the plausibility of these 
findings by showing that 11% of GHG emissions related to food are from the transportation 
segment as a whole. Moreover, the “food miles” segment (from producers to retailers) 
contributed only about 4% of total emissions, while 83% came from producing the food.376  
 
The concept of food miles is therefore a profoundly flawed sustainability indicator. Its 
proponents typically fail to factor in the efficiency of transportation modes as well as loads 
transported.  
  
2. Production Stage 
Growing concerns over food miles have resulted in a significant increase in the number of LCA 
studies on the topic. The comprehensive literature review on the subject is authored by New 
                                                 
376 (Weber, Christopher L., and H. Scott Matthews 2008)  
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Zealand researchers Caroline Saunders and Peter Hayes.377 While the scope and focus of the 27 
studies reviewed (17 of which were funded by UK sponsors) varied, they shed valuable light on 
the picture of energy consumption and CO2 emissions for the whole agricultural production 
chain. In short, according to the available data, the most energy-intensive segments (and 
therefore those providing the best target for reducing energy use) of the agricultural production 
chain were not related to the transportation but to the production stage (Figure 35). 
Figure 35 Life Cycle Analysis Scope and Input 
 
 
Source: by author 
 
                                                 
377 (Saunders, Caroline and Peter Hayes 2007) Air Freight Transport of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables. New Zealand: 
AERU, Lincoln University.  
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3. Production Method 
The DEFRA study compared emissions from energy used for UK and Spanish tomatoes and 
factored in the production stage and post-production transfer from Spain to the UK by land 
transportation. In this context, UK tomato production emits 2394 kg of CO2/ton compared to 630 
kg/ton for Spanish tomatoes, with the significant difference being accounted for by the energy 
requirements of UK greenhouse production (about 90% of the energy used in this production), 
while Spanish production takes place in unheated, plastic-sheeted greenhouses.  
 
In general, physical environments that require significant heating and/or cold protection 
technologies entail much greater energy consumption than more favorable climates, often on a 
scale that dwarfs the energy requirements associated with the transportation of agricultural 
products from more remote locations. This misplaced emphasis on transported distance from 
producers to retailers as a sustainability indicator hurts poorer economies and undermines their 
capacity to devote more resources to environmental protection. This point will be addressed in 
greater detail in later sections. 
  
4. Product Type, Preparation and Storage 
The type of product is an important factor in determining total energy consumption/CO2 
emissions.378 In other words, a product is energy intensive or less environmental friendly if it is 
preprocessed or requires much cooking preparation. Such products include frozen and ready-
prepared fruits and vegetables. Low greenhouse gas-emission products are typically seasonal, 
require no heating and protection, are not highly perishable, and travel short distances. Common 
examples are staple root vegetables and tubers (carrot and potatoes), cabbages, and staple 
indigenous fruits (apples and pears). Interestingly, however, a study on the CO2 emissions 
associated with Swedish organically grown potatoes found that the most significant factors in 
this respect are household shopping, storage, and preparation—especially in the latter case since 
potatoes cannot be eaten raw and require much energy to cook.379 A study by Martin C. Heller 
                                                 
378 (Garnett, Tara 2006) “Fruit and Vegetables & UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Exploring the Relationship”, 
working paper, Food Climate Research Network, UK.  
379 (Mattson. B. and E. Wallén 2003) “Environmental Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) of Organic Potatoes”, Acta 
Horticulturae 619: 427–435. 
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and Gregory A. Keoleian at the University of Michigan, similarly pointed out that home cooking 
and storage require much energy.380 
 
The importance of seasonality, in terms of energy input and CO2 emissions, is also often easily 
forgotten by activists and consumers. In their study, Caroline Saunders and Peter Hayes at the 
University of Lincoln, calculated out-of-season cold storage energy input and CO2 emissions for 
UK apples kept in this state for an average of six months.381 According to their scenario, UK 
apple storage energy consumption was 2069 mega joule/ton and CO2 emissions for production 
85.5 kg of CO2/ton.  
 
These amounts are comparable to the transportation energy consumption required to ship New 
Zealand apples to the United Kingdom (2030 MJ/ton), but far exceed those required to produce 
New Zealand apples (60.1 kg of CO2/ton). In other words, because New Zealand is located in the 
southern hemisphere where the growing season coincides with the northern hemisphere’s winter, 
shipping freshly picked New Zealand apples and selling them quickly to UK consumers during 
their winter season entails less greenhouse gas emissions than the purchase by UK consumers of 
UK apples that have been in storage for several months.  
 
Another study by Milà i Canals, Cowell, Sim, and Basson further factored in seasonal storage 
and storage losses.382 In this scenario, local apples, stored between five and nine months with 
normal storage loss rates, increased total primary energy use by 8 to 16%. This high level of cold 
storage energy consumption indicates that out-of-season storage should be avoided (at least if 
uneconomical) and that importing out-of-season alternatives can provide significant 
environmental benefits. 
 
 
                                                 
380 (Heller, Martin A. and Gregory A. Keoleian 2000) Life Cycle-Based Sustainability Indicators for Assessment of 
the US Food System, Center for Sustainability Systems report no.CSS00-04, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 
December. 
381(Saunders, Caroline and Peter Hayes 2007) Apples and similar fruits are frequently kept in storage with higher 
than normal CO2 concentrations. Temperature control involves either maintaining lower than ambient temperatures 
to inhibit spoilage or maintaining higher than ambient temperatures to prevent freezing, depending on the location.  
382 (Milà i Canals, Llorenç, Sarah J. Cowell, Sarah Sim, and Lauren Basson 2007) Comparing Domestic Versus 
Imported Apples: A Focus on Energy Use”, Environmental Science and Pollution Research 14, no. 5: 338344. 
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5. Consumer Shopping and Food Handling Behavior  
Consumers’ transportation choices, such as walking or biking as opposed to driving, obviously 
affect the total CO2 emissions associated with their food purchases. The magnitude of this impact, 
however, is also typically underestimated by activists and consumers. A UK consumer, driving 
six miles to buy Kenyan green beans, emits more carbon per bean than flying them from Kenya 
to the United Kingdom. 
 
Another largely overlooked issue is the way consumers handle their food. Tara Garnett at the 
University of Surrey points out that 25% of all produce grown ends up as waste.383 Another 
British study conducted by the Waste & Resources Action Programme384 analyzed the trash of 
2,138 households and estimated that more than 6.7 million tons of food—roughly a third of the 
food bought by consumers—was thrown out in the UK every year. According to the authors of 
the report, 61% of this food waste (consisting mostly of fresh fruits, vegetables, and salads, and 
amounting to approximately 70kg/year/person) could be avoided with better shopping and meal 
planning. Food waste costs were estimated to be on the order of £10.2 billion (about USD$19.5 
billion) and the cause of 18 million tons of CO2 emissions per year in the UK—an amount 
equivalent to the annual emissions of one fifth of the British car fleet.  
 
In sum, while activists and consumers tend to focus exclusively on the transportation distance 
between producers and retailers, they are unaware of the typically greater impact of their own 
shopping and food handling behavior on CO2 emissions.  
 
3.4.2 Social Effect 
About 40% of the UK’s air-freighted fresh fruit and vegetable imports have originated from sub-
Saharan countries such as South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Kenya. 385 
Kenyan producers’ successes (especially in terms of green beans, green peas, and fresh flowers), 
however, eventually drew the ire of European food and environmental activists concerned that 
                                                 
383 (Garnett, Tara 2006)   
384 (WRAP) “The food we waste”, http://www.wrap.org.uk 
WRAP is a nonprofit company established in 2000, backed by government funding from England, Scotland, Wales, 
and Northern Ireland, that “helps individuals, businesses and local authorities to reduce waste and recycle more, 
making better use of resources and helping to tackle climate change”.  
385 (MacGregor, James, and Bill Vorley, eds. 2006). 
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since these goods were air freighted, they were “the epitome of unsustainable consumption”. As 
a result, a series of initiatives, campaigns, and measures were launched that triggered 
considerable fears on the part of African governments and producers.386 The facts of the Kenyan 
case are instructive. 
In 2016, Kenya’s export of vegetables, roots, tubers, and other edible vegetables totaled $293 
million and made it the 31th largest exporting country in this category.387 In another export 
category, cut flowers and flower buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornaments, Kenya 
exported $689 million worth of merchandise and was the 4th largest exporter in the world. 
Indeed, Kenyan cut-flower exports accounts for 14% of the total export value, and is the leading 
supplier of cut flowers to the European Union. 388   
 
Because of their characteristics (light weight, high value, perishable), 9% of fresh fruits and 
vegetables exported from Kenya to the UK are air freighted, 389  adding, for example, an 
additional 2 to 18 pence to the cost of each pack of organic Kenyan green beans. 390 
Intercontinental air freight adds 8 kg of CO2 to the atmosphere per kg transported, about 200 
times more emissions and 12 times more energy than sea transport.391 However, a much larger 
volume of CO2 emissions is released by UK passenger flights each year. Indeed, passenger 
flights amount to 90% of all emissions from airlines, with cargo flights amounting to about 5%. 
Furthermore, less than 0.1% of total UK emissions of CO2 are contributed by fresh fruit and 
vegetable air-freighted imports. Interestingly, 60 to 80% of Kenyan fresh agricultural products 
are transported in the cargo hold of passenger flights.392 When passenger-related emissions are 
factored in, CO2 emission levels for air-freighted exports are much lower.  
 
                                                 
386  (Garside, Ben, James MacGregor, and Bill Vorley 2007) “Miles better? How ‘fair miles’ stack up in the 
sustainable supermarket”, Fresh Perspectives 9. London: IIED, December. (Turney, Roger) “Organic Growth”, Air 
Cargo World Online.  
387 (International Trade Statistics) Trade Competitive Map.http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/trade-
statistics/ 
388 (Riungu, Catherine 2005) “Why Kenya Dominates Export of Flowers to the EU Market”, The East African, 
February 21. http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/-/2560/245890/-/7oem2tz/-/index.html. 
389 (MacGregor, James, and Bill Vorley, eds. 2006) 
390 (Freshinfo 2008) “Airfreight proposals vilified by industry”, April 8, 2008.  
391 (MacGregor, James, and Bill Vorley, eds. 2006) 
392(MacGregor, James and Muyeye Chambwara 2007) “Room to move: ‘ecological space’ and emissions equity”, 
Fresh Perspectives 14. London: IIED, December.  
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In one study, Adrian Williams at Cranfield University, contrasted production of cut flowers in 
Kenya and the Netherlands destined for the UK market.393 For every 12,000 cut roses produced, 
Kenyan producers released 6,000 kg of CO2, as opposed to 35,000 kg of CO2 for their Dutch 
competitors. Overall, Kenyan rose production is much more efficient and environmentally 
friendly than Dutch production, reflecting that 99% of Dutch emissions were caused by heating- 
and lighting-intensive production systems, whereas Kenyan flower production relies mostly on 
natural sunshine. In contrast, 91% of Kenyan emissions were attributed to the 4000-mile 
transport from Kenya to the UK. This study provides a striking illustration of the impact of 
environmental differences between production locations. 
  
When the food miles controversy broke out, supporters of Kenyan exporters were quick to point 
out that greenhouse gas emissions associated with air-freighted produce exports were miniscule 
in comparison with the impact of tourist air travel by citizens of importing nations. They further 
argued that Kenyan agriculture, often relying on manual labor instead of farm machinery and 
chemical weed control, integrated pest management instead of applications of chemical 
pesticides, and organic rather than chemical fertilizers, was inherently more competitive in terms 
of its carbon footprint than its first-world counterpart. Of course, CO2 emissions per capita vary 
widely from country to country, but the global average is currently estimated to be about 3.6 tons 
per person per year. Interestingly, the UK average of 9.2 tons is considerably higher than the 
African average of 1.04 tons and the Kenyan average of 0.2 tons.  
 
These figures highlight the hypocrisy underlying the campaign by the Soil Association and other 
rich-country activists who claimed that the distance traveled by imported organic produce 
implied significant environmental damages in the form of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
This claim was demonstrated conclusively to be inaccurate and misleading along the lines 
already discussed in this paper:  
 
1) The distance traveled by a product between producer and consumer was not indicative of 
the relative “cost” to the environment as expressed in terms of GHG emissions. 
                                                 
393 (Williams, Adrian 2007) Comparative Study of Cut Roses for the British Market Produced in Kenya and the 
Netherlands, Précis Report for World Flowers. Cranfield University. 
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2) The mode of transportation and volume of goods transported by each mode played a 
crucial role in the amount of GHG emissions attributable to each product. Not 
surprisingly, the greatest volume of emissions was often incurred by tractor-trailers in the 
UK. 
3)  Very insignificant volumes of food travel by air compared to other modes of 
transportation. There is no reason to suppose that the share of air-freighted foodstuffs is 
going to increase significantly. 
4) Importing foods over long distances from producers that use low-carbon technologies is 
likely to be less environmentally damaging than employing locally grown alternatives, 
especially out of season.394 
3.4.3 Economic Impact  
Responding to the arguments put forward by the local food movement, a growing number of 
community groups and social activists have taken up the challenge of subsisting (at least 
temporarily) on a (mostly) local diet. The most radical individuals in this respect are the 
promoters of the so-called 100 mile diet, who voluntarily limit their food consumption to items 
grown or caught within a 100-mile radius of their residences.395 One of the best-documented 
cases is a Canadian couple based in southwest British Columbia (perhaps Canada’s most 
ecologically diverse and productive agricultural region) who took up this eco-challenge for a 
year and documented their experiences online and in a book. 396  Their experiment quickly 
highlighted some fundamental problems with the 100-mile diet approach:   
 
                                                 
394(Williams, Adrian 2007) Nonetheless, the UK Soil Association continued to insist that it did not intend to target 
all air-freighted produce, but merely that it sought to withhold its “organic” certification from produce that failed to 
meet its own ethical trade standards or the Fair Trade Foundation’s standards. This, however, raises the important 
issue of who is best placed to determine whether a product is traded fairly or not. For a more detailed discussion of 
the issue, see (Berndt, Colleen 2007) Does Fair Trade Coffee Help the Poor? Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center. 
395 The small family of Bruntisland, Fife, Scotland, provides a UK example. For six months they have adhered to 
and publicized the “Fife Diet” which is restricted to food—mostly vegetables, meat, and fish—raised in the region 
and caught in adjacent waters. (McKie, Robin 2008) “How the Myth of Food Miles Hurts the Planet, “The Observer, 
March. It should be noted that Fife is a particularly remote and windswept northerly county of Scotland. 
396 (Smith, Alisa and J. B. MacKinnon 2005) “Living on the 100-Mile Diet”, The Tyee, June 28. 
http://thetyee.ca/Life/2005/06/28/HundredMileDiet.  
(Smith, Alisa and MacKinnon 2007) The 100-Mile Diet. A Year of Local Eating. Toronto: Random House Canada. 
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 Cost: Locally grown organic products or substitutes for conventional products, in general, 
cost more (often significantly more) than conventional products.397 
 Lack of variety: Sugar, rice, lemon, ketchup, olive oil, peanut butter, orange juice, and flour 
could not be produced locally. In winter, only a very narrow selection of vegetables was 
available. 
 Time: The time spent acquiring and preparing food (for both immediate and later 
consumption) was comparable to holding a part-time job.  
Of course, these problems were actually mitigated by the fact that the couple involved did not 
forego access to a wide range of services, such as sophisticated health care, which were available 
to them only because food imports made it possible for other individuals to specialize in non-
agricultural activities. Still, this experiment does help illustrate the large and very tangible 
benefits of trade and the sophisticated division of labor it allows.  
 
3.4.4 Health and Security 
Industry-initiated and government-sponsored promotional campaigns to “buy local” are nothing 
new, as food producers and some consumers have long considered food items produced within 
their political borders (and, ideally, grown organically) to be inherently more desirable for 
alleged health and security reasons. There is, however, no guarantee that locally produced food is 
inherently safer than food produced elsewhere under the watchful eyes of advanced countries’ 
retailers whose very survival is dependent on their capacity to deliver affordable and safe food to 
consumers. Ironically, a LCA study sponsored by DEFRA has raised questions about the claims 
repeatedly made in favor of organic foodstuffs in general, the first of which is that organic 
farming is good for the environment.398 It is similarly difficult to argue that a country is safer if it 
                                                 
397 The 100-mile couple mentioned that the cost was a big problem, for example, locally grown organic salad mix 
cost $17.99 a pound, and honey cost $11 a kilo instead of $2.59 a kilo for sugar. 
398 (Johnston, Rob 2008) “The great organic myths: Why organic foods are an indulgence the world can’t afford”, 
The Independent, May 1. Interestingly, the “attack is the best form of defense” strategy employed by the Soil 
Association seems to be coming unstuck. The organic food movement in the UK, which is mostly confined to the 
wealthy southeast of the country, is also under attack from the Food Standards Agency, which maintains that “the 
weight of current scientific evidence does not support claims that organic food is more nutritious or safer than 
conventionally produced food”. (Revill, Jo 2008) “Organic Food ‘No Benefit to Health,’” The Observer, March 30. 
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relies entirely on local crops that are always subject to bad yields or outright failures rather than 
on numerous foreign suppliers.  
 
Of course, most health, safety, and environmental concerns raised over foreign food supplies are 
often thinly veiled protectionist measures. For example, the early involvement of the British Soil 
Association in the food miles controversy was quickly denounced as an ill-disguised 
protectionist move by a lobby group with a vested interest in protecting its (high cost) members 
from offshore competition. In the US, a country-of-origin labeling (COOL) proposal that would 
have required retailers to provide customers with country-of-origin labeling for beef and other 
perishable products previously exempted from this requirement was discussed in the context of 
the 2002 US farm bill. COOL proponents (primarily uncompetitive crop growers and cattle 
producers) tried to link this provision with safety and health concerns, such as BSE (mad cow 
disease) and FMD (foot and mouth disease). A trade analyst at the Cato institute, Daniel J. 
Ikenson put it that this proposal ultimately aimed to “saddle others with what should be the 
marketing costs of domestic producers and to reduce import competition”.399  
 
Not surprisingly, COOL faced strong opposition from retailers (who would bear the cost of this 
requirement) and serious implementation difficulties, leading to its postponement until March 
2009, when COOL labeling was finally implemented. This ruling covers a variety of commodity 
such as beef, lamb, pork, chicken, and goat, wild and farm-raised fish and shellfish, perishable 
agricultural commodities (fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables), peanuts, pecans, ginseng and 
macadamia nuts.400 This listing is totally arbitrary. In the beef case, COOL labeling discriminates 
against many countries where the BSE risk is negligible.401  
 
                                                 
399 (Ikenson Daniel J.2004) Uncool Rules: Second Thoughts on Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, Free Trade 
Bulletin no. 7 (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, Center for Trade Policy Analysis, 2004). See also (Brester, 
Gary, John M. Marsh, and Joseph Atwood 2004) “Who Will Bear the Cost of Country-of-Origin Labeling?” Choices, 
4th.  
400 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)). The eRulemaking. https://www.regulations.gov/ 
401  (Boland, Michael A., Lautaro Perez, and John A. Fox 2007) “Grass-Fed Certification: The Case of the 
Uruguayan Beef Industry”, Choices, 1st quarter.  
(World Organization for Animal Health 2017) Protecting animals, preserving our future.  
http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/official-disease-status/bse/list-of-bse-risk-status/ 
150 
 
Furthermore, in practice, investigating and documenting the full array of environmental impacts 
of specific items and conveying this information to consumers at the point of sale proves to be an 
extremely difficult task. For example, brands familiar to UK consumers (such as Walkers Crisps 
and Boots the Chemist), along with retail giant Tesco, were committed to implementing “carbon-
labeling” policies that would quantify and communicate the total CO2 emissions of specific items 
from the production stage to the retail shelf. While the cost of obtaining a reasonably accurate 
estimate of emission per item turned out to be at least $10,000,402  in practice the inherent 
complexity and trade-offs involved in the modern food production and distribution chain 
probably make all such attempts debatable and arbitrary.  
 
In short, while it is often assumed that locally grown foods are both less energy consuming (and 
therefore less CO2 emitting) and more beneficial in terms of safety, security, and health, there is 
no solid evidence to back any of these claims.  
 
3.4.5 Other Considerations 
1. Labeling Information and Consumer Behavior  
Studies of consumer behavior undertaken as a consequence of the food miles controversy tend to 
confirm a long-established divergence between what consumers say they prefer (in this case, a 
strong preference for local food) and their actual shopping behavior, which demonstrates the 
greater importance of factors such as price, time, convenience, variety, and year-round 
availability. Indeed, Tesco’s and Marks & Spencer’s early enthusiasm for food miles confirmed 
that “air freighted” labels have no discernable impact on sales.403 Meanwhile, consumers seem to 
continue to appreciate the convenience and choices offered by large supermarkets as opposed to 
the more limited options typical of smaller retail outlets.404  
 
Similarly, while a study conducted in the context of the US COOL debate suggests that US 
consumers might be willing to pay a premium for COOL labeled American meat on the 
assumptions that it is fresher and safer than its imported counterparts, no credible research 
                                                 
402 (Green, Heather and Kerry Capell 2008) “Carbon Confusion”, Business Week, March 6. 
403 (Freshinfo 2007) “Tesco and M&S Admit Airfreight Apathy”, November 2007. 
404 (Chambers, Stephanie, Alexandra Lobb, Laurie Butler, and others 2007) “Local, National, and Imported Foods: 
A Qualitative Study”, Appetite 49: 208–213. 
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guarantees that COOL labels would boost demand for US meat to the point that it would offset 
additional labeling costs. Moreover, a case has been made that labels describing attributes such 
as grass-fed, organic, and free range—or other factors, such as color, quality grade, and price— 
exert more influence than COOL labelling on consumers’ purchasing decisions.405   
 
2. Toward a Valid Indicator for Sustainable Production and Development  
In recent decades, market mechanisms have delivered remarkable results in providing ever more 
diverse, healthy, and affordable food to consumers. Many activists, however, suggest that these 
favorable trends have been purchased at the expense of ever increasing environmental 
degradation. Assuming that all human beings should be provided adequate nutrition, however, 
this proposition is highly debatable in that certain amount of environmental degradation should 
be acceptable in order to provide people with food.  
 
In short, there is a long-standing debate between proponents of alternative approaches to 
agricultural production—mostly those pushing the local food movement—and their opponents, 
who suggest that concentrating agricultural production in the most favorable regions is the best 
way to minimize human impacts because doing so “spares” much land that can then be returned 
to or remain in a “natural” state. This debate seems to be over and to have been won by the latter 
group.406 It is evident that the global trade market and the price mechanism developed precisely 
for the purpose of avoiding the root cause of the food miles controversy: the ability to address 
competing interests with a common yardstick.  
 
3.5 Policy Discussion 
 
3.5.1 Trade Barriers 
Feeding a rapidly growing world population in a sustainable manner requires long distance trade 
to ensure that food is produced most efficiently in the most suitable locations. Developed 
countries’ agricultural subsidy regimes and protectionist trade policies impede the ability of 
                                                 
405 (Umberger, Wendy J. 2004) “Will Consumers Pay a Premium for Country-of-Origin Labeled Meat?” Choices, 
4th quarter.  
406 (Matson, Pamela. Peter Vitousek 2006) "Agricultural Intensification: Will Land Spared from Farming Be Land 
Spared for Nature?" Conservation Biology 20, no. 3: 709–710. 
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developing nations to realize their full economic potential. Subsidies exert a considerable burden 
on taxpayers, mainly through efficiency losses and the distortion of relative market prices. In 
other words, most subsidies are, in the end, harmful to both the environment and the economy, 
although they might end up lowering consumer prices in other jurisdictions. According to one 
review of the literature, 407  estimated total subsidies worldwide to six economic sectors 
(agriculture, fishery, energy production, transport, water, and forestry) hovered around $1 trillion 
per year. Agriculture was the most heavily subsidized and receives $376 billion, $207 billion 
(55%) of which can be described as “perverse subsidies” that had negative impacts on both the 
economy and the environment.  
 
Tariffs are the most common instrument used to protect local fruit and vegetable markets. 
Compared to other industries, the average agricultural tariff, at 16.7 %, is rather high.408 The 
European Union, Japan, and the United States use a wide range of protectionist tools to varying 
degrees.409 The net effect of the trade inhibitions that arise from the subsidy regimes and trade 
policies of developed nations is to keep developing (and, ironically, also developed) countries 
poorer than they would otherwise be. Along with inappropriate domestic policy environments, 
poverty, rather than the potential to produce more food, is the main reason for food insecurity in 
many jurisdictions. Trade restrictions imposed by developed nations and the subsidy regimes that 
distort what trade is permitted, are largely to blame for food shortages in the developing world. 
As one observer has pointed out, trade restrictions and various European government policies 
tainted by “befuddled romanticism”, from campaigns against genetically modified foods and 
low-wage produce to “save the peasant” farm reforms, have resulted in sub-Saharan Africa now 
having less commercial agriculture than it did 50 years ago.410 It must be pointed out, however, 
that numerous trade barriers and other institutional deficiencies (such as lack of or inadequately 
enforced property rights) are also contributing factors in less-developed economies. 
 
                                                 
407  (Kjellingbro, Peter M., and Maria Skotte 2005) Environmentally Harmful Subsidies.Copenhagen, Denmark: 
Environmental Assessment Institute, September. 
408 (Diop, Ndiame and Steven M. Jaffee 2005)  
409 (Anderson, Kym, Will Martin, and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe 2005) “Distortions to World Trade: Impacts 
on Agricultural Markets and Farm Incomes”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 3736: 24.  
410 (Collier Paul 2007) The Bottom Billion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
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According to a World Bank report, developing countries would capture about $85.7 billion in 
real income from the full liberalization of the global merchandise trade. 411  The global 
liberalization of agricultural and food markets would contribute about 63 % of the total global 
gains, but many barriers would need to be surmounted to achieve these benefits. In short, 
removing barriers to free trade aligns the commercial interests of all actors involved in the food-
supply chain to provide an ever more reliable, higher-quality, and affordable supply of food 
items to consumers. As a result of these processes, one can observe, among other things, a 
constant need to tap supplies from places with complementary growing seasons and to use air 
freight to fill unexpected gaps in the supply of products shipped by sea.412  
 
As illustrated, barriers to the trade of food represent a major problem. Although small compared 
to these bigger issues, the local food movement only exacerbates the problems outlined above. 
Any attempt to legislate this current fad will have far-reaching negative consequences. However, 
even if not legislated, there is a misunderstanding, summarized in this thesis, about the benefits 
and costs of buying locally produced foods.  
 
3.5.2 Real Impact of Mandating Local Production Purchases 
Food-mile advocates don’t appear to understand the full ramifications of their arguments. The 
most obvious is that the immense majority of individuals living in advanced economies are food 
consumers rather than producers. Coercive policies based on food mile thinking, like all trade 
barriers to agricultural products, can therefore only affect consumers negatively.  
 
1. The Direct Costs of Hypothetical Food-Mile Legislation  
Food mile activists sometimes promote the economic benefits of local purchases, at least 
inasmuch as they imply higher incomes for local producers. Missing from this perspective, of 
course, is the fact that, if forced by political intervention, farmers’ gains can only come at the 
expense of consumers who will be forced to pay higher prices for similar food items, or similar 
                                                 
411 (Martin, Anderson, and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe 2005) “Distortions to World Trade”.  
412  As the automotive components industry has moved to just-in-time (JIT) component supply similar costly 
measures are sometimes required because the reliability of the supplier is at risk if it has to stop the assembly line for 
want of a particular part. In many respects the logistics of the fresh fruit and vegetable market is JIT because of the 
perishable nature of the product.  
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prices for lesser-quality food items, than would otherwise be the case (if not, there would be no 
need to adopt coercive policies to penalize agricultural items produced in more distant political 
jurisdictions). 
 
2. Limited Choices and Supply 
Restrictive “local food” policies would imply, even in the world’s most productive agricultural 
areas, a drastic reduction in the quantity and diversity of foods available to consumers. Smaller 
supplies of meat, soybeans, cereals, fresh fruits and vegetables - even if somewhat compensated 
by increased local production of a few items (for example, potatoes, beets, and onions) - would 
result in lower amounts of calories available per individual and reduced vitamin, protein and 
mineral intakes.413 In this context, reduced population levels and living standards would be 
mandatory. Of course, in the absence of substitutes (rice, soybeans, etc.), people suffering from 
food allergies would be more affected than most in this context, especially those who experience 
violent reactions to items such as gluten, dairy products, and eggs, which are commonly used in 
food preparation. 
 
Western Europe during the two world wars provides an interesting historical parallel, as 
continental countries were cut off from the foreign food shipments they had come to rely on. For 
example, the Allied naval blockade of Germany during World War I created such misery that by 
1916, the German population was surviving on a diet of dark bread, slices of sausage without fat, 
turnips, and an individual ration of three pounds of potatoes per week. As observers put it at the 
time, the German women "who stood in the pallid queues before shops spoke more about their 
children's hunger than about the death of their husbands”.414  Anticipating similar problems, 
officials of many European countries adopted measures to increase agricultural self-sufficiency 
before and at the beginning of World War II. As a result, large areas of pastureland and “idle” 
land were plowed under, increased subsidies were devoted to farming, and people were drafted 
                                                 
413 Of course, the situation would be made even worse if food additives such as vitamins and minerals, which are 
currently produced in a few highly efficient locations, were similarly affected by “local food” restrictions. 
414 (Raico, Ralph 1990) "The Politics of Hunger: A Review”, Review of Austrian Economics 3, no. 1: 253–259. 
Other factors, such as wartime planning and the dominance of a dietary perspective that required the diversion of 
tubers and cereals to produce more meat for German soldiers also played a role in this respect. 
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to work in agriculture. The number of chickens and pigs was curtailed drastically in order to 
make the grain, potatoes, and skim milk they were fed available to the human population.415  
 
In short, the available evidence suggests that hypothetical food mile legislation could only be 
used with parsimony. Indeed, it could perhaps oblige retailers to show the area of origin of each 
product they sell and perhaps compel them to offer a certain percentage of products from local 
producers. Beyond this, and because it would dramatically reduce the diversity of products 
available to consumers, such legislation would impose severe costs on consumers and society. 
For these reasons alone, the temptation to legislate a limit on the mileage food can travel before 
being sold to the final consumer should be resisted. It would make consumers worse off, would 
not be environmentally friendly, and would damage to the economy. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The appeal of the food-mile perspective, with its promise to reconnect people with food, 
neighboring producers, and seasonality while delivering environmental, economic, health, and 
social benefits, is superficially obvious. Unfortunately, these issues are generally discussed in an 
emotional context, based on activists’ distrust of large corporations and romanticizing of 
subsistence agriculture. The benefits claimed by food miles proponents have little basis in fact 
yet provide a new set of rhetorical tools to bolster protectionist interests that are fundamentally 
detrimental to most of humankind. Subsistence agriculture, which is ultimately what the food 
miles concept boils down to, is of course feasible, but it implies significant trade-offs that may 
not be readily apparent to most people who fail to understand that our modern food supply chain 
is a demonstrably superior alternative that has evolved through constant competition and ever 
more rigorous management efficiency.  
 
Ideally, in a world characterized by free trade and the absence of agricultural (and other) 
subsidies, prices would go much further toward coordinating supply and demand for a wide 
variety of foods in a manner that is both economically and environmentally efficient. The 
underlying principle is very simple. As Adam Smith wrote more than two centuries ago, it is the 
                                                 
415 (Vogt, William 1948) Road to Survival. New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc. 
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“maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what it will cost 
him more to make than to buy”. By continually eliminating inefficiency and promoting 
productivity, market processes would ensure an ever increasing, healthier, and more affordable 
food supply while simultaneously always reducing inputs per unit and, over time, their 
environmental impacts.  
 
The course of the debate over food miles is nonetheless instructive for policy makers. It 
illustrates the importance of questioning claims made by organizations with a vested interest in a 
particular form of public policy, and for digging deeper for information that either supports or 
refutes the claims. Above all, it highlights the need to remain focused on the issues that are 
important—in this case, the greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) of highly subsidized first-world 
agriculture, the trade imbalances that prevent both developed and developing countries from 
realizing the mutual benefits of freer trade, biofuel subsidies, and third-world poverty—and to 
avoid being distracted by “tempests in teacups”. With the population of the planet rapidly 
heading for an estimated 9 billion people over the next few decades, numerous food policy issues 
other than food miles should preoccupy policy makers.  
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CHAPTER 4. TRADE AGREEMENTS: THE PURPOSE & OPTIONS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Despite a proliferation of ‘Free Trade Agreements’ there is a huge gap between the concept and 
the practice of ‘free trade’. There is a wide variation in arrangements between and among trading 
partners/countries, ranging from very liberal (Hong Kong/Singapore/New Zealand) to very 
restrictive (North Korea). Nations have increasingly turned to bilateral and regional agreements 
to increase trade since negotiations on a global scale, involving all members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) ended in failure with the collapse of the Doha Round in 2008. This chapter 
looks at a brief history of recent trade agreements, particularly two of the larger regional 
agreements: NAFTA and TPP, and discusses future trade agreement options for Britain after 
Brexit.  
 
Modern trade negotiations are often more about politics than about realizing free trade. 
Politicians either ignore or do not understand how the nature of trade leads to benefits for many 
people both at home and abroad. Also, special interest groups exert influence both on trade 
negotiations and subsequent interpretation of the rules in order to limit competition, and thus 
agreements favour producers at the expense of consumers. The results of recent trade agreements 
are not auspicious for consumer welfare. According to Kevin Dowd, Professor at Durham 
University and a member of Economists for Free Trade in the UK, multilateral trade deals have 
achieved little trade liberalisation in over two decades.416 
 
Tariff reductions under GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and WTO (World 
Trade Organization) contributed significantly to the liberalization of trade. The important issue 
of more recent trade agreements has been non-tariff barriers.417 Attempts to address these issues, 
such as harmonization of rules, have produced mixed results. Furthermore, other regulations 
                                                 
416 (Dowd 2017) p.29.   
417 (Dowd 2017) p.29. He points out that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) does not even mention ‘trade’ in its 
title., p. 10, Dowd stated that “Nowadays achieving free trade is not so much about tariffs or classic bread –and –
butter trade policies…Many restrictions to genuine free trade arise from in areas such as the environment, consumer 
protection, health and safety, and data security”. 
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prompted by social and environmental concerns often end up being thinly disguised 
protectionism and, as such, are controversial.  
 
Overly strict and complex non-tariff measures (NTMs) have become non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
protecting domestic industry from foreign competitors, 418  and negatively influencing cross-
border trade. In general, trade gains from reducing NTBs are more difficult to achieve than gains 
from reducing tariffs, because such barriers are more resistant to reform due to the complexity or 
novelty of the issue or its political sensitivity.419  These regulatory restrictions have become 
pervasive and counterproductive.420 
 
Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), trade among Canada, Mexico, and 
the US increased dramatically. The Trump administration’s protectionist proposals to renegotiate 
NAFTA risk increasing costs for intermediate goods and encouraging firms to look outside the 
existing trading bloc for new suppliers. With America’s withdrawal from TPP, the future of that 
trade deal is now up in the air. Furthermore, the US’s departure offers China a huge opportunity 
to strengthen its ties with Pacific Rim partners, something which may ultimately be detrimental 
to the US.  
 
The UK is now faced with renegotiating its trade position as a result of the Brexit vote. There is 
therefore an opportunity to make trade liberalization and maximization of consumer benefits the 
objective of new trade agreements. To achieve this, trade agreements should be simple, 
unilaterally decided, and involve minimal levels of regulation. They should guarantee the free 
movement of goods, services and capital as much as possible.421 Of the existing trade agreement 
options in effect today, the best choice for Britain would be to adopt a unilateral non-tariff and 
free trade policy based on existing WTO rules rather than agree to a less advantageous or even 
punitive trade agreement with the EU.  
 
                                                 
418 (International Trade Center (ITC) 2017)  
419 (Dawson and Bartucci 2013) p.15.  
420 (Dowd 2017) p.10.  
421 (Dowd 2017) p.31. 
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In general, ‘mutual recognition agreements’ work well among developed countries where 
regulations and standards are high enough and legal systems are functioning well. The mutual 
recognition arrangement is a preferable option to regulatory harmonization. The mutual 
recognition arrangement reduces the complication of negotiation, decreases transaction costs, 
improves efficiences and innovations, and benefits consumers in the form of lower prices and 
increased variety.422 However, it is difficult to implement this kind of agreement with developing 
countries where the standards of the legal system and regulatory institutions are not at the levels 
of developed countries.  
 
2. Trade Agreements 
 
2.1 Evolution of Trade Regulation 
During the 17th and 18th centuries, mercantilist ideas about trade were popular: trade was 
considered a zero sum game and there was a focus on encouraging exports and discouraging 
imports. Following the adoption of ideas about the benefits of free trade from Smith and Ricardo 
and the subsequent liberalization of trade policies, there was a significant increase in living 
standards for most people. While there has been an overall trend towards greater liberalization in 
the last 250 years, there have been some periods in which protectionist legislation has increased.  
 
For example, the Smoot Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 marked the high point of tariff levels in the 
US. It raised import duties on 20,000 products by an average of 20% in an effort to protect 
American businesses and farmers.423 Other nations retaliated by raising tariffs on American 
products and, within three years, US exports and imports with Europe shrank by 66% and global 
trade collapsed (Figure 36). While this isolationist trade policy was not necessarily the cause of 
Great Depression, it played a major role to make this economic slump longer and more severe.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, exports tend to move in tandem with imports and the Depression 
provides a classic illustration. When the negative effects of protectionist policies and the 
consequent retaliations by other nations were recognized, the Reciprocal Trade Act was passed 
                                                 
422 (Dowd 2017) p. 31. (Australia Government, Department of Education and Training 2017)  
423 (Gendreau 2017) (Parker 2016) 
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in 1934 to reduce tariff levels and promote trade liberalization. This reversal of US trade policy 
ushered in a new era of declining barriers to trade.  
 
Figure 36 US exports and imports (nominal USD) from 1921 to 1940 
 
 
 
Source: (Addis 2017) 
 
 
2.2 Free trade vs. Trade Restrictions 
Every country engages in trade, and no country in the world is completely self-reliant. In practice, 
not a single country practices 100% free trade, and each county has in place some level of trade 
restrictions. The only way to boost trade is to reduce restrictions. Governments often use 
reducing tariffs as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with other nations. Trade agreements 
can either improve market access or create additional barriers. Many treaties are mislabelled as 
‘Free Trade Agreements’ (FTAs) when in fact they are really ‘managed trade agreements’ in 
which more regulations and restrictions are created.  
 
Although tariffs have declined significantly, the inclusion of non-trade measures (NTMs) in 
agreements has hindered access to markets. For the last 15 years or so, trade barriers have 
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increased and the trend towards trade liberalization has been reversed (Figure 37). 424  Two 
manifestations of the recent trend in rising Protectionism are US President Trump’s economic 
policy, ‘Trumponomics’, and the UK’s decision to leave the EU, the ‘Brexit’.  
 
Figure 37 Trade Liberalization Trends 
 
 
Source: (OECD, Economics Department 2016) 
 
 
Some reasons used to justify trade restrictions by politicians, activist and other interest groups 
include: 425 
 
 Domestic jobs. Without tariffs, imports from countries with a lower living standard cost 
less, and domestic producers move their factories overseas.  
 Unfair advantages in other countries. 
                                                 
424 (World Trade Organization 2012) According to the report, non-tariff measures can have a significant impact on 
trade, possibly even more than tariffs. Director-General Pascal Lamy said “a clear trend has emerged in which 
NTMs are less about shielding producers from import competition and more about the attainment of a broad range 
of public policy objectives”. NTMs include technical barriers to trade (TBT) or sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures (i.e. food safety and animal and plant health measures).  
425 By the author based on (K. Amadeo 2017) 
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 Labour standards concern: emerging market countries without adequate labour laws 
(grueling factory jobs in sub-standard conditions). 
 Industry subsidies by other states create unfair competition. 
 Environmental concerns: emerging market countries often don’t have measures in 
place to protect the environment. Free trade therefore leads to the depletion of timber, 
minerals and other natural resources. Deforestation and strip-mining reduce their 
jungles and fields to wastelands. 
 Government tax revenue. Without import tariffs and fees, many smaller countries must 
find ways to replace that revenue. 
 National defense. Some industries should be protected for national defence and security 
reasons such as aircraft, shipbuilding, and food suppliers.  
 National interest. As development moves into formerly pristine areas, indigenous 
cultures can be affected as local people are displaced and often killed. 
 Infant industry. New domestic industries should be protected until they are mature 
enough to compete on their own.  
 Export promotion. Subsidies to domestic producers to increase their market share in 
another country.  
These reasons are often used by anti free trade parties to protect the economic interests of its 
domestic producers. These justifications ignore the comparative advantage of each country in 
production, and distort the efficiency of resource allocations. The welfare of many individuals 
suffers as a consequence.  
 
2.3 The Political Dimension of Trade Agreements 
There are three major types of international trade agreements: unilateral (one country decides 
unilaterally to change its own trade restrictions), bilateral (between 2 countries) and multilateral 
(among several countries). The latter offers the potential for more benefits but is harder to 
negotiate. Among multilateral agreements, NAFTA and TPP (in its original configuration), are 
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the world’s largest multi-lateral trade agreements.426 TPP originally involved 12 nations, but 
President Trump pulled the US out TPP shortly after taking office in January 2017.  
 
There are many types of trade agreements based on different levels of economic integration 
among countries (Figure 38). The objective of economic integration is to increase the size of the 
market and take advantage of economies of scale; barriers against trade with countries outside 
the agreement are created at the same time.427  
 
 Preferential trade agreement (PTA): A trading block that gives preferential access to 
certain products from participating countries.  
 Free trade agreement (FTA): A free-trade area is a trade bloc whose member countries 
have signed a free-trade agreement which eliminates tariffs, import quotas, and 
preferences on most (if not all) goods and services traded between them. 
 Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA): a FTA plus free movement 
of capital and human resources.428  
 Custom Union: An agreement among countries to have free trade among themselves and 
to adopt common external barriers against any other country interested in exporting to 
these countries.  
 Common Market: A type of custom union where there are common policies on product 
regulation, and free movement of goods and services, capital and labor.  
 
 Economic and Monetary Union: An economic union with a common currency (e.g. the 
Euro). 
 
                                                 
426 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TIPP) is the largest bilateral trade agreement between the EU 
and the US. The negotiations have been moving slowly due to President Trump’s trade policy. 
(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/) 
427 (Civils daily 2016) 
428 (Civils daily 2016) Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) comes later including trade in 
services and investments. CEPA has a wider scope than CECA.  
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Countries enter into trade agreements for reasons other than trade. According to a professor at 
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Andre Sapir, “Trade policy has always been the principal 
instrument of foreign policy for the EU”.429 The US also uses preferential agreements for reasons 
that are similarly broad.430 The EU and the US both have been seeking trade agreements that go 
beyond simple tariff removal, and include rules governing services, investment and capital, 
protection of intellectual property, and adherence to health, labour, and environmental standards. 
 
Figure 38 Degree of Economic Integration and Trade Agreements  
 
 
 
Source: (Civils daily 2016) 
 
 
2.4 International Trade Organization: GATT and WTO 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established in 1947 to liberalize trade 
and improve the world trading system through a code of rules and a forum in which negotiations 
and other trade discussions taken place.431 After the devastation of World War II, it was hoped 
                                                 
429 (Sapir 1998) 
430 (K. Amadeo 2017) 
431 (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2017b) For a more detailed history of GATT please refer to 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm 
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that increased international trade would promote economic interdependence between countries, 
making wars between trading partners unthinkable. 
 
GATT was successful at reducing international tariff barriers and played a major role as a 
dispute settlement system among member countries. The average international tariff rate 
decreased from 40% in 1947 to about 5% in 2010, and these reductions contributed to a 
considerable expansion of international trade (Figure 39).432  
 
Figure 39 Average of World Tariffs and World Trade 1980-2010 
 
 
 
 
Source: (World Economic Forum 2013) p. 7.  
 
 
GATT was provisional, with a limited field of action. During its 47 years history, not everything 
went smoothly. 433  By the early 1980s it was becoming clear that GATT was no longer as 
relevant to the realities of world trade as it had been in the 1940s. For example, trade in services, 
intellectual property rights, and international investment issues were not covered by GATT rules. 
Also, GATT’s inability to successfully remedy less obvious forms of protection (such as non-
tariff barriers, and the US-European Community disagreement over agricultural subsidies created 
                                                 
432 (World Economic Forum 2013) 
433 (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2017b) 
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doubt as to the organization’s future. Many countries began to form trading blocs. Even GATT’s 
institutional structure and its dispute settlement system were causing concern. After the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, WTO took over as its successor organization in 1994. 
 
2.5 WTO 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only international organization dealing with the 
rules of trade.434 In 2016, WTO had 164 members, of which about two thirds are ‘developing’ 
countries. 435  It came into effect in 1995 as an attempt to consolidate rules based on non-
discrimination by trading partners. Its overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as 
possible and help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their 
business. It is based on a series of agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s 
trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. These documents provide the legal ground rules 
for international commerce. 
 
Once these agreements have been signed, WTO enforces them and responds to complaints. 
Countries frequently have conflicting interests, and agreements even those negotiated in WTO 
framework often need interpreting. WTO has a dispute settlement process which helps to settle 
disagreements through a neutral procedure based on an agreed legal foundation. The majority of 
these arrangements emerged from the 1986-94 negotiations called the Uruguay Round and the 
earlier GATT negotiations. 
 
2.6 The Failure of the Doha Round 
The most recent trade negotiations involving all members of WTO was the ‘Doha Round’, 
launched in Doha, Qatar in November 2001.436 Early optimism regarding a successful outcome 
gradually eroded, and the Doha Round ended in failure in 2008. 437  Efforts to resuscitate 
                                                 
434 (World Trade Orgnizations (WTO) 2017d) 
435 (World Trade Orgnization (WTO), Members and Observsers, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
436  For more details about WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT: 1948-
1994), please see WTO’s web site: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm. 
(World Trade Orgnization (WTO) b) 
437 (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2015) Annual report 2015. p.15.  
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negotiations at the Ninth Ministerial Conference held in Bali in December 2013 were also 
unsuccessful.438 The Doha Round failed because developed and developing countries could not 
agree to provide a greater access to each other’s markets. The US and the European Union both 
wanted access to the services sector in emerging markets including China and India. Developing 
countries sought fewer restrictions for their agricultural products in the European and the US 
markets.439 Generally speaking, trade agreements provide less liberalization when it comes to 
agriculture. This originates from a time when agriculture was considered a national security issue 
from a military point of view. 
 
The impasse demonstrated by the Doha Round created uncertainty over the role of WTO as a 
global forum for negotiating further trade liberalization. The challenge of reaching agreement on 
complex trade issues via WTO appears to be insurmountable. The Doha Round may mark the 
end of the quest for multilateral trade agreements on a global scale.  
 
3. Regional Trade Agreements 
 
A 2005 WTO annual report concluded that “Sluggish progress in multilateral trade negotiations 
under the Doha Development Round appeared to have accelerated further the rush to forge 
RTA”.440 Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)  are used to address region-specific political issues 
that are difficult to broach at the global level. Although many of these issues can be handled 
without trade agreements, trade discussions provide a framework through which to make 
progress on contentious issues.441 RTAs have become increasingly prevalent since the early 
1990s: the number of cumulative notifications to  GATT/WTO of RTA’s in force reached 445 in 
2017 (Figure 40).442 In an increasingly competitive global environment, national policy makers 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Fifth Ministerial Conference which took place in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003 was overshadowed by 
discord over agricultural trade and ended in deadlock over foreign investment issues.437 Farm import rules were the 
main stumbling block when negotiations held in Geneva in July 2008 collapsed. 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep15_e.pdf. 
438 (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2015) Annual report 2015. p.15.  
439 (BBC News 2008) 
440 (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005).  
441 (Baier, S. L. et al. 2008) p. 492. 
442 (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2017c) In 2017, some 625 notifications of RTAs had been received by 
GATT/WTO. The number 659 arises from counting goods, services and accessions separately. If counting goods, 
services and accessions together, these figures correspond to 445 physical RTAs of which 279 are currently in force. 
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around the world face growing pressure to maximize their economic interests, business sector 
profits and consumer welfare. The wide variation in RTAs reflects the very different motivations 
countries have for entering into such arrangements.  
Figure 40 Evolution of Regional Trade Agreements between 1948 and 2017 
 
 
Source: (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2017j)  
 
 
3.1 The Main Trends and Challenges of RTAs 
As RTAs increase in number, some trends are becoming apparent. First, RTAs have been 
increasingly more complex, in many cases establishing regulatory trade regimes which go 
beyond multilaterally agreed trade regulations, and often include provisions for some countries 
to enforce their own laws and regulations in other jurisdictions (for example, TPP has more than 
5,000 pages of documents and covers many non-trade related issues. More details on TPP are 
found on page 179 below).443 Second, reciprocal preferential agreements between developed and 
                                                 
443 (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005) 
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developing countries are on the increase, indicating that developing countries recognize the 
benefits of participating in these agreements. Third, the emergence of preferential agreements 
among key developing countries indicates a strengthening of so called South-South trading 
patterns. Fourth, there is a general pattern of expansion and consolidation, and a proliferation of 
cross-regional RTAs. As a result, the size of regional trading blocs can now be continent-wide.444 
 
Overlapping RTAs and networks of RTAs now span continents at the regional and sub-regional 
levels.445 The problem is that the growing number of regional trade agreements has created a 
‘spaghetti’ or ‘noodle’ bowl effect (Figure 41). The term ‘spaghetti bowl’ was coined by Jagdish 
N. Bhagwati, one of the world’s leading experts on trade at Columbia University. In 2004, 
Richard Baldwin, Director of the Center for Economic Policy Research based in London,446 used 
the term ‘noodle bowl’ for the same phenomenon - a maze of overlapping trade agreements with 
differing geographic and commodity scopes.447 
 
According to the Asian Development Bank’s data base, the number of trade agreements 
involving countries in the Asia-Pacific region has increased drastically, creating an “alphabet 
soup” situation in the Asian region (Figure 42). For example, as of June 2016, Singapore has 
concluded or is negotiating 32 free trade agreements, China 23, India 28, Japan and South Korea 
24, Thailand 22, Vietnam 16, and Myanmar 10.448 449 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
444 (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005) 
445 (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005) p.4.  
446  (Menon 2014) 
(Baier, Bergstrand and Egger 2007) p.54 
About Jadish Bhagwati: http://www.columbia.edu/~jb38/papers/papers.html 
Richard Baldwin: http://cepr.org/content/richard-baldwin-appointed-director-cepr 
447 (Murphy 2015) 
448 (Asia Regional Integration Center, Asian Development Bank) 
449 (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2015) p. 75. Overlapping agreements are so common that according to WTO 
report, all members except Mongolia are members of one or more, some belonging to as many as 30. 
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Figure 41 The ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ of Free Trade Agreements in the Americas and Asia-
Pacific  
    
 
 
 
    *Asia Pacific region on the left side and the Americas region on the right.  
Source: (Baier et.al 2007) 
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Figure 42 The ‘Noodle Bowl’ or ‘Alphabet Soup’ Situation in the Asian Region 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Murphy 2015) Asia’s Heyday of FTAs May Be Over.  
 
These overlapping trade agreements fragment markets because each stipulates specific rules. As 
a consequence, transaction costs increase and it becomes more difficult for both international and 
local businesses to operate efficiently.450 They raise compliance costs and increase the risk that 
enterprises may be penalized for failing to adhere to the different sets of rules established under 
each agreement.451 Most important, these trade agreements cause ‘trade diversion’ and have 
negative impacts within and outside of agreements. According to international trade specialists, 
Ian Fergusson and Bruce Vaughn, “trade diversion occurs when the existence of lower tariffs 
under a trade agreement causes trade to be diverted away from a more efficient producer outside 
                                                 
450 (Murphy 2015) 
451 (Murphy 2015) 
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the trading bloc to a producer inside the bloc”.452  In other words, smaller free trade agreements, 
with narrow coverage, encourage the use of costly products from RTA partners rather than 
competitive products from non-partners. As a result, markets are distorted and allocation of 
resources is less efficient.  
 
Some critics argue that “the world trading system is evolving in a disorderly, ineffective, and 
potentially harmful manner” (in terms of consumer welfare).453 Their ex post empirical evidence 
on the impact of RTAs shows that they may either decrease trade volumes or have only a minor 
positive effect. 454  Other trade analysts view the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements as undermining WTO, as RTAs undermine the core principle of non-discrimination 
which is fundamental to the architecture of international free trade.455 Although RTAs are by 
nature discriminatory, discrimination against non-partners can be reduced if these agreements are 
open, and agreement members allow non-signatories to join as new members. 456  Another 
criticism is that RTAs provide powerful countries including the US and the EU with an 
opportunity to extract controversial concessions from weaker trading partners on issues such as 
labor standards, intellectual property protection, environmental stewardship, and health and 
safety standards.457  
 
3.2 Mega RTAs: NAFTA and TPP 
Bilateral or small regional trade agreements are “second-best” strategies compared to multilateral 
agreements for enhancing trade and promoting market integration. Recognition of these 
shortcomings of RTAs has prompted a major rethink of strategies to liberalize trade, obtain 
efficient market access, and promote regulatory convergence among the fastest growing 
economies in the world.458  
 
                                                 
452 (Fergusson and Vaughn 2011) P.248. 
453 (Baier, Bergstrand and Egger (2007) 
454 (Baier, Bergstrand and Egger 2007) p.54. 
455 (Fergusson and Vaughn 2011) P.248. 
456 (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2016) p.85. 
457 (Murphy 2015) 
458 (Murphy 2015) 
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‘Mega regional’ trade agreements have emerged as alternatives to the ‘spaghetti bowl’ that arises 
from a multiplicity of agreements involving only a small number of countries. 459  A mega 
regional agreement with a large number of participants has the potential to harmonize rules, 
reduce business costs, and has a positive impact on the global pattern of trade.  
 
Negotiations to create large multilateral agreements are increasing: TPP among 12 (now 11, after 
America’s withdrawal) nations;460 the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
between the EU and the US,461 the Regional Comprehensive Partnership Agreement (RCEP) in 
Asia; 462  the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among the US, Canada and 
Mexico; the Pacific Alliance in Latin America, the Tripartite Agreement in Africa, and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Middle East are prominent examples.463 464 An image of some 
regional economic blocks in the world is shown in Figure 43. 
 
Multilateral agreements will only succeed as effective alternatives to the negative effects of 
‘spaghetti bowl’ arrangements if they impose a single (and simple) set of rules which supersede 
existing RTA’s involving few participants.465  
 
 
 
                                                 
459 (Baier, S. L. et al. 2008) P.465. They used the term ‘economic integration’ instead of ‘regional economic 
integration’ – to be inclusive in geographic scope of coverage of countries on different continents.  
460 (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2016) p.85. 
461 (European Commission) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/ 
462 The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a FTA negotiation among 16 countries: the 10 
members of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam) and the six countries with which ASEAN has existing free trade agreements (Australia, China, India, 
Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand). Negotiations began in late 2012. Like TPP, negotiating parties predict that 
the RCEP will be “a modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement 
establishing an open trade and investment environment in the region to facilitate the expansion of regional trade and 
investment and contribute to global economic growth and development” (New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
(Dawson and Bartucci 2013) p.13. 
463 (World Trade Organization (WTO)) Facts and figures. 
464 More details on COMESA and SADC, please see (World Trade Orgnization (WTO)) How regional economic 
communities can facilitate participation in WTO: the experience of Mauritius and Zambia..  
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case27_e.htm 
COMESA: http://www.comesa.int/, SADC: http://www.sadc.int/, EAC: http://www.eac.int/, GCC: http://www.gcc-
sg.org/en-us/Pages/default.aspx. 
465 (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2016) p.86. 
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Figure 43 Mega-Regional Trade Agreements 
 
 
 
Source: (B2B 2016) 
 
 
3.2.1 NAFTA and its Structure 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a three-country accord negotiated by 
the US, Canada and Mexico that came into effect in 1994. 466  NAFTA was the first 
comprehensive free trade agreement to join developed and developing nations, and it achieved 
broader and deeper market access than any previous trade agreement.467 
 
Officially, its primary goal was to liberalize trade in textiles, automobile manufacturing and 
agriculture. It aimed to eliminate trade barriers in 10 years except for special sectors such as 
agriculture, where the time frame was extended to 15 years. There were no external 
common tariffs included in the agreement. It did include restrictive rules of origin such as 
62.5% of cars had to be locally made and textiles were required to be made with NAFTA 
                                                 
466 (McBride and Sergie 2017) 
467 (Hills 2014) 
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yarn. From the manufacturers’ perspective, NAFTA rules were more comprehensive, 
complex and protectionist than a regular free trade agreement.468 
 
NAFTA also sought to establish dispute resolution mechanisms, protect intellectual 
property, and implement labor and environmental safeguards. At the time, the agreement 
enjoyed bipartisan support in the US.469 It was conceived by Republican President Ronald 
Reagan, negotiated by Republican President George H.W. Bush and passed through 
Congress and implemented under Democratic President Bill Clinton. Beyond improvement 
in trade, the US hoped that it would bring peace, stability and prosperity to Mexico, and 
reduce illegal immigration.  
 
It was sold to the public as a way of bringing new prosperity and a surge in well-paying jobs.470 
Proponents such as President Bill Clinton, made big promises of job gains, while opponents such 
as presidential contender Ross Perot warned of a “giant sucking sound” that would devour nearly 
six million jobs.471 Experts lined up on both sides of the argument. For example, prominent US 
economist, Paul Krugman, argued in 1993 that as far as the US was concerned, NAFTA was 
essentially a foreign policy initiative rather than an economic one. He concluded that NAFTA 
would have no impact on the number of American jobs but would lead to a slight fall in real 
wages of unskilled workers in the US, that NAFTA would not hurt and might help the 
environment and that it would produce only a small gain in overall US real income.472  
 
At the same time, many empirical studies were done on the potential economic benefits of 
NAFTA. In 1993, the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) released its 
influential study, “NAFTA: An Assessment”.473  Among other things it predicted that “with 
NAFTA, US exports to Mexico would continue to outstrip Mexican exports to the United 
States…[with a] US merchandise trade surplus with Mexico of $7 billion to $9 billion annually 
                                                 
468 (Globerman and Sands 2017) 
469 (McBride and Sergie 2017) 
470 (Jasper 2015) 
471 (King 2015) 
472 (Krugman 1993) 
473 (Hufbauer and Schott 1993) 
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throughout the 1990s and perhaps $9 billion to $12 billion annually in the following decade”. 474 
However, the actual results were totally different. In 1993, the year before NAFTA went into 
effect, the US had a $1.66 billion trade surplus with Mexico; by 1995, the first year after NAFTA 
entered into force that had changed completely to a $15.8 billion deficit. By 2000, the deficit had 
soared to $24.5 billion, and by 2014, the deficit had almost doubled to $53.8 billion.475 Such 
discrepancies, especially on a flashpoint item like trade deficits, provide fodder for those 
opposed to NAFTA. 
 
William F. Jasper, an investigative journalist of the New American,476 gave a scathing criticism 
of the PIIE study: 
 
The PIIE authors and other pseudo-free trade propagandists had cherry-
picked data and simply invented statistics to fraudulently sell their product: 
NAFTA. If they were car salesmen, they would have gone to jail for fraud 
and misrepresentation. Instead, they are back doing the same thing, 
concocting rosy statistics to sell TPP and TTIP”. 477 
 
However, other public policy academics pointed out that one of the problems with predicting 
benefits and drawbacks of trade agreements is that these policies are designed without precise 
foreknowledge of how a policy will perform. What actually happens after its implementation will 
be shaped by a multitude of interacting forces (economic, political, social, media, technological, 
demographic and climatic).478  
 
Economics Editor of the Wall Street Journal, King wrote that “there’s no clear way to 
disentangle the myriad forces at play during the decades since NAFTA’s debut–the peso’s 
plunge a year later, the consumer spending boom and debt build up in the US, the greater 
internationalization of manufacturing, and China’s rise – to isolate the agreement’s impact”.479  
 
                                                 
474 (Hufbauer and Schott 1993) P.14-15. 
475 (Jasper 2015) 
476 (Jasper 2015) 
477 (Jasper 2015) 
478 (Hill and Hupe 2009) 
479 (King 2015) 
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3.2.2 The Trump administration’s stance on new negotiation  
Since NAFTA came in effect over two decades ago, regional trade value increased from $290 
billion in 1993 to $1.1 trillion in 2016.480 Canada and Mexico have become the two largest 
destinations for US exports, accounting for more than a third of total U.S exports. However, 
NAFTA has been a continuous target in the broader debate over free trade. One morning in 
August 2017, President Trump tweeted that because NAFTA was “the worst trade deal ever 
made”, he might terminate it. He blamed NAFTA for causing US manufacturing job losses to 
Mexico. His administration reopened negotiations on NAFTA in the same month.481   
 
There are merits, however, to review the 20 year-old provisions of NAFTA including the e-
commerce, dispute settlement functions, and further reducing barriers to trade.482 At the same 
time, President Trump’s opposition has raised concerns among many.  
 
President Trump bases his opposition to the agreement on three main points:  
 
1. The US has lost manufacturing jobs as a result of NAFTA.  
2. The US has a huge trade deficit with Canada and Mexico. 
3. American manufacturers need more protection from the unfair competitive advantages of 
foreign countries 483 
 
The Trump administration has said that in the new negotiations, the focus will be on 
reducing the US-Mexico trade deficit, tightening rules of origin (ROO) requirements, 
reforming the investor state dispute resolution mechanism, and updating the pact to include 
digital services and intellectual property.484 Also, Trump has reiterated that, at any time, he 
could withdraw the US altogether from the negotiation, and replace NAFTA with two 
independent, bilateral deals with Mexico and Canada.  
 
                                                 
480 (McBride and Sergie 2017) 
481 (McBride and Sergie 2017) 
482 (Lester and Manak 2017) 
483 Sources of ‘unfair competitive advantages’ include lower labor and environmental standards, currency 
manipulation and government subsidies.  
484 (McBride and Sergie 2017) 
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3.2.3 Better NAFTA in the future? 
 
President Trump totally ignores the fact that NAFTA brought a lot of benefits, and his rhetoric 
does not stand up to scrutiny. This section discusses how President Trump distorted the facts 
about NAFTA for the sake of his argument.  
 
1. Job losses due to the agreement.  
 
In 2014, the US Chamber of Commerce estimated that about 14 million US jobs depended on 
trade with NAFTA partner countries, and about 200,000 export related jobs were created by the 
agreement annually. These jobs pay 15 to 20% more on average than jobs that were lost.485 It is 
true that the US has probably lost jobs to low cost Mexican labor. However, these jobs were 
mostly concentrated in the manufacturing industry, and as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the 
business environment is in constant flux with old firms disappearing as new more competitive 
firms take their places. Thus ‘re-shoring’ production and bringing ‘old’ jobs back is unlikely to 
happen. Also, even with a new trade agreement, President Trump may be able to stop some jobs 
from moving to Mexico, but those jobs are still likely to move factories to Vietnam, Cambodia or 
other developing nations.486 The trend in manufacturing is toward automation of production. 
Thus, the more important factor for trade policy is not how many jobs have been created but 
creating highly skilled and well-paid jobs in the country.  
 
2. The American trade deficit and capital investment. 
 
The US merchandise trade deficit with Mexico has increased. However, as mentioned in Chapter 
2, the amount of the deficit is always balanced by the foreign capital invested in the US. The 
existence of a trade deficit with another country is not necessarily indicative of a weak US 
economy. As the Apple Inc. case demonstrates, traditional accounting for trade deficits is 
misleading when global supply chains are involved, because the amount of the deficit is 
significantly overstated.  
 
                                                 
485 (Hills 2014) (McBride and Sergie 2017) 
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After NAFTA was signed, cross-border investment soared. Canadian and Mexican companies 
invested more than $200 billion in the US, and American businesses invested $452 billion in 
Mexico and Canada.487 As a result, a highly efficient and integrated supply chain has developed. 
North Americans not only sell more things to one another; they also make more things together. 
About a half of US trade with Canada and Mexico takes place between related companies, and 
the resulting specialization has boosted productivity in all three economies. 488 
 
Figure 44 Shares of US Trade in Goods       
 
                            
Source: (Amiti, Freund and Bodine-Smith 2017)   
 
According to a report by Amiti, Freund and Bodine-Smith at the Washington International Trade 
Association, 40% of imports from Mexico and 75% of exports to Mexico are intermediate inputs 
like auto parts or computer components. These are used in the production of ‘final goods’ 
available to consumers, and help US producers compete efficiently in the global market (Figure 
44).489 Companies like General Motors and Ford send auto parts back and forth across the border 
as cars are produced. If these intermediary goods become more expensive, the price of the final 
product will be affected. Availability of these low value-added components allows US firms to 
focus on the higher value added functions, and keeps them competitive and innovative. 490 Thus, 
                                                 
487 (Hills 2014) 
488 (Hills 2014) 
489 (Amiti, Freund and Bodine-Smith 2017) 
490 (Hills 2014) 
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the US derives a unique benefit from its investments in Canada and Mexico, because a large 
percentage of that output returns home as imports of intermediate goods. 
 
3. Incorporating more legal and regulatory steps into a new NAFTA 
 
Furthermore, the Trump administration is trying to move forward with other proposals such as 
changing government procurement rules to allow the expanded use of “Buy America” provisions, 
and strengthening rules of origin (ROO) which require that a sufficient proportion of the value 
added takes place within NAFTA countries.491  
 
“Buy America” policies may strike an emotional chord with some voters, but they are nothing 
but a traditional protectionist market distortion. As it explains in Chapter 2, a “Buy American” 
policy limits competition, raises cost, and leads to other trading partners adopting similar 
retaliatory policies.492  In order to be eligible for duty free imports under NAFTA, member 
countries must abide by rules of origin, which detail the conditions under which a product 
qualifies for NAFTA preferences. These are complex and applied on a product by product basis. 
Tightening rules of origin will disrupt supply chains and make US manufacturers less 
competitive, as NAFTA rules of origin are already considered to be the most stringent of any 
trade agreement in the world.493 
 
As already mentioned, low-cost inputs from Mexico help US producers compete efficiently in 
global markets. For example, NAFTA modernized the US auto industry by consolidating 
manufacturing and driving down costs. There are still more than 800,000 autoworker jobs in the 
US and there is a good case to be made that NAFTA is responsible for keeping them. Most cars 
made in North America now include parts sourced from all three countries.494  
 
In reality, many manufactured components cross borders many times as sub-assemblies and the 
final product take shape. Stricter ROO requirements will increase the cost of these parts and 
products directly and raise administrative and compliance costs. Any trade restriction that raises 
                                                 
491 (Amiti, Freund and Bodine-Smith 2017) 
492 (Lester and Manak 2017) 
493 (Lester and Manak 2017) 
494 (Wharton University 2014) 
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costs will hurt not only US imports but also their exports. Stricter ROOs ignore the reality of 
international trade where nothing is just “made in” one place, from T-shirts, to shoes, to canned 
tuna to cell phones.495 ROOs are becoming increasingly less relevant from the perspective of the 
businesses involved, while compliance with ROO regulations is becoming more problematic and 
complex. ROOs are becoming a significant barrier to trade, and the response from business is 
likely to be the diversion of supply to jurisdictions where the rules of origin are less strict.  
 
If new NAFTA rules interrupt current global supply chains, businesses will be faced with several 
choices. For example, they may have to find alternative sources for intermediate components 
from other international locations such as China or Brazil. Alternatively, factories may increase 
automation to gain productivity and a competitive edge. It is difficult to see how these 
developments will solve the US trade deficit and job loss problems in the manufacturing sector.  
 
Politicians are very good at cherry-picking the numbers which support their arguments, and 
paying attention only to concentrated losses. This thesis contends that attempting to renegotiate a 
more protectionist trade agreement with Canada and Mexico is a step backwards for 
liberalization and will have a detrimental effect on the US economy because it will disrupt 
established supply chains. This becomes apparent when looking at trade among the three 
countries in detail. 
 
3.2.4 TPP and its Structure  
 
NAFTA was the first comprehensive free-trade agreement to include both developed and 
developing nations, and it surpassed other prior trade agreements in terms of the range of 
products affected.496 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is being touted as the mega regional 
trade agreement in the 21st century.  
 
TPP was signed on 4 February 2016 in Auckland, New Zealand, after seven years of 
negotiations.497 At that time, it was a multilateral trade deal involving 12 Pacific countries: 
                                                 
495 (Lester and Manak 2017) 
496 (Hills 2014) 
497 (World Trade Organization (WTO) 2016) p.85. 
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Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. TPP is currently in a two-year period during which 
each signatory has to go through a ratification process. At the time of signing, it was the largest 
trade agreement in history. However, President Trump announced the withdrawal of the US from 
this agreement shortly after he took office in January 2017.  
 
In its original 2015 configuration, the aggregate population of TPP countries exceeded 819 
million, 11.1% of the world population. TPP therefore would have created one of the world’s 
largest economic regions in terms of population.498 The combined GDP of the twelve participants 
constitutes 37.4 % of the world GDP – about the size of China’s GDP (US$11 trillion) and the 
EU’s (US$16 trillion) combined.499  The US accounted for the largest GDP share (US$18 
trillion, 65.5%) followed by Japan (US$4 trillion, 15.1%), and Canada, Australia and Mexico 
(with 5.7%, 4.5%, 4.2% respectively).  
 
TPP demonstrates the direction in which trade agreements have been moving. According to 
Petri and Plummer at the Peterson Institue for Intenational Economics (PIIE), TPP meets two 
key objectives: the lowering of barriers to trade and investment among TPP signatories, and 
establishing and updating market-oriented rules in a rapidly changing global business 
environment.500  The general decline in worldwide tariffs and the proliferation of free trade 
agreements among TPP countries including NAFTA and ASEAN have cut intra-TPP tariffs from 
5.6% in 1996 to 2.7% in 2014.501 This means that the era of ‘low hanging fruit’ gains through 
tariff cuts is over. Further increases in trade benefits are only possible through reductions of non-
tariff barriers (NTBs). Thus, TPP is aiming at establishing trade-related measures that strengthen 
and harmonize regulations, increase certainty, and reduce trade costs for businesses.  
 
Compared to NAFTA, the TTP’s terms are more comprehensive. Because NAFTA came into 
effect in 1994, it does not address new technological developments such as e-commerce, and 
barely touched on the market for services. NAFTA also did not get rid of all tariffs or subsidies: 
                                                 
498 United Nations, World Population Prospects the 2015 Revision. 
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/ 
499 IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO), April 2016. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/ 
500 (Petri and Plummmer 2016) p.2.  
501 (Lakatos, et al. 2016) 
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Canada’s supply management system for dairy, poultry and eggs was excluded from the original 
negotiations due to a pressure from domestic industry. Critics such as Public Citizen’s Lori 
Wallach have portrayed TPP as “NAFTA on steroids”.502  
 
It has been observed that establishing comprehensive rules was the most distinctive aspect of 
TPP. If TPP succeeds it will “serve as an instructive negotiating laboratory that could yield 
useful precedents for other trade liberalization initiatives”. Other non-TTP members might adopt 
the same comprehensive rules in order to obtain similar benefits. However, success hinges on 
whether the new rules liberalize or restrict trade. Rules that are too restrictive can have a 
negative impact on trade, and prove to be counterproductive. 
 
  
                                                 
502 (Wallach 2012) 
184 
 
Table 6 The key differences between NAFTA and TPP 
 
Trade 
Remedies 
Parties confirm their WTO commitments regarding dumping and countervailing 
measures. 
NAFTA only: Allows exclusions from global safeguards if certain conditions are met. 
TPP only: Does not contemplate the possibility of replacing domestic judicial review of 
antidumping and countervailing determinations with a bi-national review panel. 
Technical 
Barriers to   
Trade 
TPP goes beyond NAFTA in reducing the potential for technical standards to impede 
trade. 
Dispute 
Settlement 
Both NAFTA and TPP contemplate a general dispute settlement mechanism between 
the Parties. TPP includes provisions designed to remedy weaknesses identified in 
NAFTA, such as the difficulties encountered establishing panels.  
Labour 
Standards 
NAFTA included labor matters in a side agreement: In TPP it is part of the main 
agreement. Both agreements include provisions pertaining to enforcement, procedural 
guarantees, cooperation, transparency and public awareness relating to labor laws. 
NAFTA relies on individual country’s labor laws. Under TPP, members shall adopt and 
maintain labor rights under the ILO (International Labor Organization) convention, 
including freedom of association, elimination of forced and child labor, and protection 
against discrimination in employment. 
Environmental 
Standards  
 
NAFTA included environmental cooperation in a side agreement: In TPP it is part of 
the main agreement.  
Both NAFTA and TPP recognize the sovereign right of each Party to establish its own 
domestic levels of protection. Both also include minimum standards regarding 
procedural matters (e.g., that there are proceedings with due process of law). However, 
under TPP obligations are more numerous and deeper, and involve reference to various 
international treaties. Mechanisms for public participation in standard setting are 
specified in TPP.  
Intellectual 
Property 
 
NAFTA and TPP Intellectual Property protection provisions are broadly consistent. 
TPP has some new features which strengthens the protection of intellectual property 
(e.g. internet domain names, patent delays, longer patent protection, trade secret 
protection).  
Trade 
Facilitation 
TPP includes a specific chapter to address trade facilitation, including simplified or 
expedited customs formalities and automation.  
Electronic 
Commerce 
This is new for TPP. It prohibits duties on electronic transmissions, protects the 
personal information of e-commerce users, maintains a legal framework governing 
electronic transactions and adopts laws to proscribe fraudulent and deceptive online 
commercial activities. 
State-Owned 
Enterprises  
TPP takes a much stronger stance on state owned enterprises.  
 
Source: by author based on (Dadush and Beatriz 2016) 
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Table 7 TPP Chapters and Annexes 
 
 
 
Source: USTR, TPP full text. https://ustr.gov/tpp/#text, United States International Trade Commission 2016, p.48. 
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3.2.5 Terms of the Agreement 
 
TPP consists of 30 chapters, only six of which deal with traditional trade-related issues (Table 7 
above).503  As explained in the previous section, TPP addresses issues beyond the scope of 
NAFTA and is more stringent than WTO rules. It includes sensitive sectors (agriculture and 
textiles), strict copyright and patent protections, internet governance, and labor and 
environmental standards.504 Also, the agreement includes several chapters that have not been in 
previous US bilateral FTAs, such as state-owned enterprises, temporary entry of businesspersons, 
cooperation and capacity building, competitiveness and business facilitation, development, small 
and medium-sized enterprises, and regulatory coherence (in Table 7, see chapters marked with 
‘a’). 
 
TPP agreement has ambitious goals and distinctive features. Among these:505   
 
 Offers comprehensive market access: All products or services are included in the agreement, 
unless explicitly restricted in GATT treaty implemented by WTO.506507 This “WTO plus 
issue coverage”508 adopts an “everything is on the table” principle on the basis of a negative 
list.509  
 
 Covers agriculture: 510 Market access for sensitive agricultural products (dairy, beef, sugar 
and rice) has been a contentious issue in free trade negotiations.511 Japan’s protective policies 
for its domestic rice sector are well known. If Japanese protection of its rice production 
remains, this will open the door for other members to shield their sensitive industries.512  
 
                                                 
503 (Public Citizen n.d.) 
504 (United States International Trade Commission 2016) p.48. (Public Citizen n.d.) 
505 (Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 2015) 
506 (Lim, Elms and Low 2012) p.9., (O'connor 2012) 
507 (Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 2015) 
508 (Lim, Elms and Low 2012)p.9. 
509 (Schott, Kotschwar and Muir 2013) P.11-12. 
510 Trade remedies are trade policy tools that allow governments to take remedial action against imports which cause 
injury to a domestic industry. These remedies are anti-dumping actions, countervailing duty measures, and 
‘safeguard’ actions.  
See more details at WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm; and the Australian 
Government, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/topics/pages/anti-dumping-and-safeguards.aspx.  
511 (Schott, Kotschwar and Muir 2013) More details on the debate on pp.18-24. 
512 (Dawson and Bartucci 2013) p.iv. 
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 Encourages Foreign Investment and Investment in Infrastructure: New disciplines in new 
areas on foreign investment protection and non-discriminatory treatment would apply 
including service infrastructure (finance, insurance, telecommunications, air express delivery 
and other transportation services).513   
 
 Addresses new trade challenges in commerce and trade agreements: TPP addresses both the 
role of state-owned enterprises and small businesses514 as well as non-tangible or knowledge-
based concepts such as intellectual property rights (IPR), telecommunications and the 
development of the digital economy. In some countries, state-owned enterprises have an 
entrenched position, and in such cases TPP provisions would help establish a level playing 
field between foreign private firms and state-owned enterprises. This objective is achieved by 
stipulating broad-ranging obligations on investment policy along with enforcement 
provisions.515 
 
 Provides a platform with an open-ended agreement for wider regional integration: One of the 
unique characteristics of TPP is that it is designed in such a way that additional countries 
may eventually join. It was the very first FTA deal in which the number of countries 
participating increased during the course of the negotiations. While the expansion of the 
participants increases the economic footprint of the prospective deal, it complicates 
negotiations since each country needs to ensure domestic political support and has different 
incentives to join the agreement.  
 
From the beginning, TPP has been envisaged as a ‘living agreement’, one that is both open to 
new members willing to sign up to its commitments/obligations and open to addressing new 
issues as they evolve.516 Future agreed commitments would become legally binding through a 
sectoral annex. This architectural style is taken originally from the development of the European 
Union (EU), whose history began as the ‘European Coal and Steel Community’ and evolved into 
the ‘Common Market of the European Community’, and eventually became the ‘European 
                                                 
513 (Schott, Kotschwar and Muir 2013) p.13. 
514 (Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 2015)  
515 (Schott, Kotschwar and Muir 2013) p.13. 
516 (Jasper 2015) The author included both TPP and TIPP. New issues can be added to the agreements without the 
need to re-open the initial international treaty nor modify participant’s institutional frameworks. 
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Union’. This evolution has been referred to as ‘broadening and deepening’.517 The ‘broadening’ 
refers to successive expansion through the addition of new member-states; ‘deepening’ refers to 
the constant creation of new supranational institutional structures and continuous expansion and 
usurpation by a supra-national authority of powers and jurisdiction that were previously 
exercised by national, state, and local governments.518 
 
Although the intention of TPP and details of the pact are clearly stated, TPP negotiation process 
has faced considerable opposition. The following section examines these concerns. 
 
3.3 Critiques of TPP and Challenges of Trade Agreements  
 
3.3.1 Political Gains and Economic Gains: Canada, Japan and US 
 
In trade agreement negotiations, each nation has its own reasons for being at the table. Smaller 
countries, like Vietnam, are motivated by access to markets. Larger countries like Canada and 
Japan are also motivated by market access but tend to place a higher emphasis on political 
considerations. Until the conditions of the agreement are decided among participants, each nation 
needs to ensure domestic political support for ‘gives and gets’, by weighing ‘economic gain and 
political pain’ both at home and abroad.519 In other words, like TPP, the more countries that 
participate, the more competitive economic trade becomes in the region and the greater the 
pressure exerted on less competitive sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture. Domestic 
influence may harden the negotiating stance of some nations and may even result in them 
withdrawing from the negotiation. This is exactly what happened when the US withdrew from 
TPP in 2017.  
 
Canada 
For Canada, the motivation to join TPP negotiations in 2012 was to expand its economic 
partnerships and deepen integration not only in North America but also with other important 
economies in East Asia.520 It was also seeking a significant role in shaping the rules, including 
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standardizing disciplines on trade and investment by state-owned enterprises that are consistent 
with the Investment Canada Act (which dictates the legal responsibilities of non-Canadians 
investing in Canada)521  and introducing new mechanisms to minimize “buy local” provisions in 
government procurement arrangements. 522  In addition, Canada wanted to take a seat at the 
negotiation table to ensure the terms of the final agreement were at least consistent with NAFTA 
so that it did not have to undertake costly reforms in order to adapt to TPP rules. 523 
 
One major obstacle for Canada is agricultural policy, specifically Canada’s supply management 
of dairy, eggs and poultry. The federally run quota system imposes prohibitive triple-digit tariffs 
on over quota imports. 524 Strong supply-managed commodity groups pressure the government to 
retain the system to protect domestic producers.  
 
Japan 
Japan joined TPP negotiations in 2013. It was interested in promoting more economic integration 
in the Asia-Pacific region, consistent with the goals of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).525 After the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake and nuclear disaster, the Japanese government was under pressure to undertake 
reforms and stimulate the economy.526  Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made it clear that Japan 
needed trade liberalization. Joining TPP is seen as a way to improve Japan’s security and contain 
China’s increasing influence in the region.527 In addition, South Korea’s successful free trade 
negotiation with the US and the EU created fears that Korean companies would gain advantages 
                                                 
521 (Government of Canada)  
522 (Dawson and Bartucci 2013) p.iv. 
523 (Dawson and Bartucci 2013) p.9. 
524 (Schott, Kotschwar and Muir 2013) p.43. 
525Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a regional economic forum established in 1989. APEC’s 21 
member are TPP’s 12 members plus 9: People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Republic of 
Korea, Papua New Guinea, The Philippines; The Russian Federation, Chinese Taipei, Thailand. (Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) ). According to CogitASIA (A New Paradigm for APEC? 2010), the problem with 
APEC is that it does not have any legal mandate to compel economies to adhere to consensus agreements. On trade, 
APEC has been effective in tabling issues that help prepare members for increasing and expanding trade and 
investment, such as customs facilitation concepts and sector pathfinder initiatives in key areas such as energy and 
food security, but it has ceded effective trade liberalization efforts to ad hoc initiatives such as the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). More details on APEC and FTAAP at http://www.apec.org/.  
526 (Schott, Kotschwar and Muir 2013) p. 46-47. 
527 (Soble 2015) (Carpenter 2015) 
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in areas where Japanese exports have traditionally been strong, namely autos and 
electrical/electronic products.528   
 
Despite strong support from the Japanese business sector, powerful opposition from agricultural 
lobbyists has been an obstacle to wholehearted Japanese participation in TPP negotiations. Rice 
and dairy have been the most contentious sectors, not only in TPP negotiations but also in other 
trade negotiations.529 TPP’s “everything is on the table” principle, in other words a “negative list” 
approach, was seen as destroying Japanese agriculture. In 2011, a keen proponent of the TTP, 
then foreign Minister Seiji Maehara, stated strongly that only 1.5% of Japan’s gross domestic 
product came from agriculture and the nation should pay heed to the other 98.5%.530   
 
The United States 
In 2011, Hillary Rodham Clinton, then the US secretary of state, wrote in an article that “[o]ne of 
the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will [….] be to lock in a 
substantially increased investment - diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise - in the Asia-
Pacific region”. 531  The US’s original motivation for joining TPP was to strengthen its 
geopolitical, security and economic ties across the Pacific, gaining an advantage vis-a-vis China. 
The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics and economics. Its remarkable 
economic growth over the past decade and its potential for continued growth in the future depend 
heavily on political security and stability.532   
 
China, the world’s second largest economy and the single most important economy in East Asia, 
is not participating in TPP negotiations. Exclusion of China from TPP, but inclusion of Vietnam, 
which is also a command economy, convinced some critics that TPP was more about politics 
than economics.533 Some observers even believed that a central objective of TPP was to exclude 
                                                 
528  (Brooks 2015) p.10. Korea-U.S. free trade agreement entered into force in March, 2012 (USTR, 
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China.534 If this was the case, TPP was originally more of a political and geopolitical security 
deal to strengthen US power in the region.  
 
For some critics, the claim that TPP is being used as a policy instrument for the containment of 
China is unrealistic and counter-productive.535 According to Schott, Kotschwar and Muir at the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, China can’t be ignored and contained. First, many 
TPP members and other countries already have extensive trade and investment ties with China, 
and there is a multilateral agreement between China and ASEAN (Figure 45).536 Second, China 
is already a member of the US-created APEC zone which includes 21 Pacific Rim member 
economies. Brookings Institute trade analysts anticipate many benefits from TPP, but warn that 
the overall economic gains from TPP will be modest. Long-term effects of TPP will depend on 
how other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, such as China, react to it, as well as the impact of 
other free trade agreements. 537  
 
Despite the US remaining a leading trade partner for nearly all Asian states, the relative 
importance of the US has been declining. Thus, the lead taken by the US in joining TPP should 
have been a useful initiative to improve not only Trans-Pacific trade relations, but also to 
demonstrate US commitment to Asia by strengthening traditional strategic alliances and building 
new partnerships in the region.538   
 
By withdrawing from TPP, President Trump’s decision appears to discount the political value of 
entering into a closer relationship with Pacific Rim countries, particularly in face of rising 
Chinese influence. This withdrawal seems to be predicated entirely upon a perception that TPP 
might inflict economic losses and a belief that a ‘better’ deal can be negotiated. However, 
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isolating the US economy by introducing protectionist measures might instead encourage 
retaliation by trading partners, which with significant negative consequences.539 
 
The China Factor 
While the US is embracing more protectionism, other nations are not standing still. At the World 
Economic Forum in Davos in 2017, President Xi Jinping delivered a strong defence of 
globalization and declared China would move towards an open-door policy.540  
 
China is extending its influence in the Pacific Rim region. It is claiming the resource-rich South 
China Sea (Senkaku/Diaoyu island and the Spratly Islands);541 has launched the Chinese-led 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)542  which is intended to displace the American 
backed the World Bank,543 and initiated a rival mega trade deal - the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) which excludes the US (Figure 45).  
 
Figure 45 TPP, ASEAN and RCEP Member States 
 
 
Source: (Chen 2015) As of 2015.  
                                                 
539 China is very successful and creative in terms of the way it retaliates. For example, when the US levied tariffs on 
Chinese-made solar panels between 2012 and 2015, China responded by imposing tariffs on American polysilicon, 
raising the cost of solar equipment and reducing employment opportunities in both nations.  
More details at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/chinese-tariffs-may-hurt-us-makers-of-solar-
cells-raw-material/2013/07/23/01ac60a4-f3d9-11e2-aa2e-4088616498b4_story.html?utm_term=.1419af93717a 
540 (Guardian 2017) 
541 (Hookway and Brereton-Fukui 2013) (Carpenter 2015) (Sanger and Gladstone 2015) 
542 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was established in 2014, and is a multilateral development bank 
(MDB) which focuses on infrastructure and other productive sectors (e.g. energy, transportation, and 
telecommunication etc.) in Asia. As of April 2015, 57 states have signed the Articles (the US and Japan’s did not 
participate). More information on AIIB at http://www.aiib.org/. 
543 (Carpenter 2015) 
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It is difficult to predict what will happen now that the US has pulled out of TPP. Sometime in the 
future TPP and/or RCEP may become a more integrated “mega-regional” trade agreement, a 
Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) (Figure 46).544 This future economic integration 
could deliver major benefits to the business sectors through a simplification of regulations and 
reduced trade diversion.  
 
This possibility was discussed by APEC leaders when they met in Bogor, Indonesia in 1994, and 
reaffirmed at the Yokohama conference in 2010 which issued the “Pathways to FTAAP” 
proposal. 545 546  TPP and RCEP have many overlapping memberships. Progress under these 
agreements will determine possible pathways towards the realization of the FTAAP with all 21 
APEC members.  
 
Figure 46 Three Trans-Pacific Pacts: TPP, RCEP, and FTAAP  
 
 
 
Source: (Tran and Heal 2014) 
                                                 
544 (Murphy 2015) (Tran and Heal 2014) 
545 (Schott, Kotschwar and Muir 2013) p.3. 
546 In 2010, the White House website had a press release on APEC’s announcement on future plans for FTAAP. 
Since 2006, APEC has been conducting a multi-year study on the long-term prospects of an FTAAP, “…We believe 
that an FTAAP should be pursued as a comprehensive free trade agreement by developing and building on ongoing 
regional undertakings, such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, among others.  
White House Office of the Press Secretary. 2010. APEC/Yokohama: Pathways to a Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific. November 13. The White House.  
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3.3.2 Business influence 
 
There are two main criticisms of TPP: that it was negotiated behind closed doors and that it 
served the interests of big business. For example, the composition of the groups involved in US 
trade negotiations suggests that the public may have good reason to worry about the influence of 
special interest groups (Figure 47). Of the 566 individuals working with the Obama 
administration to establish trade policy, 480 or 85% of the total committee members were from 
private industry and trade groups.547  
 
 
Figure 47 Participants in the US trade Advisory Committee 
 
                         
 
Source: (Ingraham and Schneider 2014) 
 
 
One critic of TPP wrote:  
 
TPP was a massive, controversial, pro-corporate “free trade”…It was stopped 
by thousands of diverse organizations representing working people united 
across borders – fighting against corporate power and for the environment, 
health, human right and democracy….TPP text was the result of 500 official 
US trade advisors representing corporate interests involved in years of 
closed—door negotiations while the public, press and Congress were locked 
out. At the heart of TPP were new rights for thousands of corporations to sue 
the US government before a panel of three corporate lawyers that could award 
                                                 
547 (Ingraham and Schneider 2014) 
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unlimited sums, including for loss of future expected profits, to be paid by 
American taxpayers when the corporations claim US policies violated the new 
entitlements TPP would provide them.548 
 
Many private industry groups believe liberalization of trade will lead to further losses of 
manufacturing jobs to low wage nations. The manufacturing, financial services, pharmaceutical 
and agricultural industries are particularly well known for their successful lobbying efforts.  
 
3.3.3 More regulation and restriction burdens 
 
The signatories of TPP represent a diverse array of countries in terms of geography, population, 
economic development and sectoral specialisation. The overriding challenge addressed by TPP is 
the implementation of high standard rules that provide a level playing field for all participants. 
TPP includes provisions on cooperation to help build the capacity of human capital, physical 
infrastructure, investment capital, and other areas. The intent is to ensure that all parties are able 
to meet their commitments under the Agreement and take full advantage of its benefits.549550   
 
TPP explicitly rules out any ‘two-speed’ or ‘special’ and differential (S&D) treatment for 
developing country members.551 Its success therefore depends on “striking the right balance” 
between enforcing a high standard of accord compliance and accommodating developing 
countries with a transitional implementation process.552  Due to TPP’s comprehensive terms, 
some countries (particularly developing countries) will require many political reforms and 
economic investments in order to join TPP.553 Indonesia and the Philippines are examples of 
jurisdictions in which protection of agriculture and industry are extremely strong.554 China is not 
ready at this point to implement and enforce the types of obligation required by TPP. However, it 
might be inferred that China has begun to take steps in this direction. These include removing 
preferential treatment for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and improving corporate 
                                                 
548 (Public Citizen n.d.) 
549 (Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 2015)  
550 (Schott, Kotschwar and Muir 2013) p.8. 
551 (Lim, Elms and Low 2012) p.12. 
552 (Schott, Kotschwar , Muir 2013) p.8.  
553 (Hookway and Brereton-Fukui 2013) 
554 (Hookway and Brereton-Fukui 2013) 
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governance, 555  establishing Free Trade Zones and reducing restrictions on foreign direct 
investment.556 
 
Moreover, the most problematic aspect of TPP is its overly restrictive rules and harmonization of 
regulations. Iain Murray at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, pointed out that these regulatory 
burdens might outweigh the benefits of TPP. 557 As he explains:  
 
Rather than a simple agreement to lower tariffs for mutual benefit, it morphed 
into a massive international regulatory regime over 5,000 pages long. It was 
weighed down by numerous non-trade provisions aimed at appeasing non-trade 
special interests…but these should be considered in separate treaties and have 
no business being part of trade negotiations. Instead, TPP went down the road 
of regulatory harmonization, a good-faith effort to tackle non-tariff barriers to 
trade that became hostage to special interests. Moreover, the complexity of the 
regulations meant that there needed to be an investor-state dispute resolution 
process, whereby companies that had invested in a country on the basis of the 
agreement could sue the country for redress of grievances if the regulations 
weren’t properly applied. The presence of these processes led to accusations 
that TPP was “corporatist” and that it was anti-democratic, putting corporate 
interest above national legislation. 
 
These comments apply not only to TPP, but also to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).558  The purpose of trade agreements should be to promote free trade, not to 
achieve other objectives. 
 
Disadvantages caused by regulatory harmonization 
Non-tariff measures (NTMs) that inhibit trade include product-specific requirements, registration 
and certification requirements, licenses, and quotas and prohibitions. NTMs are used by 
                                                 
555 (Freshfields Bruchhous Deringer) 
556 (Freshfields Bruchhous Deringer) 
557  (Murray 2017) 
558 (Dowd 2017) 
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governments for various reasons. In some cases, they help facilitate trade by promoting inter-
operability, product safety and quality, and environmental stewardship.559560  
 
Lack of compatibility among regulations in various sectors such as transportation and food safety, 
telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, environmental protection, labour markets, and 
professional services add to compliance and enforcement costs for both government and 
industry. 561  For businesses, these higher costs hinder competitiveness and productivity, as 
nontrade barriers and incoherent rules distort the market and complicate the most efficient 
deployment of scarce resources.562 Small and medium enterprises suffer disproportionately.563 
For governments, regulatory divergence also leads to less than optimum outcomes in achieving 
regulatory goals.564   
 
According to a former federal trade official in Canada, and professor at Carlton University, 
Joseph Hart, divergent standards and technical regulations between trading partners in different 
national markets, coupled with the costs of testing and certifying compliance with those 
requirements, can constitute between 2 and 10% of overall production costs.565  
 
For the reasons above, TPP attempts to harmonize regulations has resulted in a document more 
than 5,000 pages long. However, if TPP rules are not consistent with the rules governing other 
trading blocs, the international trading system will be further fragmented. Also, the regulatory 
                                                 
559 (International Trade Centre (ITC)) Understanding Non-Tariff Measures. “Non-tariff measures” (NTMs) are 
mandatory government regulations on imports and exports, excluding tariffs, those influence the price and/or 
quantity of goods being traded. The most detailed informaion on NTMs and their  classification can be found at ITC.  
Lecture 4: Classification of NTMs and POs: Online courses on Non-Tariff Measures. 
http://ntmsurvey.intracen.org/media/Lecture%204%20Classification%20of%20NTMs%20and%20POs%20-
%20Storyline%20output/story.html 
560According to WTO, non-tariff barriers include import licensing, rules for valuation of goods at customs, pre-
shipment inspections, rules of origin ('made in'), and trade related investment measures. (WTO). Non-tariff barriers: 
red tape, etc. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm9_e.htm 
562 OECD defines non-tariff barriers as “all barriers to trade that are not tariffs. Examples of these include 
countervailing and anti-dumping duties, "voluntary" export restraints, subsidies which sustain in operation loss 
making enterprises, technical barriers to trade, and obstacles to the establishment and provision of services”. 
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1837 
561 (Hart 2007) p.7. 
562 (Hart 2007) p.16.  
563 (Lim, Elms and Low 2012)p.9. 
564 (Hart 2007) p.16.  
565 (Hart 2007) p.16. 
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harmonization will increase costs, and harmonized standards will soon become obsolete and 
inefficient.566 As Fran Smith at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, has pointed out:  
 
Often policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic, in reviewing the regulatory 
state’s complexity and lack of uniformity, call for “harmonization” of 
regulations. However, such harmonization can lead to conformity and 
stagnation – resulting in superior alternatives not being explored. Rather, 
policymakers should look to competition among regulatory regimes. This 
“discovery process” is a better way to reduce transaction costs and thus 
increase voluntary wealth creation.567 
 
In other words, since governments only have limited information and are pressured by special 
interest groups, it is preferable for governments to refrain from deciding which standard is 
applied, but instead to let businesses work on better standards and compete with each other. In 
the end, the most efficient and practical regulations will be adopted and modified without 
cumbersome legal processes.  
 
Murray further suggests that regulatory competition works best by mutual recognition where 
each standard is recognized and allowed to be used within the trade agreement block as long as 
those standards produce the same outcomes. Mutual recognition would simplify the regulation 
process, and reduce costs for businesses and government. This point will be elaborated in the 
following section.  
 
In short, TPP has advantages and disadvantages. However, over restriction and regulations in 
many areas result in higher costs, more controversies, less flexibility and less liberalization of 
trade. After the US withdrawal, the impact of TPP is highly uncertain.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
566 (Murray 2017) 
567 (F. Smith 2013) 
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4. Trade Policy and Agreement Options for Britain after Brexit 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In June 2016, U.K. citizens voted to leave the EU effective March 2019. There is no precedent as 
to how withdrawal from the EU should be executed, nor what kind of relationship the EU will 
have with the U.K. thereafter.568 More importantly, what will happen after Brexit is highly 
uncertain.  
 
The Brexit decision was made based on weighing two options: 1) the economic benefits from 
staying as a member of the EU and 2) regaining political sovereignty and freedom from the 
burden of EU regulations.569 Julian Jessop, Chief Economist at the Institute for Economic Affairs 
in the UK, pointed out that the EU’s growing integration has often exacerbated economic and 
social problems rather than alleviating them in many countries.570  He stated that the Brexit 
debate exposed some of the EU’s counterproductive rules, regulations, and other policies.571  
 
Brexit voters sent a clear message that the primary concern of UK policymakers should be to 
promote the interests of UK consumers, not to protect producers in other EU countries.572 New 
trade agreements for Britain are a very important part of Brexit negotiations, both with the EU 
and with other countries. It is quite clear that the existing range of tariffs set by the EU is not 
necessarily aligned with the UK’s national interest. For example, there are high tariffs on food, 
clothes, footwear, and umbrellas (very important for U.K. citizens) which amount to regressive 
taxes and disproportionately affect the poor.573 Such tariffs are also an extremely expensive way 
                                                 
568 (Dhingra and Sampson 2016) The formal procedures for leaving the EU were laid out in Article 50 of 2009 the 
Lisbon Treaty. Britain is the first country to leave the EU. (Hunt and Wheeler 2017) The EU is an economic and 
political partnership involving 28 European countries with a combined population of more than 500 million. It 
functions as a “single market” as if the member states were one country, allowing goods and people to move freely. 
The EU has a parliament and sets rules and regulations in a wide range of areas including the environment, 
transportation, consumer rights, and even mobile phone charges. In 2015, the EU’s budget was 145 billion euros, 
contributed by member countries. More detailed history and how the EU works, please refer to “What is the EU and 
how does it work” at http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zgjwtyc.  
569 (BBC News 2017) 
570 (Jessop 2017) 
571 (Jessop 2017) 
572 (Dowd 2017) 
573 (Dowd 2017) p.17.  
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to protect jobs, and destroy jobs in non-protected domestic industries, as well as jobs in 
developing countries.574  
 
4.2 Trade Agreement Options  
One particular concern for the UK is retaining access to the EU market. According to 
international treaty law, when a country secedes or disengages from a broader union, there is a 
presumption that their relationship will remain the same unless explicitly changed.575 Thus, when 
Brexit happens, there is a presumption that its trade and treaty relationships with all other entities, 
including the EU, will continue to be the same. In other words, in the short term, the UK does 
not have to agree to any post-Brexit trade treaty with the EU.576   
 
At this point, there are a number of possible options for trade agreements for Britain (Table 8):  
 
Table 8 Brexit Trade Agreement Options with the EU  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: by Author                                                                                * = Common Agricultural Policy 
 
 
 
                                                 
574 (Dowd 2017) pp.16-17. According to this article, in 2016 there was more than 12,000 import tariffs in the EU 
which created an “external tariff wall”, preventing consumers from buying goods at world prices.  
575 (Dowd 2017) P.24. 
576 (Dowd 2017) pp.24-25. 
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The first option is to adopt the trade policies of non-EU countries such as Norway and 
Switzerland. ‘Doing a Norway’ model and joining the European Economic Area (EEA), or 
‘doing a Switzerland’ model and negotiating bilateral deals with the EU would link the UK to the 
EU, but membership comes with a cost. This cost is not much less than being a member of the 
EU, but Britain would no longer have political representation in the EU policy making 
process.577 The UK would also have to comply with many EU regulations and directives, an idea 
that was rejected by many UK voters who supported Brexit. These options are unlikely to be 
chosen by either the UK or the EU. 
 
Another alternative is “going it alone as a member of the World Trade Organization”.578 This 
would give the UK more sovereignty without a long and complicated negotiation process. WTO 
governs trade with the EU and with almost all other counties in the world. WTO members have 
access to each other’s markets with very low ‘most favored nation’ (MFN) tariffs.579 According 
to the World Bank, the average tariff charged on imports by the EU is only 1.6%.580 Of course, 
Britain is better off by striking a mutual UK-EU free trade with zero tariffs and free trade in 
services. However, if Britain fails to reach an FTA with the EU, a number of economists have 
argued that the best strategy is to walk away: ‘No deal’ is better than a ‘bad deal’, since WTO 
fall back option can be executed unilaterally and involves fairly low tariffs.581  
 
4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages Under WTO Default Option 
Advantages:  
 
 The UK would achieve more sovereignty and would no longer have to pay membership fees 
to support a bloated EU bureaucracy. 
                                                 
577 (Dhingra and Sampson 2016) pp.4-6. 
578 (Dhingra and Sampson 2016) pp.7-8.  
579 (Dhingra and Sampson 2016) p.7. Under WTO rules, each member must grant the same ‘most favoured nation’ 
(MFN) market access, including charging the same tariffs, to all other WTO members. The only exceptions to this 
principle are that countries can choose to enter into free trade agreements such as the EU or EFTA and those who 
choose to give preferential market access to developing countries. According to WTO website, the number of 
members nations as of July 2016 was 164. (https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm) 
580 (World Bank 2017a)  
581 (Dhingra and Sampson 2016) In this paper, they point out that there are other drawbacks to this option. For 
example, WTO does not cover some important areas including financial services and labor mobility, and its 
coverage is far less progressive than EU/UK’s standards for trade in services. Essentially, this means that UK 
service producers would have a limited access to the EU market. (pp. 9-10).  
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 This option can be achieved unilaterally. There is no need for protracted trade agreement 
negotiations. Uncertainty about changes in rules makes it difficult for businesses to operate. 
A quick reset is better than a long period of uncertainty. 
 WTO has already negotiated low tariff rates and, under WTO rules, the EU is not allowed to 
change the structure of tariff rates for the UK without doing the same thing for other 
countries, something it is unlikely to do. 
 The UK would no longer have to comply with the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. 
 The UK would no longer be subject to onerous EU regulations, which add a significant cost 
to businesses with respect to compliance. 
 The UK would be an independent player in trade negotiations582 and could opt to seek closer 
integration with countries outside Europe including the US, India, China and the Middle East. 
Inward investment and ripple effects on the UK economy could be phenomenal.583 The UK 
could seek trade agreements tailored specifically to the interests of its own businesses and 
consumers.  
 Close proximity to the EU and a long history of trade with the that entity works in Britain’s 
favour. Despite reductions in transportation costs, international trade and investment still fall 
substantially with distance,584 while historical relationships play an important role in shaping 
the direction of international trade.585  
 
Disadvantages:   
 
 Change is always disruptive. There will be winners and losers when the rules change. 
                                                 
582 (Dhingra and Sampson 2016) 
583 (Dowd 2017) p.21.  
584 (Dhingra and Sampson 2016) 
585 (Eichengreen and Irwin 1998) p. 55. 
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 Although able to negotiate its own trade deals independent of the EU, the UK would be a 
smaller entity and therefore have less bargaining power.586 However, if Britain proposes 
unilateral free trade in these negotiations, that deficiency disappears. 
 A low tariff versus no tariff would still have a negative effect on British export volume to the 
EU. Although the average tariff in the EU is 1.6%, it varies by sector. For example, the tariff 
on manufactured goods is between 3 and 5%. Any reduction in overall exports to the EU 
should be relatively small, but it would have a different effect on different sectors. If 
relationships between UK and EU firms are well-established and profitable, the cost of 
switching to new suppliers may not be worthwhile. However, the imposition of a tariff will 
put pressure on UK suppliers to lower their prices to absorb the increased cost.  
 WTO option does not provide free trade in services. Economists differ on the potential 
impact of this. Patrick Minford of Cardiff University, and Edgar Miller at Cass Business 
School (City of London College), 587  argue that insurance and asset management are 
reasonably immune from this change, with only about 9% of the City of London’s total 
revenue at risk. However, others, such as Ingo Borchert at University of Sussex, are less 
optimistic and suggest it is important to negotiate a new services agreement to maintain the 
UK’s position as a net exporter of services to the EU.588  
 If the UK is no longer subject to Harmonization of Rules, it may eventually diverge from EU 
rules, which will potentially increase transaction costs for businesses. 
 Once it is no longer part of a common market, the UK will be subject to the EU Rules of 
Origin (ROO) requirement. Given the increasing complexity of supply chains, this will add 
huge costs for UK businesses dealing with EU partners. 
 
Net Benefits and Tit for Tat 
Economic predictions are always problematic given the number of unforseen events that can 
affect future outcomes. However, it is interesting to look at a recent study of the net benefits of 
                                                 
586 (Dhingra and Sampson 2016) p.12.  
587 (Minford and Miller 2017) 
588 (Borchert 2016) 
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WTO option provided by Minford and Miller, based on the macro-models of the Cardiff 
University Macroeconomics Research Group.589 It suggests that British consumer prices would 
fall about 8% and food prices would fall about 20%. Consumer price declines would be derived 
from eliminating EU tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers on imports from non-EU countries. GDP 
would increase by about 4% compared to the level it would achieve if Britain remained in the 
Single Market. In addition, there would be more gains from avoiding contributions to the EU 
budget (about €10 billion per year) and savings on compliance and administration costs of some 
€3 billion per year to enforce over 12,000 EU import tariffs.590 They conclude that the EU, the 
largest merchandise and commercial services market, would remain Britain’s biggest trade 
partner.  
 
Minford and Miller specifically counsel against engaging in ‘tit for tat’ (raising tariffs in 
response to actions by the EU) in any future negotiations with the EU. Going back to the 
arguments first enunciated by Cobden and Bright leading up to the Repeal of the Corn Laws in 
1846, they argue that tariffs cause self-harm because they reduce gains from free trade to the 
consumer and disrupt global supply chains. 
 
4.4 Mutual Recognition Agreements 
If Britain’s primary goal for new trade agreements is to benefit the consumer and maximize trade 
for its businesses, it should pursue trade agreements that guarantee free movement of goods, and 
services as much as possible.591 Such a strategy would be simple, involve few regulations, and 
could be implemented unilaterally (i.e. without any negotiations). 
 
One option that has already been tested, is the use of ‘mutual recognition agreements’ that 
acknowledge differences between different countries’ regulatory systems and bridge the gaps in 
regulatory standards, rather than attempting to harmonize them. 592  Mutual recognition 
arrangements work well among developed countries where regulations and standards are high 
and legal systems function well. However, they do not work as well with developing countries 
                                                 
589 (Minford and Miller 2017) 
590 (Dowd 2017) p.16. (Minford and Miller 2017) p. 2.  
591 (Dowd 2017) p. 31. 
592 (Dowd 2017) p. 31. (Freund and Oliver 2015) 
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where prevailing standards and legal systems fall below those of developed countries. Given that 
Britain has already harmonized its standards with the rest of the EU, it could move to this model 
immediately, while but at the same time, given itself some freedom to implement slightly 
different rules in the future. The key here would be to maintain enough similarity to enhance the 
flow of trade.  
  
One example of a successful mutual recognition agreement is the Australia-New Zealand single 
economic market, based on the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement which took effect 
in 1998.593  This agreement applies to the sale of goods and the registration of occupations 
between Australia and New Zealand. It states: 
 
 A good that may legally be sold in Australia may be sold in New Zealand, and a good that 
may be legally sold in New Zealand may be sold in Australia. This is regardless of 
differences in standards or other sale-related regulatory requirements in Australia or New 
Zealand. 
 
 A person registered to practice an occupation in Australia is entitled to practice an equivalent 
occupation in New Zealand, and vice versa, without the need for further testing or 
examination.594 
 
This agreement creates a seamless market without complicated negotiations. Benefits include:595  
 
 Lower business costs. 
 Enhanced efficiency resulting from manufacturing to one standard. 
 Greater consumer choice. 
 Greater cooperation between regulatory authorities. 
 Greater discipline among regulators: discourages the introduction of new standards, 
regulations and occupational registration requirements. This makes a huge difference 
                                                 
593 (Dowd 2017) p. 31. (Australia Government, Department of Education and Training 2017)  
594 (Australia Government, Department of Education and Training 2017)  
595 (New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and& Employment 2017) 
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compared to regulatory harmonisation (as in TPP and TTIP which involve thousands of 
pages of broad area coverage). 596   
 
Another example of the benefits of mutual recognition comes from a 2015 study by Freund and 
Oliver at the Peterson Institute. It looks at the expected effects of  mutual recognition of auto 
safety regulations between the US and the EU in TTIP.597 Currently, without mutual recognition, 
companies must produce two versions of the same model for the two different markets. For 
example, Audi produces one version of the A7 for the US market to meet US regulations and a 
different model for Europe to meet European regulations. This raises production costs, reduces 
the available varieties, and encourages price discrimination by producers.598   
 
Since there is no significant difference between the safety outcome in European countries versus 
those of the US, mutual recognition of safety standards for automobiles is a realistic policy 
proposal. Benefits include minimal adjustment to current systems and no requirement for one 
standard to change (harmonize) due to the safetly certification legislation in the other jurisdiction. 
Freund and Oliver estimate that implementing mutual recognition in TTIP would mutually boost 
automobile exports by at least 20%.  
 
Mutual recognition seems to offer a better alternative to regulatory harmonization. It reduces the 
complicated negotiation process, reduces transaction costs, improves efficiency, encourages 
innovation, and benefits consumers in the form of lower prices and greater choice. As long as 
each country’s regulations and standards are high and have similar outcomes, mutual recognition 
should be sought in trade agreements. Britan could definitely use this option with both the EU 
and the US to expedite trade negotiations, to the benefit of all. 
 
4.5 Other Implications 
A ‘consumer first’, free trade policy would send the message that the UK is ‘open for business’. 
Britain could take the opportunity presented by Brexit to once again become a world leader in 
global free trade: open to the free movement of goods, services, capital and investment, and 
                                                 
596 (Murray 2017) 
597 (Freund and Oliver 2015) 
598 (Freund and Oliver 2015) 
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providing strong property rights and a transparent legal framework to make it work. Brexit voters 
gave their government a mandate to put national consumer interests ahead of EU regulations and 
narrow sectoral interests. Brexit offers Britain the freedom to have an alliance with many, instead 
of remaining within the EU fortress. It could bring the UK many new opportunities and 
sustainable economic growth over the long term. Moreover, this decision could benefit not only 
UK consumers but also people in other nations, particularly those in developing countries.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The high point in US protectionist trade policies and the low point in US trade was reached after 
the implementation of the Smoot Hawley Act in 1930. The results were disastrous. This sharp 
increase in tariffs was rescinded four years later after much damage had been done to the global 
economy. Since that time, there has been an increase in trade liberalization by GATT and WTO, 
significantly reducing the average international tariff from 40% in 1947 to about 2.7% among 
member countries by 2014.  
In the last fifteen years, trade agreements have become more restrictive as a result of 
incorporating an increasing number of ‘non-trade measures’ (NTMs) into their terms. ‘Managed 
trade’ represents a growing and alarming trend in efforts that are supposed to be seeking trade 
liberalization. It usually prevents realization of this objective and hence is very costly for 
consumers. NTMs can be used by powerful countries to protect their industries from ‘unfair’ 
competition. Rather than promoting innovation, managed trade becomes a means of protecting 
inefficient industries. President Trump has specifically talked about renegotiating ‘bad’ trade 
agreements in order to level the playing field to protect American jobs. Developing countries are 
particular vulnerable to such tactics.  
Obstacles to trade other than tariffs599 have received a great deal of attention in recent trade 
negotiations. If such barriers are reduced, they facilitate trade, but often they accomplish the 
opposite.  
 
Trade agreements, in general, have a number of weaknesses:   
                                                 
599 e.g. customs procedures and phytosanitary requirements. 
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1. They take a great deal of time to negotiate (providing employment for negotiators and 
associated government officials) because of the difficulty of reaching a consensus 
among parties. They get mired in difficult issues like trade in agricultural products 
(e.g. the Doha Round) and non-tariff barriers. As the negotiation process drags on, the 
world economy continues to evolve so any agreement is obsolete by the time it is 
signed.  
2. Trade agreements are sensitive to the incumbent government's policy, as is starkly 
demonstrated by President Trump’s abrupt withdrawal from TPP. Trade negotiations 
are used as tools to further domestic policy agendas.  
3. Politicians have much shorter time horizons and different criteria for success than 
consumers or businesses. Therefore, trade policy may maximize neither consumer 
welfare nor business efficiency. Government officials often promote their own 
interests by securing favors for special-interest groups at the expense of the general 
public. Special interest groups include not just business but also labor organizations, 
‘under-employed intellectuals’ and well meaning, but often ill-informed consumers. 
4. Changes in trade policies create winners and losers: they tend to be biased in favor of 
producers over consumers and often benefit one business sector over another.  
5. Trade agreements are designed without precise foreknowledge of how a policy will 
perform when subject to the future interaction of complex market forces which are 
unknowable at the time negotiations are underway.  
6. By including non-trade items like environmental and labor conditions, they create 
barriers to trade, particularly for developing countries. 
 
Politicians are heavily influenced by special interest groups. Businesses, such as international 
pharmaceutical companies, have exerted influence to make patent regulations a requirement in 
recent trade agreements. Major aerospace companies have all received government subsidies, 
contrary to WTO rules, but are nonetheless quick to claim that their competitors are violating the 
rules when they do the same. Any increase in prices is ultimately passed on to the consumer, 
who is likely unaware of the role such actions play in the price her or she pays.  
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Protectionist measures ignore the importance of international supply chains to all the 
participating countries. They reduce the competitiveness of businesses, ensure higher prices for 
consumers, and encourage firms to either establish new supply chains in countries like China or 
to invest in more automation to reduce the cost of their domestic wage bill. Protectionism also 
underestimates the likely retaliation from trading partners, and raise “the specter of a global trade 
war, crimping the free-flow of goods and services, and dragging on productivity, corporate 
profitability and consumer demand”, according to a report reflecting the perspectives and global 
expertise of macroeconomists, market strategists and key sector analysts at Morgan Stanley.600 
China has already shown that it will implement ‘tit for tat’ responses to American restrictions.  
President Trump is the first protectionist president in the US since Herbert Hoover and is at odds 
with the traditional pro-trade stance favoured by the Republican Party. His threat to tear up 
existing trade deals and to implement more mercantilist measures is unlikely to achieve any of 
his stated objectives.  
 
Britain is in the process of reviewing its trade policies as it prepares to leave the EU. The EU 
appears to be digging in its heels in preliminary negotiations. Given the fallback option of WTO 
tariff regime, Britain should not resort to a ‘tit for tat’ response if the EU refuses to remove tariff 
barriers. It would be better off pursuing a unilateral tariff free policy. As the 19th century French 
economist Frédéric Bastiat stated: "It makes no more sense to be protectionist because other 
countries have tariffs than it would to block up our harbours because other countries have rocky 
coasts”.  
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
 
1. Thesis Findings 
 
Humanity has always lived in groups in order to survive. Over time, people have traded with 
each other in order to take advantage of each other’s expertise. One rarely thinks about the 
benefits of specialization and trade: from getting a haircut or being able to buy an inexpensive T-
shirt, to having a special cancer treatment in the US because there are excellent specialists who 
devote their time to the study and practice of medicine (rather than growing their own food to 
survive).  
 
Donald J. Boudreaux, an American economist at George Mason University, defines globalization 
as “the advance of human cooperation across national boundaries”. 601  Technical change in 
general, and advances in transportation and telecommunication technology in particular, create 
the potential for specialization and trade on a global scale. This potential is unlocked when 
companies develop global supply chains over increasingly long distances in order to provide 
superior products to consumers at a reasonable price.  
 
In the case of food, technological progress in such things as shipping, refrigeration and food 
processing has allowed the majority of the world’s population access to a broader variety of food. 
Those in the northern hemisphere are now able to get a regular supply of Vitamin C in winter 
from Spanish oranges or potassium from bananas imported from Central America. Society is 
now more immune to drought and famine because food can be traded among many partners 
worldwide.  
 
The case of Apple Inc. in Chapter 2, is a prime example of how global supply chains have 
contributed considerably to mass produce sophisticated electronic devices. We get pleasure and 
utility from the world’s technological expertise embodied in the iPhone, and more people are 
able to afford this technical marvel because the rise of these supply chains has driven down costs. 
Components of iPhones and many other products now cross various international borders before 
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being assembled into final products and shipped to consumers in markets around the world. The 
success of Apple is evident by its share price and high profit margins.  
 
This study suggests that consumers do not capture the full benefits of international trade because 
of an ‘unholy alliance’ between businesses and national governments limits competition. 
Consumers unwittingly facilitate this conspiracy against their own best interests because they are 
prone to what Caplan labels an ‘anti-market bias’: they support government intervention which 
they (mistakenly) believe will protect them from the negative social consequences of ‘unbridled 
laissez-faire capitalism’. This mandate for intervention enables governments to use trade 
negotiations to manage trade rather than pursuing the free trade which would maximize benefits 
for their citizenry. NAFTA and TPP are prime examples of ‘managed trade” agreements, and 
have been heavily influenced by political considerations.  
 
The process of managing trade at a global scale began with GATT. Dani Rodrik of Harvard 
pointed out that, “GATT’s purpose was never to maximise free trade. It was to achieve the 
maximum amount of trade compatible with different nations doing their own thing. In that 
respect, the institution proved spectacularly successful”.602 The collapse of the Doha round of 
WTO negotiations led to attempts to manage trade at the regional scale. As shown in Chapter 4, 
the amount of time devoted to non-trade measures in the protracted negotiation of TPP serves to 
emphasize that ‘free trade’ is not the prime objective.  
 
When the objective of trade negotiations is managed trade rather than free trade, governments 
extract concessions from weaker partners in order to achieve geo-political objectives. Businesses 
also exert influence in order to avoid exposure to the competition they would face under free 
trade. Many companies benefit from the protection given to brands when intellectual property 
rights are among the conditions imposed by the more powerful parties to trade negotiations. For 
example, Boeing clearly benefits from free trade in the components it uses to assemble its 
aircraft, and from the subsidies it extracts from the US government. These subsidies have been 
challenged by its major competitor Airbus of France, under WTO rules. Apple Inc. also 
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benefitted from import restrictions imposed by the US government on Chinese brand name smart 
phones due to cybersecurity concerns.  
 
Ever since trade extended beyond our immediate surroundings, it has been under assault. 
Manufacturers have jealously protected their markets from outsiders through organizations such 
as guilds which first made their appearance during the Roman Empire. Governments have seen 
trade as a key source of revenue and a tool used in pursuit of foreign policy objectives.  
 
People have always feared changes as well as who are different from themselves (Caplan’s ‘anti-
foreigner bias’). The food miles lobby takes this bias to extreme levels, implying that any 
foodstuff that has passed through the hands of foreigners may be sub-standard. Failure or 
discontent are frequently blamed on outside forces, to avoid facing up to the real underlying 
causes and the associated responsibility. Despite all the evidence showing the benefits of trade, 
politicians like Trump play on these fears and invoke global trade as a bogeyman to further their 
own political ambitions.603 
 
Over the last 250 years, the world has under gone a rapid period of transformation. We have both 
embraced technical change and railed against it. In the early 1800s, the Luddites smashed 
machines because they feared that their jobs would disappear as the result of new inventions. 
This was an early example of Caplan’s ‘make work bias’ in action. Today, workers demand 
legislation to protect their jobs. These jobs are disappearing because of a combination of 
technological progress and lower labor cost in other jurisdictions. Many economists believe that 
the former is of much significance. To cite an example mentioned earlier, no protectionist policy 
could have saved the horse drawn buggy from being replaced by the automobile. The fact that 
trade often destroys low-skilled jobs while at the same time creating high-skilled, high-paying 
jobs in new industries, it’s too often overlooked.  
 
Schumpeter’s insights into how the process of creative destruction leads to higher living 
standards and how government intervention in the economy impedes the process of technical 
change are an essential framework for this analysis. Businesses are constantly disappearing at the 
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same time new ones are being created. The very really pain felt by displaced workers has led to 
rising discontent and fueled political movements in America, Europe and elsewhere. Politicians 
like US President Trump are quick to capitalize on this discontent. They misdiagnose (often 
deliberately) complex issues and offer simple solutions to placate their supporters. Because the 
period between elections is so short, politicians favour short term fixes, often with a ‘make work’ 
bias, that benefit certain segments of society at the expense of the community as a whole. As 
Bastiat pointed out, the public sees only the short term ‘benefits’ of these initiatives and not the 
huge but widely dispersed burden on the taxpayer. 
 
Schumpeter emphasized that development, which maximizes the ‘wealth of individuals’, would 
occur when technological change was driven by markets. Under such circumstances, ‘normal’ 
recessions would continuously reallocate resources from obsolete industries (such as horse 
drawn buggies), to the production and delivery of goods and services that are in demand, like 
automobiles. The resultant productivity improvements enhance the well-being of the public by 
the higher wages (and hence purchasing power) and lower prices. In the 21st century, 
international trade promotes more innovation and technical changes.  
 
This discussion of trade policy in the era of Trumponomics and Brexit provides a good 
illustration of Schumpeter’s contention that recessions which are not ‘normal’ result when 
government interferes with the economic process. The sudden appearance of China in the global 
market as a potential exporter is a good illustration. The liberalization of trade under the auspices 
of GATT and WTO occurred mostly without the participation of China which joined WTO in 
2001. Trade with China was not free before it joined WTO, nor was it free afterward. What did 
change was a sharp reduction in uncertainty over the businesses environment in China. By 
joining WTO, China signalled that its companies would adhere to WTO rules and conventions. 
American companies flocked to do business in China as a result. The subsequent influx of 
Chinese products to the American market raised consumer welfare significantly, but it also 
accelerated the ‘creative destruction’ process. Low skilled US jobs disappeared rapidly in some 
manufacturing sectors such as textiles. 
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This precipitated a classic Schumpeterian crisis in some US states which suffered the 
concentrated impact of sudden job-losses. These job losses exacerbated the underlying ‘anti-
foreign-bias’, and President Trump pandered to those biases with his ‘Make America Great 
Again’ rhetoric. Similar shocks have accompanied previous changes in the rules governing trade. 
The imposition of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs by the United States in response to the Depression 
of the 1930s had worldwide repercussions. When Britain entered the European Community, 
many of its traditional suppliers of agricultural commodities were disadvantaged by protective 
EU policies. 
 
This study anticipates that President Trump will take steps to implement more protectionist 
policies, which will only harm the people he claims he is trying to help. In the medium to long 
term, protected businesses insulated from the world market competition become progressively 
weaker and are not sustainable. Some jobs are saved by taxpayers at considerable cost, but these 
costs are usually well hidden. It is not uncommon for these jobs to disappear eventually because 
the businesses involved are uncompetitive or obsolete. Faced with higher employment costs than 
offshore competitors, protected businesses will use every opportunity to reduce their wage bill 
through increased automation, again leading to a reduction in jobs. In addition, using the spectre 
of lost jobs these protected businesses use the fear of transferring jobs to China or Mexico to 
extract wage concessions from their workers.  
 
Tariffs increase not only the price of final goods but also the price of intermediate goods. Even if 
it were morally and economically advantageous for the US to embrace protectionism, it is almost 
certainly impossible for it do so. Prominent US manufacturers have become integral links in a 
highly complex global value chain that involves producers on multiple continents. Over 50% of 
all imports to the US are inputs and capital goods consumed by American businesses to make 
globally competitive products. Multiple businesses all over the world cooperate to produce a 
single product and that connectivity cannot be disrupted without impairing the competitiveness 
of those involved and the global economy as a whole. 
 
Goods such as the smartphones discussed in Chapter 2, are the product of co-operation (parts, 
labor, ideas) with many countries. Raising these firms’ costs via tariffs would make them less 
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competitive and would lead to fewer jobs. They might even go out of business. It would also 
affect downstream industries (e.g., steel users), which typically employ far more workers than 
their upstream counterparts (e.g., steelmakers).  
 
According to industry sources and trade experts, US President Donald Trump is expected to 
impose steel import tariffs on national security grounds. The administration has been all talk and 
no action so far. The price of steel in the US is already well above that of other countries. If 
tariffs are imposed on prevailing (and lower) world priced steel, many American steel consuming 
businesses will suffer and become even less competitive. Since half of America’s imports are 
used as inputs by manufacturers, it isn’t surprising that many companies consider these duties 
unfair.  
 
It is not only manufacturers who benefit from international co-operation. Various businesses 
from retailers like Walmart and the Gap to transportation and logistics companies such as FedEx 
benefit too. While multinational firms like Apple assemble iPhones in China, it is important to 
note that they also generate most of their profits in the US through marketing, design, and 
researching. American exporters, like Boeing and Caterpillar, also gain from trade, and trade 
agreements which create a larger market to help such firms take advantage of economies of scale.  
 
When a government interferes to change trade rules, it creates winners and losers. This is why 
lobbying is a multi-billion-dollar industry. Contrary to popular opinion, some businesses do want 
more regulations, and are willing to spend a great deal of time and money to ensure that the rules 
work in their favour while disadvantaging potential competitors.  
 
When the government tries to protect business interests, no attempt is made to balance the 
interests of taxpayers and consumers: these are left to fend for themselves. This may not be a 
significant burden for well to do people in developed countries. They might pay a bit more at the 
supermarket or adjust their shopping preferences. But, many daily necessities, including apparel 
and shoes, are subject to higher tariffs than are luxury goods. These tariffs lead to higher prices 
for consumers and place a disproportionate financial burden on the poor.  
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Concern for the environment is laudable but often solutions are misguided and influenced by 
special interest groups and businesses with ulterior motives. They use naïve consumers and 
‘under-employed intellectuals’ to support their objectives. For example, they use arguments 
about protecting the environment to discourage the purchase of imported products like palm oil. 
Well-meaning consumers will ignore the plight of small farmers in Malaysia, while at the same 
time singing the praises of family farms in their own country.  
 
There is overwhelming empirical evidence (the Kuznets Curve) that shows that beyond a certain 
point in economic development (about $5,000 per capita GDP per year), environmental damage 
is no longer tolerated and environmental indicators begin to improve. In other words, for less 
developed countries, the path to environmental protection depends on economic growth. 
Insisting on higher environmental standards in trade agreements in less developed countries may 
actually prevent the improvement in environmental standards they claim to encourage. If, as 
described in Chapter 3, palm oil farmers turn to illegal logging because they are prevented from 
earning a living from farming, abuse of the physical environment may be exacerbated. Given the 
choice, individuals will always choose a sustainable practice over an unsustainable one if they 
have to live with the consequences. Free trade promotes economic growth and thus creates the 
wealth necessary to support land conservation and a cleaner environment. 
 
Non-tariff barriers are hard to quantify and assess, but they are becoming more common in trade 
agreements as traditional tariff protection declines. Newer agreements such as TPP are ‘more 
comprehensive’ in terms of non-trade related issues. This is often portrayed as a positive 
development. However, items like increased protection for intellectual property may be used to 
tilt regulations to protect special interest groups and businesses in developed countries. TPP, 
with its thousands of pages of regulations, may have gone too far. In addition, it has still not 
sorted out some contentious agricultural issues. 
 
This thesis contends that protectionism doesn’t achieve its intended objectives. The major 
beneficiaries of trade restrictions are incompetent firms and special interest groups that lobby for 
protection against foreign competition. Protectionism makes countries economically weaker. A 
study comparing income growth across over 70 countries during a 30-year period, found strong 
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evidence that countries that have abandoned protectionism in favour of freer trade experienced 
higher income levels and income growth.604  
 
US trade policy forms a key part of ‘Trumponomics’. On his campaign web site, Trump 
promised to "negotiate fair trade deals that create American jobs, increase American wages, and 
reduce America's trade deficit”. An American economics writer Jeffery Tucker criticized these 
policies as explicitly protectionist and nationalistic fascism that are “railing against free trade, 
fostering paranoid immigration fears, and blaming other nations of unfair dealings with the US 
and promise better, harder, tougher management of the nation from the centre under a Great 
Man”.605  
 
Trump's threat to erect more trade barriers is likely to lead to retaliation. If the United States 
closes its borders, other countries will do the same. The US tried this tactic in the 1930s with the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and it plunged the country even further into recession. In this new 
round of protectionism, China is likely to be its main target. The latter has already shown that it 
will retaliate. 
 
Although free trade creates both winners and losers, the benefits of freer international trade 
continue to be greater than the drawbacks. While the open market may be imperfect, it provides 
better outcomes for ordinary people than a restricted alternative. As the world’s largest importer 
and the second largest exporter, the United States will be badly affected by protectionism. 
Trump’s proposed course of action will not “Make America Great Again”. 
 
When faced with trade barriers, in the medium to long run, countries would be best served by 
dismantling them not retaliating by raising barriers of their own. Trade agreements can be a way 
to liberalize trade by eliminating tariffs and other non-tariff barriers. However, as shown in 
Chapter 4, there is a tendency towards managing trade by increasingly imposing non-tariff 
measures.  
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The mutual recognition trade agreement between New Zealand and Australia is an interesting 
case which shows that freer trade can be realised without long and complicated negotiations. 
Both Australia and New Zealand have traditionally depended heavily on trade. In 1998, Australia 
and New Zealand agreed to liberalize bi-lateral trade in goods and services. There was also a 
provision, whereby qualified professionals in either jurisdiction were permitted to practise in the 
other country without their qualifications been evaluated against that country’s requirements. 
This principle of mutual recognition accepts the standards adopted in a particular country (e.g. 
for environment protection, labour laws, and professional qualifications) as appropriate, and does 
not attempt to harmonize standards among the countries entering into a trade agreement. Mutual 
recognition agreements are thus a step toward freer trade, whereas attempts to impose 
harmonization in negotiations such as TPP discriminate against nations where lower standards 
prevail.  
 
Following the Brexit vote, Britain now faces decisions about its trade relations following its exit 
from the EU. Those negotiating on behalf of Britain are getting advice from all sides about 
which strategy should be adopted. One of the main recommendations is that Britain should not 
negotiate a punitive post-divorce agreement with the EU, but invoke the right to trade with EU 
members under the most-favoured nation provisions of WTO. This can be done unilaterally, and 
WTO rules prevent the EU from raising tariffs on UK products above the minimums specified. 
Britain could then go one step further by unilaterally adopting free trade once again, just as it did 
in the middle of the 19th century. Canada, too, may consider this option if the re-negotiation of 
NAFTA requires unacceptable concessions.  
 
Support for Brexit came from those keen to eliminate the costly EU bureaucracy and the (over) 
regulation it generates and implements, as well as from those who have been adversely affected 
by the single market. This poses the usual dilemma for the negotiators: liberalize trade or protect 
ailing industries.  
 
The material presented in this thesis supports opting for further liberalisation of trade between 
Britain and both EU and non-EU countries. Brexit will change international trade rules and offer 
more opportunities for businesses. Ultimately, consumers will be the main beneficiaries.   
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2. Policy Recommendations 
 
Firstly, provide education to help consumers, voters and politicians understand the considerable 
benefits that flow from free trade. How do tariffs increase everyday consumer costs? How do 
global supply chains contribute to the success of domestic industries? Many people have no idea 
how these issues affect their own lives. Likewise, many politicians fail to understand these 
matters. Their policy making suffers from misguided and biased ideas. In order to make 
informed decisions, we need to understand the ‘unseen’ as well as the ‘seen’.606   
 
Secondly, strengthen WTO’s dispute mechanism. As discussed in Chapter 4, there is a tendency 
towards managing trade by imposing non-tariff measures. The US and the EU in particular use 
these measures to discriminate against other nations' products. WTO, in its role as a mediator, is 
a significant counterbalance to unreasonable protectionism. 
 
Thirdly, simplify trade agreements. Focus on measures that increase free movement of goods, 
services and capital. Remove as many non-trade measures as possible. Use consumer welfare as 
the most important yardstick of success.  
 
Finally, give serious consideration to unilateral free trade policies. If negotiations break down 
due to unreasonable demands, no deal is better than a bad deal. Unilateral policies require no 
negotiations and avoid the “spaghetti bowl” situation. They unify the global market, reduce 
compliance and other regulation-related costs, and encourage business everywhere to operate 
efficiently.  
 
3. Opportunities for Further Research 
 
This study suggests several opportunities for further research. Firstly, investigate the impact that 
technological innovation has had on trade. For example, shipping containers and the invention of 
diesel power and jet engines were among the most important developments of the 20th century. 
The Internet and information technology may be the game changers during the 21st century. 
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Determine the economic effects of technological changes on trade, and investigate to what extent 
technological evolution is upending old business practices.  
Secondly, track the development of trade policy in the UK in the wake of Brexit. Will the UK 
pursue free trade or not? Trumponomics should be similarly assessed. Will it strengthen the US 
economy and raise living standards? A comparative study of the US and UK trade policies and 
their effects may reveal interesting results. Examining how these economies change as a result of 
upcoming choices will no doubt be a fruitful source of future case studies.  
 
Thirdly, explore the relationship between globalization and inequality. Globalization and trade 
have been blamed for creating income inequality within and between nations. Dani Rodrik of 
Harvard, Branco Milanovic of the World Bank, Paul Krugman (the 2008 Nobel Memorial Prize 
winner in Economics), and David Autor of MIT all focus on the negative effects of globalization. 
On other hand, Jadish Bhagwati of Columbia and Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics argue that globalization brings considerable benefits. 
 
Global trade is a complex matter with multiple dimensions. When academics and specialists 
analyze it from their own narrow perspective, they frequently miss the big picture. 
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